Dilemmas and compromises: fiscal equalization in transition countries by Slukhai, Sergii

DILEMMAS AND COMPROMISES:
FISCAL EQUALIZATION 
IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES
EDITED BY SERGII SLUKHAI
Local Government
and Public Service 
Reform Initiative
LGI
Fellowship
Series
OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE
OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE REFORM INITIATIVE
Address
Nádor utca 11
H-1051 Budapest, Hungary
Mailing Address
P.O. Box 519
H-1357 Budapest, Hungary
Telephone
 (36-1) 327-3100
Fax
(36-1) 327-3105
E-mail
lgprog@osi.hu
Web Site
http://lgi.osi.hu/
First published in 2003
by Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute–Budapest
© OSI/LGI, 2003
ISSN: 1586 4499
ISBN: 963 9419 73 7
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form 
or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, 
including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, 
without permission in writing from the publishers.
Copies of the book can be ordered by e-mail or post from OSI.
Copyeditor: John Kowalzyk
Printed in Budapest, Hungary, September 2003.
Design & Layout by Createch Ltd.
All rights reserved. TM and Copyright © 2003 Open Society Institute
5Contents
Preface...................................................................................................................................9
Sergii Slukhai
Fiscal Equalization in Transition Countries: Searching for the Right Policy .........................11
 1. Introduction.......................................................................................13
 2. Setting up a Problem..........................................................................15
 3. Trends in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations......................................18
 4. Vertical and Horizontal Imbalances and Need for Equalization ..........22
 5. Evolution of Equalization Instruments ...............................................26
 6. Agenda for Reforming the Equalization Policy: 
  Using Lessons from the Experience of Other Countries......................28
 References ................................................................................................31
 Endnotes ..................................................................................................32
Sorin Ionită
Halfway Th ere: Assessing Intergovernmental Fiscal Equalization in Romania ......................33
 1. Introduction.......................................................................................36  
 2. Th e Structure of Local Governments in Romania ...............................37  
 3. Subnational Government Framework.................................................39 
 4. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations .....................................................40
  4.1 Functions of Local Governments ...............................................41
  4.2 Revenues of Local Governments ................................................43 
 5. Th e Equalization System ....................................................................44 
  5.1 Sources of Funds ........................................................................45
  5.2 Vertical Equalization ..................................................................49
  5.3 Horizontal Equalization .............................................................51
 6. Conclusions and Recommendations...................................................56 
 References ................................................................................................61
 Endnotes ..................................................................................................62  
 Annex: Map of Romania ......................................................................
    
6 L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
Ildar Zulkarnay
Fiscal Equalization Policy in the Russian Federation............................................................65
 1. Introduction.......................................................................................67
 2. Trends in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations......................................68
  2.1 Assignment of Expenditure Responsibilities ...............................69
  2.2 Revenue Assignment ..................................................................73
  2.3 Some Problematic Issues in Intergovernmental Finance..............75
 3. Equalization System ...........................................................................77
  3.1 Vertical Imbalance and the Equalization.....................................77
  3.2 Horizontal Interregional Disparities and Th eir Equalization.......79
  3.3 Horizontal and Vertical Equalization 
   on the Sub-regional Level: Th e Case of Bashkortostan................91
 4. Conclusions and Recommendations...................................................97
  4.1 Current State of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 
   in the Russian Federation and Equalization Policy 
   Recommendations ....................................................................97
  4.2 Current State of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 
   in Bashkortostan and Other Subjects of the Federation 
   and Equalization Policy Recommendations .............................101
 References ..............................................................................................104
 Annex: Tables and Figures .................................................................106
Yuriy Lukovenko
Ukraine: Steps towards Eﬀ ective Fiscal Equalization .........................................................121
 1. Introduction.....................................................................................123 
 2. Fiscal Decentralization in Ukraine: Main Issues................................124
 3. Characteristics of Local Finance  and Intergovernmental 
  Fiscal Relations.................................................................................128
  3.1 Local Government Finance ......................................................128
  3.2 Shortcomings of Ukrainian Intergovernmental Finance ...........129
  3.3 Budget Code: New Approaches and Old Problems ..................131
 4. Fiscal Equalization: Towards New Techniques.................................134
  4.1 Previous Policy in Local Government 
   Expenditure Equalization.........................................................134
  4.2 Vertical Imbalance....................................................................136
  4.3 Horizontal Equalization in the Recent Past ..............................136
  4.4 New Equalization Procedure ....................................................137
7 5. Subnational Expenditures on Education:
  Towards an Eﬀ ective Use of Public Resources?..................................143
  5.1 Th e Present Situation in Secondary Education
   after Independence...................................................................143
  5.2 Spatial Disparities in Educational Expenditures .......................144
 6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations ......................................146
  6.1 Conclusions .............................................................................146
  6.2 Policy Recommendations .........................................................146
 References ..............................................................................................151
 Endnotes ................................................................................................154
 Annex.....................................................................................................155
List of Contributors ..........................................................................................................165
Index.................................................................................................................................167
LGI Fellowship Program ...................................................................................................169
9Preface
Th e present volume Dilemmas and Compromises: Fiscal 
Equalization in Transition Countries analyzes the equal-
ization system of three post-communist countries: 
Russia, Romania and Ukraine. Each country displays 
a fundamentally diﬀ erent model and stage of decen-
tralization:
• Russia and Ukraine are post-Soviet countries that 
experienced a long break in local self-government 
activities; Romania, on the other hand, while also 
a former Communist country, underwent a shorter 
period under this system and is currently a candi-
date country to the European Union,
• Romania and Ukraine are unitary countries, while 
Russia is a federation. 
Th is selection of countries permits generalization 
of the problems encountered in the following analysis 
to many other countries undergoing transformation. 
Th ese three countries have minimal experience or 
have had a long hiatus in decentralization of public 
ﬁ nance. At the same time, there are signiﬁ cant in-
equalities between local governments, arising from 
the fact that Communist countries did not conduct 
their own policies for assisting poorer regions; these 
inequalities, therefore, have become etrenched. Varia-
tions also occur across regions, which is evident in 
the maps the authors present, as well as across urban 
and rural self-governments and between capitals and 
provincial areas.
Further exacerbating the existing inequalities are 
the problems of insuﬃ  cient local government revenues 
and opportunities for transfers from the central budget. 
Under such conditions, the state treats equalization 
transfers as an element of its inﬂ uence over local gov-
ernments.
For this reason, the authors level their most seri-
ous charge at the nebulous system of distribution of 
equalization transfers, involving negotiations instead 
of the application of a concrete formula. Further, the 
“rules of the game” are often changed; instability is 
the norm. 
In fact, a further criticism applies to the entire 
local government system and not just equalization 
policy. Unclear divisions of functions among the 
central government administration and the various 
tiers of local governments signiﬁ cantly hinder the 
application of any kind of equalization system. In 
essence, ﬁ rst the issue of division of competencies 
should be settled and then the technique of equaliza-
tion should be improved. Th is is the long-term recom-
mendation of the authors.
Th e authors analyze in detail the method of equali-
zation applied in their respective countries. Th ey 
present both trends in the division of funds (how 
equalization transfers have changed over time) as well 
as the eﬀ ects of applied equalization techniques.
A presentation of the eﬀ ects of the application 
of equalization transfers in each country leads to an 
interesting conclusion: in essence, the methods cur-
rently used are not improving the situation of less 
developed local governments.
Based on this conclusion, the authors propose 
the introduction or modiﬁ cation of formulas used for 
calculation of transfers. Th e authors illustrate their re-
search through simulations of the eﬀ ects of applying 
new formulas for local governments and demonstrate 
the potential improvements: better distribution of 
funds and equalization of opportunity. Naturally, just 
as the countries in these studies are diﬀ erent, the pro-
posed solutions are also diﬀ erent. For Romania, it 
is suggested that it is suﬃ  cient to address local gov-
ernment ﬁ scal capacity. Such a solution, not always 
recommended, is sometimes applied successfully. In 
Poland, for example, equalization transfers are based 
exclusively on the ﬁ scal capacity from the previous 
year. Th is solution functions properly because local 
governments are, to a large extent, in a three-tiered 
self-government system and public services are uni-
formly divided among local self-governments: in gen-
eral all must provide residents with access to the same 
services. Moreover, local governments are readily able 
to enter into agreements, as well as to transfer func-
tions and funds among themselves.
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In the case of Russia and Ukraine, where in the 
past each service had been unevenly distributed, lim-
iting a solution to ﬁ scal capacity only would lead to 
a deepening of these inequalities. Th erefore, it is rec-
ommended that local government needs be reconsid-
ered in these countries.
Th e volume diﬀ erentiates not only the analytical 
approach in the existing equalization systems in the 
three countries, but also proposes concrete changes in 
the systems. Th ese proposals were based on simula-
tions and forecasts of local government revenues after 
applying a proposed transfer formula. In contrast to 
many other such publications, the authors suggest 
very concrete changes in the equalization system and 
do not limit themselves to general recommendations 
for system improvement. 
A very important element of this publication is 
the introduction, which oﬀ ers a comparative study. 
Th e introduction aﬀ ords the reader the opportunity 
to become familiar with background information on 
ﬁ scal equalization, applied measures and techniques, 
as well as to compare the systems used in the three 
countries.
Th anks to the introduction, the reader has the op-
portunity to compare three countries and their expe-
riences and attempts at ﬁ scal decentralization, as well 
as to understand why certain solutions are successful 
in one country and not in another. 
While the solutions the authors propose them-
selves require further discussion and development, 
they do constitute a very concrete proposal for change. 
I encourage you to read this very interesting work and 
to develop your own conclusions on ﬁ scal equaliztion.
Rafal Stanek
R.Stanek@sponsor.com.pl
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1. INTRODUCTION
Th e collection of papers in this volume contains an 
analysis of ﬁ scal equalization, an important compo-
nent of intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations, in three 
post-communist countries: Romania, Russia, and 
Ukraine. As with many other transition countries, 
since the late 1980s these countries have been in a pro-
cess of ﬁ nding their own path for public sector de-
mocratization and construction of a sound public 
ﬁ nance management system. 
Of course, for these three countries undergoing 
reforms was not easy: the destruction of Communist 
regimes led to a weakening of the state, economic cha-
os, and a deterioration of the public ﬁ nance system. A 
fall in GDP, high inﬂ ation rates, and growing public 
arrears are common features of most countries of the 
former “socialist camp.” As it turned out, under such 
conditions the inherited state mechanism could not 
properly handle the emerging problems; it was neces-
sary to ﬁ nd ways to make the state cheaper and more 
eﬀ ective, thus “to reinvent” a state that would be more 
consistent with a new (transitional) condition of so-
ciety.
Generally speaking, in all post-socialist countries 
the public ﬁ scal systems have the same roots and, at 
least initially, a similar structure; the intergovernmen-
tal equalization systems redistributed large portions of 
public revenues with the aim of equalizing living con-
ditions throughout the country due to an egalitarian 
notion of equality. After the start of the transition pe-
riod, this unique approach to public ﬁ nance backed 
by the dominate communist ideology disappeared. 
For this reason, the comparative study of the equali-
zation techniques as they evolve in diﬀ erent countries 
could help generate solutions to emerging problems 
in the intergovernmental equalization ﬁ eld, in both 
horizontal and vertical dimensions.
Th e collection of papers below is dedicated to the 
ﬁ scal equalization policy pursued by the respective 
national governments from the late 1990s through 
the early 2000s. Using country-speciﬁ c practical 
evi-dence and highlighting current developments, 
the authors search for possible improvements to cur-
rent ﬁ scal equalization schemes and aim to develop 
a set of proposals on how to make them more ef-
fective. Th ese proposals are of value not only for 
Romania, Russia and Ukraine, but also for other 
transition countries facing similar problems.
Th e authors of the papers are experts in the ﬁ eld 
of public ﬁ nance. Th eir motivation to participate in 
LGI’s Policy Fellowship Program and to carry out 
studies of ﬁ scal equalization techniques is grounded 
in their active participation in past seminars on ﬁ s-
cal decentralization provided at summer university 
courses sponsored by the Open Society Institute–
Budapest.  
Th e contributors were asked to evaluate the fol-
lowing issues: what is the value of equalization and its 
actual importance in a context of intergovernmental 
ﬁ nance in transition; what are the constituent ele-
ments of the mechanism of equalization grant alloca-
tion; what are the trends in the development of the 
ﬁ scal equalization mechanism; whether the equaliza-
tion procedures employed are consistent with the goal 
of ﬁ scal equalization; whether the extent of equaliza-
tion is suﬃ  cient or not; whether the instruments of 
equalization are used according to their ability to 
achieve desired grades of equalization; whether on-
going reforms in the ﬁ scal equalization branch take 
into account both positive and negative experiences 
of the past.
Each paper presents a study of a nation’s ﬁ scal 
equalization practice from a diﬀ erent point of view. 
Th e case study on Romania is devoted to an analysis of 
the eﬃ  ciency of the recently introduced equalization 
14
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scheme; the case study on Russia presents trends in 
the evolution of formula-driven equalization app-
roaches on the federal level, with some reﬂ ections on 
its possible introduction at the regional level; while 
the case study on Ukraine reﬂ ects recent develop-
ments in intergovernmental ﬁ nance with special 
emphasis given to equalizing diﬀ erentials in service 
levels between local authorities. Th e diversity of ap-
proaches presented in this volume gives the reader a 
good reason to think about similar issues arising in 
her own country.     
To understand the developments in ﬁ scal equal-
ization policy in Romania, Russian Federation and 
Ukraine, one must keep in mind the initially diﬀ erent 
political and economic factors at play in the respective 
countries which form the backdrop of ongoing changes 
in ﬁ scal relations and still aﬀ ect the intensity of reform 
activity. All these countries belonged to the former 
“socialist camp” and share many characteristics, e.g., 
with respect to political systems, human rights, and 
traditions of public administration, etc. Th eir turn to 
the common way of civic development has had some 
special characteristics: in Romania it was initiated 
by the fall of Ceausescu’s regime eﬀ ected by mass 
protest; the Russian Federation and Ukraine have 
obtained their true sovereignty in the course of a ge-
nerally peaceful “divorce” that split the Soviet Union 
into ﬁ fteen independent nations. 
In general, in the initial stage of transition, all 
three countries shared many similarities in public ad-
ministration inherited from before the regime chang-
es. Th e inherited similarities were, among others, 
hierarchic relationships between tiers of government, 
lack of real ﬁ scal autonomy of local governments, 
and so on. Many of these features still remain in the 
present public ﬁ nance systems.
At the same time, the three countries displayed 
many diﬀ erences that could be attributed to histori-
cal heritage in structuring the sector of public admin-
istration. Romania has a long tradition of relatively 
large local units of territorial administration. Due 
to their coexistence in the highly centralized Soviet 
state over many decades, the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine have a similar situation in the sector of pub-
lic administration, although historical background 
plays its role here. For example, Russia is biased 
against taking into account the perspectives of many 
diﬀ erent nations while building its territorial admin-
istration; the Ukrainian situation is characterized by 
an imbalance in the development of self-government 
units in diﬀ erent parts of the country—traditionally, 
the municipalities in the west are more independent 
and accountable to local voters than those in other 
parts of the country.
It is within this background that the reforms of 
intergovernmental ﬁ nance have had their start. Ro-
mania and Russia, in 1998, and Ukraine, in 2001, have 
begun substantial changes by approving new frame-
work legislation. Th e ﬁ rst results of these reforms are 
not unconditionally positive; there have been many 
negative developments and steps backward. Th e re-
forms are far from completion in many respects. Th e 
mechanisms of equalization are unstable: subject to 
permanent changes according to the shaky balance 
of political power between the center and subnational 
entities. Th ese conditions provide experts with much 
room to propose alternatives to current equalization 
policies. 
It should be mentioned that there have been sev-
eral studies on the evolving intergovernmental ﬁ scal 
relations in these countries: for example, the World 
Bank studies on the socialist state transition (Bird, 
Ebel, and Wallich 1995; Martinez-Vasquez and Boex 
2000, 2001; Wetzel 2001); some aspects of ﬁ scal 
equalization were presented to the international pub-
lic in the LGI series on local governments in transition 
countries (Kandeva 2001; Popa and Muntianu 2001); 
and other publications (Engelschalk 1999; Ieda 2000; 
Nemec and Wright 1997). But with respect to ﬁ scal 
equalization issues, Russia receives the most attention 
because of its great importance for the world economy 
and its political impact on the post-Soviet rim, and 
also because its federal nature forces it to implement 
more or less eﬀ ective equalization procedures among 
subjects of the federation.
Taking this fact into account, the proposed study 
addresses some lacunae in the economic literature con-
cerning important aspects of intergovernmental ﬁ s-
cal relations in Romania and Ukraine, but also in 
Russia.
Th e economies of the countries under investiga-
tion are in very diﬀ erent stages of development (see 
Table 1.1), which aﬀ ects the functioning of the public 
sector as a whole, state economic policy, and in par-
ticular, the shaping of the ﬁ scal equalization issue.
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Table 1.1 
Th e Most Important Economic Indicators of Romania, Russia, and Ukraine, 2000
Romania Russia Ukraine
GDP [billion USD] 36.7 251.1 31.8
Surface Area [million sq. km] 0.238 17.1 0.604
Population [millions] 22.4 145.6 49.5
GDP per Capita [USD] 1638 1725 642
Population Density [inhabitants/sq. km] 94.1 8.5 82.0
State Budget Balance [percent of GDP] –3.0 4.1 –0.6
Source: World Bank 2002.
From the above data, an economist would ob-
serve that Russia has a readily evident need for ﬁ scal 
equalization and extensive state policy in this ﬁ eld. 
Its vast surface area and sparse population results in 
greater expenditure diﬀ erentials and diﬀ erences in the 
ﬁ scal endowment of territorial units. Th e economist’s 
observation would be strengthened by the introduc-
tion of a political factor—Russia is a federation, 
whereas Romania and Ukraine are unitary states. 
Due to its better economic performance—primarily 
the result of temporarily favorable international trade 
conditions—the Russian central ﬁ scus have enough 
resources not only to repay loans to foreign creditors 
before they come due, but also to ﬁ nd additional re-
sources to solve intergovernmental ﬁ nancial problems 
more eﬀ ectively.
List of Abbreviations
CEE  Central and Eastern Europe
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
fSU former Soviet Union
GDP gross domestic product
HC Hunter’s coeﬃ  cient
LG  local government
PIT personal income tax
SNG subnational government
2. SETTING UP A PROBLEM
With regard to public administration, the last decade 
of the twentieth century is often referred to as a “dec-
ade of decentralization” (World Bank 1997); during 
this period of time many countries of the developing 
and transition world have launched programs de-
signed to shift the growing share of public functions 
to lower governmental tiers.   
Public administration in transition countries is 
under reconstruction. Th e structure and basic prin-
ciples of ﬁ scal relations between tiers of government 
should correspond to the new needs of the emerging 
market economy. Building strong and sound inter-
governmental ﬁ scal relations in transition countries 
requires, to a reasonable extent, incorporation of his-
torical traditions and current realities of the economy, 
together with the theory on ﬁ scal federalism and 
worldwide experiences with its implementation. 
Th e empirical evidence shows that there is some 
kind of trend to decentralization in transition coun-
tries, although some asymmetry is likely at play: while 
the relative size of subnational expenditure responsi-
bilities has soared, their slowly growing revenues 
remain insuﬃ  cient to cover functions shifted from 
above (Table 1.2). Th is provides national govern-
ments with a “good excuse” to subsidize subnational 
units instead of giving them own revenue sources.
16
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Table 1.2
Dynamics of SNG Share in Combined Public Revenues and Expenditures (transfers excluded) [percent] 
Country Expenditures Revenues
Starting Period Final Period Starting Period Final Period
Armenia, 1995–1999 4.7 4.7 — —
Azerbaijan, 1994–1999 25.3 23.6 18.9 14.9
Belarus, 1992–1998 30.4 41.0 29.0 36.1
Czech Republic, 1993–1999 21.3 21.9 14.3 19.0
Estonia, 1991–1999 30.3 24.2 26.6 16.7
Georgia, 1995–1999 (1) 17.2 26.1 — 30.6
Hungary, 1988–1998 22.4 25.4 11.9 15.0
Kazakhstan, 1997–1998 29.9 33.4 27.8 29.7
Kyrgyz Republic, 1999 — 30.7 — 17.4
Latvia, 1994–1999 24.1 24.7 19.4 19.9
Lithuania, 1991–1999 24.9 19.3 14.3 21.2
Moldova, 1995–1999 29.5 21.7 31.7 17.7
Poland, 1994–1999 16.6 36.4 12.4 22.1
Romania. 1987–1997 8.1 11.4 7.1 10.3
Russia, 1994–1999 39.2 39.9 41.4 36.2
Slovakia, 1996–1999 8.1 6.8 7.5 5.6
Tajikistan, 1998 — 36.5 — 27.4
Ukraine, 1991–1999 (1) 31.4 45.0 45.8 40.0
Unweighted average  22.7 26.3 22.0 22.3
Source: Own computations based on IMF 1999, 2000.
(1) National ﬁ nancial statistics and country studies published by the World Bank.
Th e countries in question have demonstrated 
diﬀ erent trends in expenditure/revenue share devel-
opment: in Russia, slow growth of subnational ex-
penditure share is accompanied by a sharp decline in 
respective revenue share; in Ukraine, decentralization 
of expenditures has not been supported by growth in 
subnational revenue share; conversely, in Romania, a 
slight growth of expenditure portion has been accom-
panied by respective growth in revenues of SNGs. We 
might conclude then that, within this sample, only in 
Romania does decentralization occur in a balanced 
way.  
Th ere are numerous reasons why many nations 
in transition engage in decentralization activity: to 
increase the eﬃ  ciency of the public sector in line with 
W. Oates’ “theorem of decentralization” (1972), to 
diminish the costs of public administration, to reduce 
horizontal disparities, to encourage democratic insti-
tutions at the subnational level, and so on. But some-
times the only reason may be to merely shift the ﬁ scal 
burden from the central authorities downwards in 
order to make the central ﬁ scal balance look better. 
In many cases, such a policy has caused asym-
metric development of intergovernmental ﬁ scal rela-
tions, when the soaring spending responsibilities of 
local authorities has no backup in the form of an own 
revenue base. Th us, this development led to the grow-
ing ﬁ scal dependence of SNGs on national decisions 
concerning transfer fund allocation. As a matter of 
fact, the regional and local governments in transition 
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countries have a revenue structure skewed toward 
external revenue sources, such as shared taxes and 
governmental grants. Th is situation was observed in 
the early 1990s (Bird, Ebel, and Wallich 1995), and 
has not changed much since then.
Growing local spending responsibilities and rigid 
revenue endowment led to increasing disparities 
among regions and communities with respect to their 
ability to ﬁ nance their own expenditure programs, 
making topical the issue of ﬁ scal equalization. It is 
well known that functional decentralization auto-
matically has to be followed by vertical redistribution 
of public ﬁ scal resources. But, the vertical redistribu-
tion of revenue sources per se is not automatically fol-
lowed by increased eﬃ  ciency in the combined public 
administration sector. 
Th ere are some complicating factors that make 
decentralization a very problematic issue within the 
context of transition. Ineﬃ  ciency in decision-making, 
corruption, and other negative phenomena can also 
appear at lower levels of public administration, which 
are especially vulnerable to such phenomenon in light 
of their institutional weakness and the absence of 
long-standing traditions at this level.
All these considerations have to be taken into ac-
count when reforms of intergovernmental ﬁ nancial 
relations are undertaken.
Fiscal equalization systems should evolve in con-
junction with changes in intergovernmental arrange-
ments. Being “a top” intergovernmental ﬁ nance, the 
structure of an equalization system reﬂ ects the bal-
ance of powers among the main stakeholders in the 
public sector. Th e intergovernmental system is there-
fore very vulnerable to any changes in the political 
and economic status quo within the country. Th us, 
the reasons for implementing equalization policy are 
often not only economic. Th at is why, strictly speak-
ing, it is misleading to speak here of a “system.”
Th e grant system is an integral part of intergov-
ernmental ﬁ scal relations and as such a primary target 
of change. Th e diﬀ erent types of grants include indi-
rect and direct, general and selective, and matching 
and non-matching. National grant systems have ﬁ scal 
equalization as one of their main objectives. Th us, as 
a core instrument of state ﬁ scal assistance policy to-
wards SNGs, the grant system necessarily experiences 
rather big ﬂ uctuations. 
All the post-socialist countries make use of some 
sort of equalization scheme. Th is practice is still 
highly inﬂ uenced by the socialist legacy: post-socialist 
countries inherited a very unequal territorial alloca-
tion of industries along with a weak ﬁ scal basis for 
local government. Revenue sharing still remains a 
common instrument of equalization in this part of 
the world, especially in CIS countries (Table 1.3).
Th e need for ﬁ scal equalization in transition 
countries is great because of the territorial inequality 
in allocation of revenue base. Th is is largely a result 
of the decline of the traditional industries that under 
socialist policy were heavily concentrated in particu-
lar regions—and now create consequent horizontal 
imbalances. It would be plausible to guess that hori-
zontal rather than vertical imbalance is more topical, 
as is true in most developing countries (Shah 1994, 
42). Almost all post-socialist countries have applied 
instruments of some sort to achieve more equity 
among jurisdictions, with the exception of those few 
that have very modest equalization policies (Czech 
Republic and Slovakia). 
It is worth noting that many of the post-socialist 
countries practice horizontal equalization by use of 
contributions from subnational units, so in a sense 
they are playing “Robin Hood.” A system of this 
sort is uncommon in developed nations (though 
Denmark has a similar ﬁ scal arrangement). Such an 
approach (with variations concerning degree of equal-
ization, etc.) is still at work in many CIS countries, 
e.g., Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine (until 2001), and 
amongst CEE countries—in Latvia and Lithuania. 
Most countries use more advanced equalization 
techniques which account for both the revenue and 
expenditure sides of subnational budgets; the excep-
tions are Estonia and Poland which equalize only the 
revenue side.
In most countries not all the components of the 
state grant system are consistent with “optimal” cri-
teria. Th e most important characteristics of a good 
transfer system are objectivity, stability, and transpar-
ency (Bahl and Linn 1992); while movement towards 
better systems can be observed in Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Kyrgyz Republic, Poland, and Ukraine. In 
these countries, formula grants are soon going to be 
the most important source of centralized ﬁ scal sup-
port for SNGs despite diﬃ  culties faced in the imple-
mentation of the new approaches. 
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By the end of the 1990s, most post-socialist coun-
tries had launched reforms in the area of equaliza-
tion; the core issue had been the implementation 
or improvement of the formula-based equalization 
transfers. Th is is true for Romania, Russia, and 
Ukraine as well as for the majority of transition coun-
tries. Nevertheless, most of these systems remain far 
from ideal. Less positive features of the equalization 
policies include instability, incompletion, and the 
sacriﬁ ce of strategic interests for the sake of current 
political gains. It is for these reasons that the need 
for shaping ﬁ scal equalization policy analysis is very 
Table 1.3
Equalization Schemes Employed in Selected ECA Transition Nations 
Country Equalization Procedure
Armenia Formula, with respect to per capita incomes and expenditure need indicators, especially geographic 
characteristics of SNG
Belarus Formula, with respect to diﬀ erence between per capita standard expenditure and normative revenues; 
revenue sharing is also at play 
Czech Republic No clearly deﬁ ned equalization procedure
Estonia Formula, with size of population and diﬀ erence in actual and average per capita revenues as factors 
Georgia Equalization is done through diﬀ erentiation of conditional grants for basic social needs; there are 
no transparent procedures for their allocation 
Hungary Equalization is a component of the normative grant which takes into account both the revenue and 
expenditure sides; also investment grants are involved 
Kazakhstan Formula, with respect to per capita standard revenues and expenditures; funded exclusively through 
regional contributions 
Kyrgyz Republic Formula, with respect to diﬀ erence in per capita revenues and expenditures; conditional grants are also 
employed to equalize diﬀ erence in delivery of social services 
Latvia Formula, with diﬀ erence in per capita revenues and expenditures to be equalized; the system is funded 
mainly through contributions of local governments 
Lithuania Formula, equalization component is included into general grants allocation; the diﬀ erences in 
both per capita revenues and expenditure needs are involved; subnational units’ contributions are practiced 
Moldova Regional diﬀ erentiation of tax-sharing rates
Poland Formula, per capita revenues are equalized up to predetermined grade by use of general subsidy
Romania Formula, with revenue and expenditure indicators employed
Russia Formula, the regional level disparities in revenues and expenditures are equalized; the equalization on a sub-
regional level is very vague 
Slovakia Indirect equalization through diﬀ erentiation of sharing rates and addressed grants to small municipalities 
Tajikistan Equalization is undertaken by use of regional sharing rates diﬀ erentiation and deﬁ cit grants allocation 
Ukraine Combination of diﬀ erentiated sharing rates and equalization grants; formula used since 2001, with respect to 
diﬀ erence in expenditure needs and revenue capacity
Uzbekistan Equalization is undertaken by use of regional sharing rates diﬀ erentiation and equalization grant allocation 
Source: Slukhai 2002a.
timely, and proposals concerning its improvement 
could be very valuable.
3. TRENDS IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
 FISCAL RELATIONS
Romania, Russia, and Ukraine have quite diﬀ erent 
characteristics of intergovernmental ﬁ nance.
In Romania, the public sector is represented by 
three levels: national, county, and municipal (cities 
and villages). Legislation states that there is no direct 
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delegated to local state administrations of oblast and 
rayon levels.
As follows from a look at the administrative struc-
ture of each country (Table 1.4), the most eﬀ ective ad-
ministration at present is in Romania where the struc-
ture of public administration on the subnational level 
tends toward an integrated type. Th is corresponds to 
long-standing traditions of public sector structuring 
in South Eastern Europe, with its relatively large mu-
nicipalities and an absence of regional-level territorial 
administration. Romania and Russia could be treated 
as countries with limited integration on the local level 
(Nemec and Wright 1997).
From the three countries, Ukraine could be as-
sumed to have the most severe problems, where the 
municipalities are very small on average with less than 
two thousand inhabitants per local unit of basic level. 
Most of these units are too weak to perform legally 
prescribed activities in public service delivery; there 
exists therefore a need for reassessment and a follow-
ing reorganization of administrative-territorial divi-
sion of the basic level in this country.
According to legislation in all three countries, the 
local councils should have an independent ﬁ scal base, 
but the practice of Russia and Ukraine shows that 
this principle is not universally implemented: about 
two-thirds of their local authorities of basic level 
(these are mainly rural communities) cannot execute 
their full budgetary rights and depend on budgetary 
subordination between the governmental tiers. On 
the county level the central government is represented 
by prefects and branches of line ministries.
In Russia, due to the federal nature of the coun-
try, the structure is more complicated: federal, region-
al, and municipal levels are at play; three to four tiers 
of public administration are present. Moreover, inter-
governmental ﬁ scal relations on a sub-regional level 
are under the jurisdiction of regional governments. 
Th is serves in many cases to erode the common 
intergovernmental framework because regional gov-
ernments have introduced their own schemes of inter-
governmental ﬁ scal relations that often contradict 
federal legislation.
In Ukraine, according to national legislation, 
there are two levels of government—national and lo-
cal. Th e local level is represented, on the one hand, by 
oblast (regional), rayon (county), and cities of oblast 
signiﬁ cance that all have separate ﬁ scal relations to 
state government, and on the other hand, by units 
of the lower level: towns, settlements, urban districts, 
villages. So, in fact, Ukrainian public administration 
is structured of four levels. Each territorial unit is 
guaranteed budgetary independence, however, in 
practice, this clause of the Ukrainian Constitution is 
not eﬀ ectively implemented. Th e right of territorial 
governments at regional and rayon levels to execute 
independent ﬁ scal power is very limited, as execu-
tive power of locally elected bodies is increasingly 
Table 1.4
Number of Subnational Units in Romania, Russia, and Ukraine, by year 2000
Level Romania Russia Ukraine
Regional — 89 27a
County 41 1488b 490
Municipality 
(basic level of local authority)
265 cities, 
2,686 rural communes 
592 cities, 
126 urban districts, 
519 urban settlements, 
9,000 rural and 
village communities
451 cities, 
122 urban districts,
893 urban settlements, 
28,651 villages
Average population 
of a municipalityc
7,600 14,400 1,700
a Includes 24 oblasts, Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Kiev City, and Sevastopol.
b Units of county level in Russia are treated as “municipal units” due to federal legislation. In order to make the data on administrative 
structure more compatible, for Russia we separated the county level from other municipal units.
c In the calculation urban districts are excluded in order to avoid double counting.
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decisions of the upper level government (of region or 
county). One of the explanations for this situation is 
the following: the size of local government in terms of 
population (and correspondingly, revenue base) is in-
suﬃ  cient to generate enough revenue to ﬁ nance even 
mere administrative expenditures. Th is may provide 
us with an additional reason to reassess the territorial 
division of a country in order to obtain more reason-
ably sized  basic territorial units.
Th is division of units has impact on the structure 
of public ﬁ nance. With such weak municipalities in 
general, the central government concentrates quite a 
large portion of ﬁ scal resources in the state budget 
and, in a paternalistic manner, disburses them be-
tween lower-level governments.
Th e picture of the share of subnational govern-
ment in combined state budget expenditure and GDP 
presented in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 is likely to show just 
the opposite: the most decentralized public expendi-
tures are in Russia and then in Ukraine; while the 
less decentralized are in Romania. Th ese data com-
bine total subnational expenditures of all the levels. 
In order to make them more compatible, one should 
extract regional expenditures from the total because 
Romania has no regional level. Allowing for this, 
the share of SNGs of county and lower level are for 
Russia about 8–9 percent of GDP and 28–30 percent 
of combined public sector expenditures, and, for 
Ukraine, 9–10 percent of GDP and 25–30 percent of 
combined public sector expenditures. Th is proves that 
the situation with the allocation of public ﬁ scal resources 
between governmental levels with respect to the basic 
level of territorial administration is quite similar in all 
three countries.
Apart from current budgetary expenditure distri-
bution, the observed trends in this ﬁ eld are also very 
important. Th e growing local government share of 
GDP in Romania shows that only here do we have a 
soaring process of decentralization—it received a push 
in 1998 when the Law on Public Finance was adopt-
ed. In Russia and Ukraine, a decline of subnational 
expenditures as a portion of GDP (about 2.5 times 
in Russia and 1.5 times in Ukraine) can be seen. Th is 
can be understood as a part of a more general process 
of shrinkage of state responsibilities during the transi-
tion period. Th is shrinkage has gone asymmetric: the 
relative expenditures of the central government are 
growing in general at the expense of governments of 
lower tiers, especially local governments.  
We can conclude from the above tables that the 
real decentralization process started in these countries 
only in the mid-1990s: ﬁ rst in Russia, then in Romania, 
and ﬁ nally in Ukraine. Th e decentralization process 
was initiated due to new legislation recently adopted 
in the countries—in 1998 in Romania and Russia, 
and in 2001 in Ukraine.
Table 1.5
SNG Expenditure Share in GDP [percent]
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Romania 3.9 4.1 4.6 5.0 4.1 4.3 4.0 4.9 7.0
Russia 26.1 18.9 15.6 18.0 15.4 12.1 12.6 12.3 10.6*
Ukraine 15.2 15.9 17.5 14.4 14.8 14.6 12.1 9.8 10.6
* First half of 2001.
Table 1.6
SNG Share in Combined Public Budget Expenditures [percent]
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Romania 13.0 13.5 14.0 15.3 13.8 14.4 13.4 16.5 23.2
Russia 38.4 48.8 48.7 46.6 51.9 55.2 51.9 54.3 56.4*
Ukraine 39.5 35.3 47.3 43.6 39.8 48.1 35.4 35.3 40.3
* First half of 2001.
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Figure 1.1
Subnational Government Share in Public Expenditures in Romania
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Figure 1.2
Subnational Government Share in Public Expenditures in Russia
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Figure 1.3
Subnational Government Share in Public Expenditures in Ukraine
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As Figures 1.1–1.3 suggest, the trends (showed 
by a solid line) of ﬁ scal decentralization are very 
important for Romania and Russia. Russia shows a 
more clearly shaped trend toward decentralization of 
expenditures than Romania. In contrast, the shaky 
governmental policy in ﬁ eld of decentralization in 
Ukraine still demonstrates no clear long-term trend 
towards decentralization. Th e dominate form of de-
centralization is deconcentration—where the central 
government exercises more responsibilities through 
local (oblast and rayon) state administrations; giving 
them more discretion concerning the budget process 
on the local level, and demonstrating the reluctance 
of the central government to vest more power in self-
government bodies. Th e ﬁ rst steps toward real ﬁ scal 
decentralization in Ukraine were undertaken only in 
2001, when the implementation of the provisions of 
the Budget Code began. 
It could be asked how the ongoing process of de-
centralization aﬀ ects the relative size of the state. One 
of the dangers of the decentralization process is: while 
decentralizing certain functions and giving SNGs 
more discretionary power in ﬁ scal policy, the state 
would grow both relatively and absolutely, hampering 
the development of the private sector. Th e last could 
be a great danger for a transition economy where the 
private sector is weak and requires state assistance to 
get “raised on its feet.”
Th e statistical data on our sample of countries 
testify that signs of such danger are present. In 
Romania, the process of expenditure decentralization 
is accompanied by a growing state. In Russia, the 
relative size of the state measured by the share of state 
expenditures of GDP has dropped from 50 percent 
in 1992 to about 28 percent in 2000. In Ukraine in 
the ﬁ rst half of the 1990s, the growing SNG share 
was accompanied by a soaring state size. Th e process 
of centralization in the second half of the 1990s was 
then followed by a stable or diminishing state size, 
and only since 2000 has there been a trend toward 
slight decentralization of public expenditures in line 
with this stabilization of the size of the state.1 Th is 
proves that in the selected countries two hypotheses 
of decentralization are ﬁ tting: the Brennan-Buchanan 
hypothesis of collusion (Romania and Ukraine) and 
the Wallis-Oates ﬁ scal decentralization hypothesis 
(for Russia).2
4. VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL 
 IMBALANCES AND NEED
 FOR EQUALIZATION 
Issues of vertical and horizontal imbalances and 
their eﬀ ective equalization are very relevant for most 
post-socialist countries. Vertical equalization aims to 
obtain suﬃ  cient capacity to ﬁ nance public services at 
any level of government: national, regional, and local. 
It can be achieved both through the assignment of rev-
enue sources and the distribution of responsibilities 
for public service delivery among the governmental 
levels. Th e formation of national policy in this ﬁ eld 
depends on the degree of democratization of society. 
In the case of initially highly centralized countries 
(i.e., all countries surveyed), this policy depends on 
the readiness of the center to oﬀ er real autonomy to 
SNGs and to grant them real discretion in decision-
making on the territory of their own jurisdiction. All 
three countries have made steps in this direction, but 
there is still a lot of unsolved reforms remaining. 
Intergovernmental horizontal ﬁ scal equalization 
aims at diminishing the gap between the obligation 
of SNGs to deliver public services within their ju-
risdictions and their capacity to fund such services. 
Th eoretically speaking, there are pros and contras to 
horizontal equalization policy. A contra-argument re-
lates to the eﬃ  ciency issue: interregional equalization 
may hamper eﬃ  cient allocation of resources through-
out the national (regional) territory and hinder eco-
nomic growth because it delivers wrong incentives 
to economic entities concerning resource allocation. 
It also diminishes incentives for SNGs to generate 
revenues. A pro-argument delivers a notion of equity:
the national government has to guarantee a certain 
minimal level of public services throughout the na-
tional territory regardless of SNGs’ ﬁ scal ability. Th e 
well-shaped equalization policy will ﬁ nd the right 
compromise between eﬃ  ciency and equity in order to 
grant fairness and eﬃ  ciency simultaneously.
For the issue of vertical imbalance, it is important 
that the correspondence between expenditure respon-
sibilities and the ﬁ scal resources available to each level 
of government be measured in some way. One means 
of measurement is based on the computation of coef-
ﬁ cients of imbalance proposed by J. Hunter (1977). 
Th ese coeﬃ  cients (HC) are calculated in the follow-
ing way:
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Coeﬃ  cient #1 = 1 –  
revenue sharing + untied (equalizing) and other transfers
 
    total expenditures 
 
Coeﬃ  cient #2 = 1 –  
untied (equalizing) and other transfers
 
   total expenditures 
 
Table 1.7
Hunter’s Coeﬃ  cients of Vertical Imbalance for Respective Countries
Romania, 2001 Russia, 2001 Ukraine, 2000
Coeﬃ  cient # 1 0.22 0.324 0.609
Coeﬃ  cient # 2 — 0.833 0.742
Table 1.8
Most Important Own Revenues of SNGs.
Revenue Type Romania Russia Ukraine
Taxes on Income and Proﬁ t No R: Tax on imputed earnings No
Taxes on Property L: Land tax; building tax; 
 vehicle tax
R: Enterprise property tax; 
 forest tax
L: Individual property tax; 
 tax on gifts and  
 inheritance
No
Legend: R—regional government, C—county government, L—local government.
Th ese coeﬃ  cients can have values between 0 and 
1. Th us, HC #1 values which are closer to 0 indicate 
larger vertical imbalance because SNG total expendi-
tures are covered mostly by external sources; HC #2 
values which are closer to 0 indicate high dependence 
of expenditure ﬁ nancing on direct transfers from the 
central government. Table 1.7 presents the HC values 
for our three countries.
Th ese data show that Romania has the worst ver-
tical imbalance; the role of direct transfers in covering 
the vertical gap in all three countries is quite modest. 
However, HC #1 does not reﬂ ect the role of real own 
revenues of SNGs; the truth is that the vertical imbal-
ance is remedied mainly through ceded national taxes 
that could be considered as “own” revenue sources 
only with much caution (see Bailey 1999).
SNG units are now seeking ﬁ scal endowments 
which corresponds to the shifting of expenditure 
responsibilities to lower tiers and the vesting of more 
functions in local governments of basic and inter-
mediate levels that occurred in the last decade. Th is 
requires allotting more revenue sources to local units. 
In accordance with a theory of ﬁ scal federalism, the 
more spending responsibilities the SNGs receive, the 
more own revenue sources they should control. But as 
is the case with many post-socialist countries, the cen-
tral government is not in a position to relax its control 
over ﬁ scal ﬂ ows in the public sector.3 Th e three coun-
tries under analysis are not exempt from this rule.
Table 1.8 presents the most important “own” 
revenue sources for SNGs in Romania, Russia, and 
Ukraine.
Th ere is some confusion with the term “own 
revenue” in these countries. In contrast to the com-
mon Western understanding—according to which 
local revenues are those over which SNGs have a high 
degree of discretion, e.g., determining tax base and 
rate, tax exemptions, etc. (Bailey 1999)—some rev-
enues that may not be taken as “own” are in practice 
treated as such for SNGs. Examples are PIT and land 
24
D I L E M M A S  A N D  C O M P R O M I S E S :  F I S C A L  E Q U A L I Z A T I O N  I N  T R A N S I T I O N  C O U N T R I E S
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
tax in Russia; ceded national taxes (PIT and land tax) 
and national taxes with long-term sharing rates in 
Ukraine. In fact, the extremely limited discretion of 
governments regarding these taxes is reason enough 
to exclude ceded taxes and shared revenues from the 
deﬁ nition of “own” ﬁ scal resources for SNGs. 
Further confusion derives from the understand-
ing of regional and local revenues in these countries. 
It is worth mentioning that most of these so-called lo-
cal revenue sources could be considered as quasi-own 
because the central government executes control over 
all important elements of the SNG “own-revenue” 
system: the central government legislates the taxes, 
determines tax bases and tax rates (the common 
practice is capping or imposing minimal rates for the 
majority of local taxes), and administers the local tax 
collection (in case of Ukraine only). Of course, such 
an arrangement undermines local ﬁ scal autonomy and 
seriously damages the accountability of local administra-
tors to voters; this, in turn, is no good for SNG ﬁ nancial 
management.
Own revenues do however play a role in subna-
tional ﬁ nance, though so far only a minor one; most 
revenues are still ceded national taxes, shared national 
taxes, and state grants. As Table 1.9 suggests, the 
own revenue share was more signiﬁ cant in the case 
of Romania and Russia, than in Ukraine where the 
greater portion of SNG revenue sources comes from 
central government indirect transfers (ceded and 
shared national taxes).
Th e lack of ﬁ scal discretion at regional and local 
governmental levels in both quantitative and quali-
tative dimensions suggests that the three countries 
Table 1.9
Structure of Revenues of SNGs, by Countries [percent]
Romaniab, 2001 Russiaa, 1999 Ukrainea, 1999
Own revenues 22 16 3
Ceded national taxes — 9 11c
Shared taxes 57 49 56
State grants 16 26 16
a Combined regional budgets. 
b Combined county budgets.
c Since 2001, the situation with SNG revenues in Ukraine has changed. Th e PIT became a ceded tax; so the ceded taxes are now the 
most important source of subnational revenues.
have a high degree of vertical ﬁ scal imbalance in public 
ﬁ nance: about 80–85 percent of budgetary expendi-
tures in Romania and Russia are covered by external 
sources; this same ﬁ gure for Ukraine is on average as 
high as 95 percent or more.
Th e massive vertical gap is bridged by the assign-
ment of some national taxes and duties, and tax-shar-
ing. Assigned (ceded) revenues played no signiﬁ cant 
role in all three countries until recently. Th e latest 
changes in Ukrainian legislation portend that the 
most important assigned taxes (PIT and land tax) 
will be the dominate sources of SNG ﬁ nancing; in 
Russia PIT tends to be a ceded tax as well.4 Th e other 
taxes liable to be ceded are duties on usage of natural 
resources (forest, water, mineral resources) and prop-
erty taxes (motor vehicle tax in Russia and Ukraine). 
Proceeds from assigned national taxes are usually 
shared between subordinated governmental levels in 
Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. 
Th e system of tax-sharing is the most important 
instrument for correction of the vertical imbal-
ance—although it also has other beneﬁ ts. Because 
regionally diﬀ erentiated sharing rates can be applied, 
tax-sharing can also be employed as an instrument of 
horizontal equalization (in Ukraine until 2001, cur-
rently in Russia).
Th e mode of usage for shared taxes is varied (for 
more details please refer to Table 1.10).
In Romania, the tax-sharing system has multiple 
functions. First, the PIT tax shares are determined 
to correct the vertical imbalance (ﬁ xed sharing rates 
for central government, counties, and municipalities; 
annual budget appropriations from the grant fund 
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Table 1.10
Th e Tax-sharing Systems in Romania, Russia, and Ukraine
Romania Russia Ukraine
Center-
County
County-
Municipality
Center-
region
Region-
Municipal 
units
Center-
regions
Region 
–county,
city
County-
municipality
Designated rev-
enues
PIT PIT share Share of 
federal budget 
revenues
Shares of 
federal and 
regional taxes
None PIT, 
land tax
PIT, 
land tax
Annual rate ﬁ xing Yes Yes PIT Excise 
on alcohol
No No No
Spatial sharing 
rate diﬀ erentiation 
No No No For some 
taxes
No No No
Long-term rate 
ﬁ xing
No No Excise on 
alcohol, land 
tax, natural 
resources 
mining tax
Land tax, 
natural 
resources 
mining tax
PIT, 
land tax
PIT, 
land tax
PIT, 
land tax
formed by state portion of PIT for welfare support 
and supplementary heating and utility price subsi-
dies); second, the state’s PIT share is used to cure 
horizontal imbalances on the county level; third, 
the VAT share is used to equalize some speciﬁ c LG 
expenditures (mostly on primary and secondary edu-
cation services delivered by municipalities) by use of 
earmarked grants.
In Russia, the tax-sharing between federal and 
regional tiers is used solely to bridge vertical imbal-
ance; additionally, on a subnational level it is used to 
equalize horizontal disparities through the individu-
ally negotiated sharing rates.
In Ukraine, after the enactment of the Budget 
Code, tax-sharing functions as an instrument of 
vertical equalization in relations between state and 
regional, county and city of oblast signiﬁ cance au-
thorities, as well as municipalities of lower level (the 
sharing rates for the PIT and land tax are ﬁ xed in 
legislation for a long term).
In Russia, due to the recent intergovernmental 
reform agenda, there is no hope of reducing the 
degree of vertical imbalance. According to federal 
government plans, the total federal share in public 
revenues would increase by 2005 from about 50 to 70 
percent. Th ere are not many positive developments to 
be foreseen in this sphere in Romania either: SNGs 
own revenue share will drop in line with the newly 
legislated mandated expenditures vested in LGs that 
are to be compensated through the growing inﬂ ow 
of earmarked grants. In Ukraine, vertical imbalance 
could be stabilized if the provisions of the Budget 
Code were strictly implemented that delineate ex-
penditure responsibilities and revenue sources of the 
diﬀ erent governmental levels.
Th e status of horizontal imbalance looks quite 
diﬀ erent in the various countries. In Romania, due to 
ﬁ xed PIT sharing rates and employment of the origin 
principle, the variation coeﬃ  cient for local revenues 
for counties was around 0.5 and for municipalities 
about 1.0, with  great variance between the maxi-
mum and minimum per capita revenues (equalization 
grants excluded). In Russia, the disparity between 
revenues and expenditures amongst regional units 
tends to grow with time. Th e list of needy regions 
also grows despite the present equalization policy. In 
Ukraine, the diﬀ erences between regions and locali-
ties in ﬁ scal endowment and service level also remain 
quite high with a trend toward greater inequity over 
time.
In Russia, the uneven territorial distribution of 
capital and natural resources as a factor of emerging 
equalization policy was combined with a need for 
regional political and economic elites to have more 
discretion in ﬁ scal policy. Th e elected oblast gover-
nors and presidents of national republics in Russia 
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are important political actors that represent regional 
interests and have some inﬂ uence on the federal 
center; in contrast, the regional governors in Ukraine 
are merely creatures of the central executive and are 
determined to follow the guidance of the Ukrainian 
President (Ieda 2000). Th is is a reason why, namely 
in Russia, we ﬁ nd the ﬁ rst attempts to introduce a 
formula-based approach to horizontal ﬁ scal equaliza-
tion on a post-Soviet rim. It also explains why the 
equalization procedure is elaborated and functions 
until now only between federal center and regions, 
without any signiﬁ cant positive steps on a sub-
regional tier.
Although the central government gives some 
guidance to intermediate authorities of how to deal 
with the ﬁ scal inequality of units on sub-regional and 
sub-county levels, ﬁ scal inequality is still a problem-
atic issue in all these countries. Th e intermediate gov-
ernments avoid creating a transparent and fair proce-
dure for allotting ﬁ scal resources on the territory of 
their jurisdiction, making municipalities dependent 
on their will to implement some kind of equalization 
instrument. Th e usual practice shows that these gov-
ernments try to withhold more ﬁ scal resources than 
they should based on their expenditure needs. Th is is 
why the legislated sharing rates for the most impor-
tant national taxes are below the level prescribed by 
national legislation. With this practice, intermediate 
governmental units possess a very important instru-
ment for controlling the behavior of the governmental 
units of the lower level, securing for administrators of 
the intermediate level more space for bargaining and 
informal arrangements.
5. EVOLUTION 
 OF EQUALIZATION INSTRUMENTS
Fiscal equalization practices in diﬀ erent countries 
show that there are no universal approaches to deal 
with the problem of interregional and interlocality 
ﬁ scal disparities (See Table 1.3 above). Each country 
chooses from a combination of instruments that cor-
respond to the existing state of the public administra-
tion sector, revenue and expenditure assignments, and 
ideology of state formation.
Th e process of the evolution of equalization 
mechanisms in respective countries has moved away 
from Soviet-type equalization based on diﬀ erentia-
tion of national tax-sharing rates (supplemented by 
state donations to cover the remaining budget deﬁ cit 
of territorial units after tax-sharing) to a formula-
based approach with the use of direct grants.5
In Romania, the initial equalization mechanism 
was completed through discretionary tax-sharing 
that existed until 1999. Since then the equalization 
has been done by allocating shares of the central 
government’s portion of PIT to the counties (hori-
zontal equalization grant is allocated to counties, not 
directly to municipalities; the former can withhold 
up to 25 percent of grant money for their own use 
and then must distribute the rest to localities within 
their jurisdiction), which is supplemented by a special 
VAT share for conditional grants with an equaliza-
tion component. In Russia, after the collapse of the 
Communist regime, ﬁ scal equalization was initially 
carried out in the obsolete Soviet manner by use of 
regionally diﬀ erentiated sharing rates and coverage 
of remaining ﬁ scal deﬁ cits through deﬁ cit grants. 
Th e ﬁ scal shortages of the ﬁ rst years of the transition 
period, combined with high inﬂ ation rates, brought 
to life manual administration of intergovernmental 
ﬁ scal ﬂ ows. Th e most important instrument of ﬁ scal 
equalization was discretionary mutual settlements 
(which constituted up to 80 percent of grants dis-
bursed in 1993), the role of grants in equalization was 
then very modest.
Th e situation has changed gradually since. In 
1994 the Federal Fund for Support of Regions was 
established with the aim to create an appropriate in-
strument to equalize interregional budgetary dispari-
ties. Since 1995 it became the most important source 
of regional government external funding peaking in 
its relative value in 1998 (about 75 percent of direct 
federal ﬁ scal assistance). Essentially, the equalization 
has been done for actual expenditures and revenues of 
regional budgets that incorporate mighty anti-stimuli 
for regional budgetary policy. Despite the evolution 
of some elements of the Russian equalization system 
(it is likely to become more sophisticated through the 
time), its essence (to equalize actual revenue and 
expenditure diﬀ erentials) remained unchanged un-
til 2001. It is no surprise that most regional units 
had been eligible for federal untied assistance from 
this Fund (about 80 percent of regions by now) and 
that the overall equalization eﬀ ect is insigniﬁ cant; 
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moreover, the diﬀ erentials after equalization are more 
signiﬁ cant than before the Fund. Th e diﬀ erence in 
minimum and maximum regional per capita expen-
ditures has risen from 12 times in 1992 to 40 times 
in 2000; correspondingly, the value of the variation 
coeﬃ  cient for regional expenditures for this time pe-
riod has doubled. Th e new developments as of 2001 
are likely to make the fund allocation procedure more 
goal-compliant.
In Ukraine, until the late 1990s, the employed in-
strument of equalization was regional diﬀ erentiation 
of sharing rates of some national taxes (the sharing 
pool has been changed almost every year) supported 
by state grants with vesting of responsibility for ﬁ s-
cal equalization on the sub-regional level to regional 
authorities, on the county level—to county authori-
ties. Since 2001, equalization has been carried out 
only with respect to delegated functions due to the 
composition of the formula: involving ﬁ scal capacity 
(measured as SNG average per capita revenues for the 
last three years multiplied by tax ability coeﬃ  cient) 
and expenditure needs (measured on a base of nor-
malized per capita expenditure norms). 
A comparison of current equalization techniques 
practiced in the three countries is provided in Table 
1.11.
Table 1.11
Comparison of Current Equalization Systems
Component Romania Russia Ukraine
Funding Source Fixed share of national PIT  
proceeds, discretionary rate 
of VAT (lump sum)
Predetermined share of federal 
government revenues
SNG contributions, annual 
state budget appropriations
Involvement of Intermediate 
Governmental Tier
County governments 
determine the actual 
equalization of municipal 
budgets
Regional governments fully 
determine the equalization of 
budgets of municipal units 
Equalization of budgets of 
oblasts, rayons and cities 
of oblast signiﬁ cance is done 
separately by the MoF; on 
the sub-county and sub-city 
level—by rayon and city 
authorities
Allocation Mode C: Formula, with respect 
 to expenditure needs 
 (decreasingly, eliminated 
 completely in 2002) and 
 ﬁ scal capacity
M: Nontransparent 
R: Formula, with respect to 
 expenditure needs and 
 ﬁ scal capacity
M: Nontransparent
R, C, M (cities of oblast 
signiﬁ cance): formula with 
respect to expenditure needs 
and ﬁ scal capacity
M (cities of rayon signiﬁ cance, 
settlements, villages): 
Nontransparent
Legend: R—region; C—county; M—municipality
Based on this information, one of the most im-
portant issues that has not been satisfactorily solved 
until now is equalization on the basic level of local 
government. Th e state policy towards equalization on 
this level has undergone no signiﬁ cant change since 
the turn to a market economy and Western values in 
state-building. Vesting equalization issues on interme-
diate governmental levels—in the case of Russia and 
Ukraine on respective state administrations—cannot 
be regarded as the best solution.
Although the overall development of ﬁ scal equal-
ization systems could be judged as positive, there are 
also some countertrends in intergovernmental ﬁ nance 
that could worsen the quality of currently problem-
atic equalization procedures. In Romania, there is a 
trend to relax expenditure needs and to use only ﬁ scal 
capacity as an indicator of ﬁ scal equalization with 
growing use of conditional grants to compensate for 
soaring expenditure disparities. In Russia, the Fund 
for Fiscal Support of Regions undertook recently the 
inappropriate role of disbursing speciﬁ c grants. In 
Ukraine, the basic approach formulated in the Budget 
Code has begun to be eroded by implementation of 
non-justiﬁ ed instruments, such as practicing coeﬃ  cient 
of budget performance and tax-sharing arrangements 
that were not foreseen in budgetary legislation.
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6. AGENDA FOR REFORMING 
 EQUALIZATION POLICY: 
 USING LESSONS FROM THE 
 EXPERIENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES
Proposals to shape equalization policy in the three 
countries can be eﬀ ective only within the broader 
context of intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations: functions 
and expenditure assignment, revenue assignment, and 
correcting for horizontal ﬁ scal deﬁ ciencies. Th us, if no 
improvement is possible in the current state of the two 
ﬁ rst layers of intergovernmental arrangements, then 
there is no sense in proposing changes to the equaliza-
tion branch.
Th e above comparisons reveal some common prob-
lems that are still present, not only in the countries 
that are analyzed in the following chapters, but also in 
other transition countries whose instruments of inter-
governmental ﬁ nance are undergoing rapid change. 
Need for a Complex Approach
Th e countries in question lack a comprehensive ap-
proach to ﬁ scal equalization. Not all issues concerning 
the institutionalization of SNGs have been solved. In 
Russia and Ukraine most territorial units in rural areas 
do not have the status of municipal units, nor do they 
have their own budgets; so they are excluded from 
direct participation in intergovernmental relations 
despite the fact that legislation grants them the right 
to revenues for implementing their own functions. 
If all local authorities are to receive their full rights, 
reassessment of the current administrative structure is 
recommended for Ukraine and Russia. Th is recom-
mendation is based on the fact that ﬁ scal equalization 
volume depends on the administrative structure of the 
respective countries. Th e smaller the units of the basic 
governmental level, the greater the need for equaliza-
tion tends to be. Creating ﬁ scally self-reliant govern-
mental units at this level will blunt the issue of equali-
zation in both political and ﬁ nancial dimensions. Th is 
has been proved by the experience of several transition 
countries in the fSU rim.
Th e other issue that could reduce the volume 
of equalization is reconsideration of the tax-sharing 
system. In all three countries tax-sharing is done 
according to the origin principle, i.e., the taxes are 
shared with the government(s) in whose territory the 
head oﬃ  ce of the ﬁ rm is located. Such an approach 
per se creates signiﬁ cant horizontal ﬁ scal disparities. 
Although disparity could be lessened through a poli-
cy of ﬂ exible regionally diﬀ erentiated sharing rates as 
practiced in some transition countries, the preferable 
policy would be to ﬁ x long-term sharing rates with a 
redistribution of tax proceeds on a per capita basis.
Taking into account all the stages of the equali-
zation process, it should be recognized that only the 
ﬁ nal stage of ﬁ scal equalization is more or less worked 
out; the other important basic issues (rational func-
tion and expenditure assignment, as well as own rev-
enue development) could be seen as the hidden part 
of an iceberg; so the citizens of the three countries are 
still waiting for a well-weighted approach.
Functions Reassessment 
Th e root of the ongoing diﬃ  culties in the area of ﬁ scal 
equalization can be found in the very vague assign-
ment of functions within the public sector. It appears 
there is no signiﬁ cant political will on the national 
level to sort things out, to clarify who within the state 
administration is responsible for doing what.
In Ukraine and Russia, current legislation has 
no provisions concerning the criteria of function as-
signment. Th e delineation of expenditures does not 
exclude multi-sourced funding of service delivery 
with the simultaneous involvement of governments of 
several tiers. Service delivery is administered accord-
ing to the historical traditions of the socialist period 
without applying any objective criteria. Th ere is some 
confusion too with actual service delivery because in 
many cases local governments, being very weak both 
in a ﬁ scal and administrative sense, delegate their 
basic functions to upper level governments—to the 
territorial state administrations of the regional and 
county levels.
Th e other problem here is the very limited scope 
of real subnational functions over which SNGs actu-
ally have discretion. In Ukraine, the own expenditure 
competence of local governments extends to only 10 
percent of total expenditures; in Romania and Russia 
the situation is better but not to a great extent.
Th e recommended policy is a strict legal sepa-
ration of functions and responsibilities within the 
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vertical structure of the public administration sector 
with special account given to the size of local units: 
authorities of the big city and the small village can-
not have the same range of functions. Th is is very 
important because if we know “who should do what,” 
we can calculate a more accurate revenue amount 
needed for function implementation, without a loss 
in eﬃ  ciency due to mutual bargaining and informal 
commitments between administrators of upper and 
lower governmental levels.
One of the remedies for the weak system of inter-
governmental ﬁ nance is fostering horizontal coop-
eration on the basic level of self-government. Th is 
cooperation, supported through state conditional 
grants and voluntary horizontal grants, will diminish 
the need to shift some LG responsibilities to upper 
governmental levels. Good candidates for such an ap-
proach are health care and educational (primary and 
secondary) services, where the service beneﬁ ciaries 
are located within the boundaries of the local govern-
ment of the basic level. Another positive direction in 
eﬃ  cient local service delivery would be the creation 
of special local governments having their own author-
ity and revenue sources. In use for many decades in 
federal countries (e.g., United States and Canada), 
this approach is an innovation for unitary transition 
countries. Th ere have been some positive achieve-
ments with this innovation in Poland, where health 
care has been separated from the scope of functions 
of general local governments.
Revenue Base Broadening
A growing vertical imbalance is one of the most 
critical issues prompting a framework for equalization 
policy from the central government.
Less successful have been the attempts at devel-
oping own revenues for subnational governments in 
the countries. Th e trend is the concentration of ﬁ scal 
power on the central level. In Romania, draft legisla-
tion will conﬁ ne the rates for property tax—the larg-
est source of own revenue—within a range, with caps 
above and below imposed from the center; thus the 
degree of discretion exercised by SNGs in this ﬁ eld 
will be signiﬁ cantly reduced. In Russia, due to the 
latest governmental projections, SNG discretion over 
revenues will be reduced. In Ukraine, there are no 
positive changes foreseen in revenue base (the recently 
adopted Budget Code did not address this issue).
Th is all means that a large vertical imbalance will 
become reality, and will continue to grow. Deﬁ ciency 
in ﬁ scal autonomy will combine in the long run with 
a large inﬂ ow of external resources to local budgets. 
Such an arrangement can be judged as more or less 
satisfactory, as it approximates the practices of some 
developed countries (e.g., Great Britain, Netherlands) 
where local discretion over ﬁ scal issues is quite low. 
Th e greater value to be had is stability. And this is the 
most frequently challenged value in many cases.
Making Th ings More Transparent 
One problem found in all of the reviewed countries 
is a lack of transparency in equalization policy. With-
out exception, in all three countries the intermediate 
level is involved in the equalization issue. Due to the 
discretion that the central government vested on re-
gional and county governments, these intermediaries 
undertake equalization activities in the absence of any 
strict regulation (although legislative frameworks ex-
ist) and in a very subjective manner according to their 
own ideas of how the process should be carried out. 
Th e result is unsatisfactory equalization on the basic 
level (there is no equalization observed or its degree is 
very modest).
Th e following are possible policy recommenda-
tions: separate equalization for intermediate and basic 
levels of government. Dividing up the equalization 
funds between the two levels will result in more 
transparent and stable funding. Of course, such an 
approach will consume some administrative resources 
at the central level, but the ﬁ nal outcomes in terms 
of direct and implicit beneﬁ ts will more than com-
pensate. Informal bargaining will be superseded by a 
clear procedure.
Incorporating Stimuli
From the authors’ analyses we can conclude, at the risk 
of being overly optimistic, that the stimulating eﬀ ect 
of current equalization schemes is very modest. With 
respect to revenue collection and sound ﬁ scal manage-
ment, the current equalization techniques seem rather 
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to counteract subnational ﬁ scal eﬀ orts. For example, 
the methodology for calculating expenditure need 
in Russia gives SNGs incentives to spend the sum 
of money received from upper level governments 
without working to improve the quality and quantity 
of services delivered; in short, the methodology is a 
disincentive to the pursuit of a rational economy of 
expenditures. Eﬃ  ciency is punished with diminishing 
grant money for the next ﬁ scal year. Th e same is also 
true to some extent for Romania and Ukraine. 
An appropriate policy response is a comprehensive 
strategy of encouraging SNGs to collect more money 
for their own budgets. But, frankly speaking, this is 
feasible only when internal revenues begin to compose 
a  signiﬁ cant portion of total subnational revenues. 
Introduction of the real estate tax in Ukraine, and 
increasing SNG discretion in tax administration in 
all countries could be recommended as steps in this 
direction.
Securing Goal Compliance
Th e mere goal of equalization instruments is to 
achieve a degree of equalization. Th e instrument that 
is best suited to equalization is a general grant. Th is 
means that an equalization fund should not deliber-
ately intervene with other goals of grant policy, e.g., 
price subsidizing or stimulation of special types of 
subnational expenditures. From this point of view, in 
Russia steps should be taken to release equalization 
funds from inappropriate goals as mentioned above. 
Th ere is some confusion with goal compliance of 
the equalization process in Russia. Empirical studies 
have observed that the per capita revenue diﬀ erences 
between subjects of the federation are growing instead 
of diminishing. Th is gives reason to suggest the 
following: ﬁ rst, that the real equalization goals might 
be distant from the declared ones (e.g., political
instead of economic); second, that the real procedure 
of equalization deviates from the legislated one; and 
third, that the elaborated mechanisms of equalization 
are not able to address the problem of interregional 
equalization. 
One of the acute problems in Ukraine that under-
mines the eﬀ ectiveness of equalization eﬀ orts, is the 
ﬁ nancing of delegated functions (these must be fully 
funded from the state budget—according to legisla-
tion) assigned to SNGs by the central government 
with the own revenues of SNGs. In an environment 
of insuﬃ  cient resources, the fulﬁ llment of delegated 
state obligations requires LGs to substitute their own 
resources, which reduces the funding available for im-
portant functions of local concern. Until this hidden 
deﬁ cit of ﬁ scal resources is eliminated, equalization 
procedure will not help. 
Th ere is a tradeoﬀ  between the economic and po-
litical reasoning of equalization. Th e former promotes 
equalization as an eﬃ  cient and fair way of public fund 
disbursement between governmental levels, while the 
later sees it as a means of securing a status quo in the 
balance of power and extracting higher political rent.
Stabilizing Intergovernmental Fiscal Flows
According to theory, the critical issue in ﬁ scal equali-
zation is the stability of the mechanism. Th e tempta-
tion to change the rules in order to solve short-run 
budgetary problems is especially high in transition 
countries, due to the vulnerable nature of their 
economy and, correspondingly, their public ﬁ nance 
system. Recently adopted legislation will probably be 
revised in Romania; in Russia, almost annually the 
federal government makes changes in the equalization 
formulas; in Ukraine, the provisions of the recently 
adopted Budget Code have been permanently modi-
ﬁ ed through annual budget laws and governmental 
regulations. So, basic budgetary arrangements are 
undergoing “creeping” changes. 
All these modiﬁ cations make for unpredictable 
intergovernmental ﬁ nance, damaging the ability of 
SNGs to plan ﬁ nancially even in the short run. 
Th erefore, a good step in the right direction would 
be a moratorium for basic equalization procedures 
(formulaic components) and a ﬁ xing of tax-sharing 
arrangements (in Romania and Russia especially) for 
some period of time. After analyzing all the problem-
atic issues during the period of moratorium, the com-
prehensive reform of equalization could be launched. 
Stability of equalization techniques is one of the 
prerequisites for less distortion in the ﬁ scal behavior 
of SNGs; stability relates to all components of the 
equalization process.
First of all, the size of the equalization fund should 
be more or less constant. Th e current procedures—
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where the size of the fund is determined through an-
nual budgetary appropriations (Romania and Russia) 
or through SNG contributions (Ukraine)—seem 
prone to instability and ﬂ uctuation in the amount of 
central funding committed toward the equalization of 
ﬁ scal disparities. Better alternatives involve ﬁ xing the 
sum to economic indices that reﬂ ect general trends 
in the economy. A pool of several national taxes (or a 
ﬁ xed portion of) that are most important for public 
revenue formation could serve here best.
Second, the allocation of equalization funds 
should be done on a stable basis and, if possible,  with-
out the deviations of annual budget laws and other 
governmental regulations. Th e discrete procedure of 
grant allocation that may be best for the central gov-
ernment has nothing in common with other goals of 
public sector policy, such as preserving and fostering 
local democratization and growing public involve-
ment in decision-making on the lowest governmental 
tier. If we take local autonomy as a social value, then 
we have to realize that it develops best in a stable en-
vironment.
Reconsidering Equalization Formulas
According to well-known theoretical studies in the 
ﬁ eld of ﬁ scal federalism and grant theory (Ahmad 
1997; Musgrave 1961; Shah 1994), the most eﬀ ective 
approach to ﬁ scal equalization is the simultaneous 
equalization of both ﬁ scal needs and ﬁ scal capacity.
Th e practice of the surveyed countries shows that 
current approaches could be more compliant with the 
recommendations of theory. However, the problems 
preventing such compliance are obvious: the lack of 
reliable statistical data on the ﬁ scal performance of 
local authorities; insigniﬁ cance of local own revenues 
for SNGs; insuﬃ  cient ﬁ scal discretion in expenditure 
policy; and failure to ﬁ nd appropriate measures, espe-
cially for expenditure needs. 
Reconsideration of formulas may lead to de-
creased inequity if a strict implementation procedure 
is employed in order to minimize the deviation be-
tween legal and actual mechanisms of equalization.     
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ENDNOTES
1 See detailed data presented by Slukhai 2002b.
2 According to Brennan-Buchanan collusion hy-
pothesis, the state tiers form something like a 
cartel in order to avoid competition in service 
delivery resulting from decentralization process; 
Wallis-Oates hypothesis says that ﬁ scal decen-
tralization is followed by a growing subnational 
government share and a decreasing national gov-
ernment share.
 Th ese hypotheses are presented in detail by Shad-
begian (1999).
3 For more detailed information on this issue see: 
Engelschalk 1999; Slukhai 2002a.
4 According to Budget Code of Russian Federation 
(1998), the PIT proceeds should accrue to com-
bined regional budgets. But according to current 
budgetary practice, they are still shared between 
federal government and regions, with a dominat-
ing SNG’ share (99 percent in 2001).
5 We make a distinction between direct and indi-
rect grants. Indirect grants are intergovernmental 
ﬁ scal transfers in the form of shared national 
taxes; direct grants are funds disbursed from the 
governmental budget. 
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Halfway Th ere: Assessing Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Equalization in Romania*
S o r i n  I o n i t ă
Immediately after the fall of the Communist regime, 
Romania made some timid steps towards decentrali-
zation. Th e process accelerated in 1997–98 with the 
passing of a new Law on Local Public Finance, but 
there are still many ﬂ aws in the functioning of inter-
governmental ﬁ nance. Th is paper focuses on a partic-
ular category of transfers—equalization grants—and 
highlights the achievements and the shortcomings 
identiﬁ able so far. Th e analysis is based on budget 
execution data from all local governments of Roma-
nia: 41 counties and 2,950 localities (except for the 
capital, Bucharest, which has a special status and does 
not receive equalization funds). While many conclu-
sions and recommendations are country-speciﬁ c, 
some are more general and may apply to other transi-
tion countries too. 
First, states with weak administration and poor 
ﬁ nancial discipline should not attempt to implement 
complex redistribution rules or rely on data that are 
unreliable or diﬃ  cult to develop. In many cases sec-
ond best solutions should be adopted if they minimize 
the implementation costs and increase transparency 
and predictability, preventing narrow interest groups 
from taking advantage of intricacies and abusing the 
system. Simplicity and daylight are the best disinfect-
ants for public funds. 
Second, the battle lines in the process of decen-
tralization are not always clear-cut, with the good 
guys on one side (local governments) and the bad 
guys on the other (central government, presumably 
opposing decentralization). Instead, local decision-
makers may cherish those aspects of decentralization 
that bring them more resources, but not those that 
require painful decisions, and hence incur political 
costs. Th ey may prefer a situation when funds keep 
coming from the center, instead of having to raise 
own resources from the community and pay a politi-
cal price for it. Th is is important because many times 
analysts assume that local politicians do want more 
local autonomy—which may not be the case. 
Th ird, local governments are not a monolithic 
group: diﬀ erent tiers or types of localities may have 
diverging interests when it comes to ﬁ nancial decen-
tralization, and the central government ends up as 
a mediator rather than a player in the process. For 
example, in Romania’s case, too much discretion for 
county councils in the allocation of funds aﬀ ects the 
ﬁ nancial autonomy of localities. A careful balance 
should be found between the legitimate interests of all 
tiers of government, so that resources match respon-
sibilities and moral hazard or rent-seeking situations 
are avoided. 
Finally, the new democracies should learn that 
good governance means not only passing legisla-
tion, but also implementing it, collecting feedback 
on a steady basis and adjusting the policies whenever 
necessary. Had Romanian decision-makers done so 
in the case of intergovernmental equalization, they 
would have noted that the main goal of the whole ex-
ercise—i.e. equalization—is often not met. Because 
of its loopholes, the system works erratically and even, 
in some instances, transfers resources from poor com-
munities to rich ones. Th is paper concludes with a set 
of recommendations aimed at making the Romanian 
∗ All the data presented in this paper are based on the primary 
aggregation of ﬁ nancial reports available from the Romanian 
Ministry of Finance. I am particularly indebted to Mr. Marin 
Cojoc, director in the MoF, for kindly providing access to 
the ﬁ nancial data from local governments. Many points and 
arguments presented in this paper were developed during 
various discussions with Romanian civil servants, and for-
eign and Romanian independent consultants and academics 
working in the ﬁ eld of local government. I am grateful to all 
of them, but since their number is large I can only mention 
here two of them, whose comments were particularly helpful: 
Francis Conway from the Urban Institute, and Tom Spoﬀ ord 
from the Research Triangle Institute. 
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equalization system simpler, more transparent, and as 
a result, fairer. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Like all other post-communist countries, in the 
early nineties Romania started the transition towards 
democracy and the market economy in a global in-
tellectual environment where decentralization and 
public sector reform were the words of the day. Th ere 
are many motives for why most of the developed and 
developing nations have engaged in decentralization 
in the last decades: to stimulate economic growth, re-
duce urban-rural disparities, deepen democracy, and 
encourage civil society at the local level. Th ese objec-
tives were only partially fulﬁ lled through the previous 
top-down policies pursued by the centralized states 
(Manor 1999). In other cases, central governments 
wanted simply to get rid of part of the development 
burden at a time when the public sector was facing 
tighter budgetary constraints, by placing it on the 
shoulder of locally elected politicians. In one way or 
another, decentralization was seen as the right solu-
tion to many types of problems.
However, it was soon discovered that, as in real 
life, any policy has its own downside. More local 
autonomy and less central intervention in resource 
allocations lead to increasing disparities among 
communities. Th e tolerance towards inequality is 
not very high in the region, given the expectations 
built into the public in the decades of Communism, 
and the previous centralist tradition of the pre-com-
munist states. Ineﬃ  ciency and corruption can also be 
decentralized, so that there is no guarantee that by 
simply transferring more attributions and resources to 
local governments the state will function better. On 
the contrary, overall public spending may increase, 
creating additional problems for the national mac-
roequilibria. Moreover, when designing and promot-
ing decentralization the central government, oﬃ  cials, 
and experts assume that local decision-makers prefer 
more autonomy and self-reliance. However, this is not 
always the case: often local oﬃ  cials avoid making 
use of their full decision-making power, especially 
when it comes to raising local taxes—if they have the 
more convenient alternative of getting funds from the 
center without any political costs attached.
Th ese considerations converge into a more gen-
eral vision that underpins all the proposals outlined 
in the ﬁ nal part of this paper: in spite of the apparent 
complexity of the equalization system, its design and 
monitorization cannot be left entirely to technical ex-
perts. Th e role of technical expertise in the process of 
policymaking must be better understood. Too often, 
we who live in Central and Eastern Europe have the 
impression that each public problem has one right 
solution, and all we have to do is ﬁ nd the best experts 
in the ﬁ eld—and occasionally, appoint them to posi-
tions of power—to sort things out. Th is is naïve and 
unworkable. Experts, whether in public institutions 
or independent, can help by framing the discussion 
properly, identifying and analyzing alternative cours-
es of action, pointing out inconsistencies in existing 
policies, and clarifying options. But ultimately, like 
in other public policy areas, the basic design of inter-
governmental ﬁ scal relations embodies fundamental 
choices that must be made deliberately by the broader 
community in an informed and rational manner, as 
much as this is possible. In our case, for example, 
there are tradeoﬀ s where a decision is needed, such 
as: how much money should be eventually transferred 
(i.e., how much equality do we want to achieve); or 
what is the right balance between economic eﬃ  cien-
cy, which may require larger local governments, and a 
higher degree of autonomy in smaller, traditional lo-
cal units that may be sub-optimal from an economic 
point of view. Another tradeoﬀ  exists between the 
ﬂ exibility of ﬁ scal arrangements, between allowing 
adjustments or bailouts of local communities in need 
by higher-level governments on the one hand, and the 
safeguards against discretionary political interference 
or rent-seeking behavior on the other. 
All these considerations must be taken into ac-
count when designing intergovernmental ﬁ nancial 
relations. Th e equalization grant systems must strike 
the right balance between local autonomy and na-
tional solidarity, administrative tradition and the new 
public sector reform requirements, self-interest and 
external control. Unfortunately, it is a rare case when 
such decisions are taken in a coherent and deliberate 
way. Most often, the system of relations between the 
tiers of government in a country evolve at least in 
part by default, its structuring being the byproduct 
of economic and ﬁ scal decisions that do not follow 
a deliberate decentralization strategy or the result of 
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institutional struggles among local interest groups. 
Romania is no exception, though some rationality 
has been instilled into the system with the 1998–99 
reforms.
Th is paper analyzes the functioning of the equali-
zation grants in Romania, a few budgetary cycles 
after they were introduced. Th e basic questions are: 
so far, have they actually fulﬁ lled their goal—i.e., 
provide extra resources to the poorest communities? 
And can something be done to improve their eﬀ ec-
tiveness? Th e next two sections present and discuss 
the structure and legal framework of local govern-
ments in Romania, focusing on those elements that 
inﬂ uence the equalization transfers. Section four 
analyzes the functions and revenues of local govern-
ments and the inﬂ uence of their assignment on local 
disparities. Section ﬁ ve evaluates the grants system 
with its two conceptual components—vertical and 
horizontal equalization—and outlines its current 
shortcomings. Th e ﬁ nal section concludes with a 
blueprint for reforms aimed at improving the equali-
zation system, phased over two stages: short-term and 
medium-term. 
List of Abbreviations
ASBL Annual State Budget Law
CEE Central and Eastern Europe
LG  local government
LLPF Law of Local Public Finance
LLT Law of Local Taxes
MoF Ministry of Finance
PIT personal income tax
VAT value-added tax
2. THE STRUCTURE OF LOCAL 
 GOVERNMENTS IN ROMANIA
Th e local administration in Romania is organized on 
two tiers: localities and counties (Figure 2.1). Th ere is 
no hierarchical administrative subordination between 
localities, counties and the central government, each 
constituting a component of the public sector with 
full political legitimacy. Th e ruling bodies of the lo-
calities and counties are the councils, elected directly 
every four years. Since both convene only periodi-
cally—usually not more than two or three times per 
month—they need executive structures to oversee the 
Figure 2.1
Central and Local Governments (2 Tiers) in Romania
Local Councils
(2,951 localities)
Mayors
(2,951 localities)
County Councils
(41 counties)
Parliament
Voters
Prefects
(41 counties)
Government
Directly elected; political legitimacy
Appointed; political control
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daily operations of local government. In practice the 
counties are led on a daily basis by a Standing Delega-
tion, which is  elected by the councilors from their 
own ranks and headed by the county president (also 
elected by the councilors). Th e county presidents exert 
much power, formally and informally, since they con-
trol the budgets, the appropriations process, and the 
human resource policies of the executive bodies of the 
county government, plus, under the current system, a 
good part of the equalization funds distributed to the 
localities in the respective county. 
Th e councils of cities, towns, and communes elect 
council chairpersons too, but they have far less power 
than the county presidents—actually, they are not 
part of the executive of the local governments proper. 
Instead, the head of the executive is the mayor, 
elected directly through uninominal vote1 for a term 
of four years in the same local elections, and hence 
possessing her own political legitimacy. 
Th e only exception from the uniform pattern 
outlined above is Bucharest, with a special—and, in 
some respects, unclear—status. Th e capital city does 
not belong to Ilfov county—which for the purpose 
of this paper makes little diﬀ erence since Bucharest 
does not receive equalization funds anyway—and 
so indirectly enjoys county status. On the other 
hand, it is divided into six “sectors,” each with their 
own elected councils and mayors. Each sector has 
approximately the population of an average county, 
and most of the attributions that are common for 
large cities.
In brief, counties have monolithic government, 
while localities have dual government with the power 
split between the legislative and executive. In theory 
each of them is independent from the higher-order 
authorities and accountable only to the citizens. In 
practice the real distribution of powers between tiers 
of government or between executives and legislatures 
varies greatly, being inﬂ uenced by the party aﬃ  liation 
of mayors and council majorities, their relationship 
with the prefect, and, last but not least, by the per-
sonality of mayors and county presidents. Sometimes, 
especially in the case of cities, mayors can be powerful 
characters who manage to act almost independently 
from their councils, very much in the way a strong 
British prime minister controls its Parliament. On the 
other hand, the real independence of action in local 
government can be constrained by the lack of admin-
istrative capability, opaque budgetary allocations, or 
interference from the part of the central government. 
Th is is usually the case in poor rural communes, 
where mayors and local councils try to build good in-
formal relationships with the president of the county 
council, the prefect or the deconcentrated oﬃ  ces of 
the ministries, especially the Ministry of Finance, in 
order to make their ends meet. 
Paralleling this structure, there is also a number 
of oﬃ  ces that are not local government proper, but 
nevertheless inﬂ uence local policies in general, and 
the equalization process in particular. Th e prefects 
are the representatives of the central government 
in territory, acting as coordinators of the ministry 
branches at the county level and heads of the territo-
rial emergency services. Th ey also perform “legality 
supervision” of the decisions taken by local govern-
ments, both at county and locality level, which means 
they can challenge LGs in administrative courts 
whenever they consider an act or action undertaken 
by councils or mayors in their jurisdiction to have 
exceeded the limits of the Constitution or national 
laws. In such cases the local decision or action is sus-
pended until the court issues a ﬁ nal ruling. Since they 
are not elected but appointed, prefects are not part of 
the system of local government proper, being an im-
partial instrument of the central government’s check 
over locally elected oﬃ  cials. However, since the local 
elections are held every four years just a few months 
before the general ones, and so the ruling party is 
likely to have majorities in many county councils too, 
the prefects tend to have close party links with the 
county councils and presidents. As a result, prefects 
are perceived as oﬃ  cials with a pro-county bias. Th ey 
are more likely to take tougher action against local 
councils or mayors, especially against those aﬃ  liated 
with an opposition party. 
Some ministries such as Finance, Transportation 
and Public Works, Agriculture, Environment or 
Home Aﬀ airs have oﬃ  ces in territory, typically in 
county capital cities. While all of them have legal 
attributions in aggregating sectoral policies, some are 
important for the activity of all local governments. 
Romanian public institutions must keep all their 
funds in the State Treasury,2 which is a unit of the 
Ministry of Finance. Th e Treasury oﬃ  ces collect and 
disburse all the funds in/from LG accounts. More-
over, the County Directorates of MoF assist LGs in 
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the process of preparing their own budgets, aggre-
gating ﬁ nancial data for reporting purposes, and 
collecting and allocating the shared national taxes 
(PIT and VAT). Th e frequent interactions of these 
MoF branches with LGs make them important ins-
truments in the hands of the central government for 
exerting informal control over local aﬀ airs. 
3. SUBNATIONAL 
 GOVERNMENT FRAMEWORK
By tradition, the modern Romanian state born in the 
second half of the nineteenth century copied the cen-
tralized, uniform structure of the French republic. For 
the majority of time since its inception local govern-
ment has been organized on two tiers (though there 
were several attempts to create a third tier). But if the 
details of the administrative structure changed several 
times in the last century and a half, the institutional 
culture in local government has remained more or less 
the same: central government intervention in local af-
fairs is tacitly accepted, or at least tolerated, especially 
when it comes from the oﬃ  ce of the prefect. Local au-
tonomy has never been as strong as in Central Europe, 
which was more exposed to the German inﬂ uence. 
Moreover, since nation- and state-building were top 
priorities in the nineteenth century, all other political 
goals were subordinated to the urge to create a mod-
ern and functional national body politic and bureauc-
racy. Local needs and agendas were seen as secondary 
and accepted only as long as they did not threaten the 
interests of the broader national community. 
Th erefore, a uniform pattern of local units was 
created which, though not totally independent of 
regional traditions, was meant to serve ﬁ rst of all the 
functional imperatives of the young state. Grassroots 
democracy has been traditionally weak and all attribu-
tions of local governments, irrespective of the formal 
constitutional setting, were perceived as mandates or 
liberties delegated or created by the nation-state. 
Th e Communist regime that took over in 1948 
eﬀ ected many changes in the local government 
framework, but found the old arrangements funda-
mentally convenient for its own purposes. Since local 
communities were generally accustomed to being 
patronized—and sometimes abused—by the central 
government, they did not represent a real obstacle for 
the new authorities. As a result, when decentraliza-
tion was embarked upon immediately after 1989, 
being regarded as a mandatory stage on the “road 
towards Europe,” the historical experience of local 
self-government was neither rich, nor very useful in 
the new context. Creating a functional network of 
local governments turned out to be both a challenge, 
because of the diﬃ  culties, and an opportunity, since a 
new system could be built up from scratch in a coher-
ent manner. 
As in real life, a complex system such as this could 
not be organized entirely rationally. Many decisions 
that aﬀ ected the process of decentralization were 
taken by default rather than deliberately, and the ﬁ nal 
result is sub-optimal. Many characteristics that sup-
port this conclusion will be discussed further in this 
chapter—and a good deal of them have to do with 
the allocation of transfers and equalization grants. 
But eventually a system did emerge. As far as inter-
governmental ﬁ scal relations are concerned, it relies 
on four main streams of legislation:
• Th e Law on Local Public Administration (LLPA) 
was adopted in 1991 and amended many times 
afterwards, until it was replaced by a new LLPA 
in 2001. Th is piece of legislation deﬁ nes the 
structure and attributions of local governments 
in Romania, at both the local and county level. 
It actually formalizes the return to the Romanian 
subnational administrative structure from the 
interwar years.3 Th e language is rather general as 
far as the functions are concerned, enumerating a 
long list of attributions and making very few dis-
tinctions between the two levels of local govern-
ment. 
• Th e Law on Local Taxes (LLT) was adopted in 
1993, and modiﬁ ed in 2002. Th is act established 
in law the notion of own taxes, controlled and 
levied by the local governments (though the 
control has never been total). Th us, the property 
tax became the main source of own revenues for 
subnational government in Romania.
• Th e Law on Local Public Finance (LLPF) was 
adopted in 1998. Th is act governs the system of 
transfers, shared taxes, equalization grants, and 
municipal borrowing issues. In its current form it 
represents an attempt to codify and make the rev-
enue-sharing system in Romania more transpar-
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ent and rule-based. Th e annex of the law contains 
the chart of accounts that must be used by local 
governments in managing their own revenues 
and expenditures.
• Th e Annual State Budget Laws (ASBL) governs 
one budgetary cycle (January–December) and 
must be passed by Parliament before the end of 
the previous year. ASBLs specify the total amount 
of funds transferred from the central budget to 
local governments in the form of equalization 
money or conditional grants. It also sets the cri-
teria to be used by the Ministry of Finance and 
counties in the process of equalization. 
While in the early ’90s the ASBL was the focus 
of local government policy, reﬂ ecting a high degree 
of centralization in decision-making and high un-
certainty at the local level, the situation has gradu-
ally changed over time. LLPA and LLT substantially 
extended local administrative autonomy and cre-
ated own sources of revenue for local governments. 
However, many ﬁ scal issues had not been sorted 
out and the predictability of the allocation process 
remained low.
Changes in the Local Taxes norms passed in 
1997–98 increased LG control over their own reve-
nues and authorized local councils to administer their 
own taxes. First, monitorization and collection of 
local taxes were entirely transferred to LGs. Second, 
an automatic formula of sharing the personal income 
tax (PIT) among the three tiers of government was 
introduced, which improved the predictability of 
intergovernmental ﬁ nance. A system of equalization 
grants was also introduced, thus reducing the central 
government’s discretion in earmarking sums for LGs. 
Shortcomings remain, however, some of which 
became apparent only subsequently in practice. 
Th e rate of shared taxes has been altered each year 
through ASBLs, though lately it has stabilized around 
the values speciﬁ ed in the LLPF. Special funds dedi-
cated to investments continue to exist, and are allo-
cated to LGs in a way that is neither transparent nor 
very accountable. Some matching grants for invest-
ments are included in the state budget with a known 
destination. But some of them are simply given to 
the relevant line ministries, who are responsible for 
administering them (most often Public Works or 
Industries, since the typical investments are in roads, 
social housing, water systems, and gas pipes). 
Another problem is the substantial interaction 
taking place between county and locality oﬃ  cials—
through both formal and informal channels—in the 
process of drafting the budgets and allocating the 
transfer funds. As counties have to wait for the pass-
ing of the ASBL in order to see how much money they 
will eventually get, so the localities have to wait in 
turn for the county councils to ﬁ nalize the equaliza-
tion process. Th is process creates many points of entry 
for political lobbying and rent-seeking behavior.
4. INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
 FISCAL RELATIONS
In the last decade we have witnessed a steady process 
of reassignment of both functions and revenues to 
subnational levels of government in Romania. Th e lan-
guage of the LLPA drafted in 1991 was loose enough 
so as to accommodate the subsequent reassignments 
without problems. As a result, until 1997–98 a slow 
“creeping” decentralization took place. Two kinds of 
motivations at the central level may explain this process:
• Successive governments faced mounting external 
pressure to implement reform packages, whether 
from international ﬁ nancial institutions or the 
bilateral aid agencies of the European Union. 
Decentralization was a crucial component in all 
these packages. 
• Th e central government wanted to get rid of some 
spending and administrative burdens, and hence 
transferred responsibilities to the lower levels.
On the other hand, there were constraints that 
sometimes made the decentralization process look 
half-hearted, such as:
• Th e genuine concerns in central government 
regarding LGs’ poor managerial capabilities, pos-
sibilities of fraud or municipal bankruptcy, overall 
public debt, rising inequality, etc.
• Th e well-entrenched paternalistic attitude towards 
LGs, who are not regarded as equals by top cen-
tral government oﬃ  cials and the public, no mat-
ter what the law says. 
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Nevertheless, decentralization continued and 
actually gained speed on both dimensions—attri-
butions and revenues—after the big push initiated 
in 1998 and continued in 2001. Figure 2.2 displays 
the evolution in time of the size of local government 
expenditures. While the trend may be judged as posi-
tive, we should also bear in mind the warning of Vito 
Tanzi (2001): in modern and democratic societies, 
decentralization in spending correlates with a larger 
public sector. In other words, some European countries 
may be more decentralized just because they have more 
state and less private sector in their societies. Many times 
when assets or services are privatized, these are more 
likely to come from the portfolio of local govern-
ments. Which is to say that privatization may be an 
even better alternative than decentralization. 
4.1 Functions of Local Governments
Central authorities have a tendency of maintaining 
control over the level of LG expenditures for mac-
roeconomic reasons on the one hand, and because 
they are partially funded from the state budget on the 
other hand. Local autonomy is highly restricted when 
central authorities micromanage expenditures at the 
local level. In fact, in this situation, local authorities 
are only used as agents in executing national policies 
(such as education) or play the part of revenue dis-
tributors (up to an amount set at the central level) to 
public services that, by their nature, need to be pro-
vided at the local level (utilities). At the other extreme 
is strong local autonomy, where the central authority 
only exerts control at the consolidated level of local 
governments, leaving LGs unrestricted decision-mak-
ing power on the amount of expenditures and their 
allocation. 
Th e post-communist countries, Romania in-
cluded, are somewhere in-between these two extreme 
cases. Th eir place on the continuum is deﬁ ned by 
the combination of own and mandated functions, 
imposed on them by the central government. Th e 
analysis below distinguishes between mandatory and 
optional tasks of LGs, taking into account the way a 
particular service is ﬁ nanced, provided and regulated, 
as well as the degree of limitation on local decision-
making power each of them implies. Figure 2.3 gives 
an idea of the functional structure of expenditures at 
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the local level in 2002, which is the most extensive 
the Romanian LGs have seen so far. 
Several observations can be made about the at-
tributions of LGs in Romania in connection with 
their degree of autonomy. First, the scope and extent 
of services has increased steadily over time, as the 
central government transferred additional functions 
to lower levels. Currently, the most important man-
dates, both in terms of visibility and share in local 
budgets, are those that were transferred (or redeﬁ ned) 
more recently: education and welfare support. Second, 
some mandates were terminated, such as the obliga-
tion to subsidize local public transportation. And 
third, many substantial attributions are currently in 
the process of being decentralized, such as police, 
emergency services, or the specialized health sector. 
All these generate important eﬀ ects for the equaliza-
tion system. Th e new functions and mandates will 
probably reinforce the current trend of increasing the 
share of LG expenditure in total public expenditure 
through earmarked sums allocated by the central 
government, both by functional destination and 
geographical area. In practical terms, this will reduce 
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Figure 2.3
Local Government Expenditure (Average Yearly Exchange Rate) [USD]
both the share of own revenues in LG budgets and 
their autonomy to make spending decisions. 
On the other hand, the government argues that 
the decentralization agenda will not be expanded 
forever, and that this will be the last wave of sub-
stantial reassignments of functions. When these are 
completed, in one or two years, the situation will sta-
bilize and we shall have a clearer picture of the costs 
of each service—and of the true vertical and horizon-
tal imbalance in Romanian intergovernmental ﬁ scal 
relations. With stabilization the central government 
has committed itself to relaxing some of the mandates 
now imposed on local governments and transforming 
some of the dedicated transfers associated with them 
into own revenues, or at least into general purpose tax 
shares. Until then, the pure quantitative analysis of 
trends in both expenditures and revenues is somewhat 
misleading if not supplemented with an institutional 
assessment, as well as a description of the general di-
rection of evolution. 
Nevertheless, the overall impression one gains 
from the unfolding of the decentralization of func-
tions in Romania is that a uniform template was 
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(licenses, permits, etc.); all qualify for b, but 
just.
 • After January 2003, when the new LLT will 
be enacted: all of the above are governed by 
the new Local Taxes Law, which narrows the 
range of local options for the property tax 
rate—so everything moves to e.
 • Th e special purpose taxes that can be intro-
duced by LGs at their own will and other own 
revenues that are not aﬀ ected by the new LLT 
remain in category a.
ii) Personal income tax shares (considered to be own 
revenues for the purpose of municipal borrowing, 
for example) qualify for category d4: both the base 
and the rate are set by the central government, but 
the revenue is split automatically on a monthly 
basis according to a formula speciﬁ ed in the LLPF 
that can be modiﬁ ed by the Annual State Budget 
(Table 2.1). Th e PIT shares serve for both hori-
zontal and vertical equalization, as shown in the 
next section.
iii) VAT share grants, allocated yearly through the An-
nual State Budget. Th ey were introduced for the 
ﬁ rst time in 2001, the amount of transfers is set 
discretionary by the central government and the 
money is earmarked. 
iv) Other transfers and subsidies from special funds, 
also deﬁ ned in the ASBL.
Th e evolution of the proportion of each type of 
revenue is shown in Figure 2.4. LGs are allowed to 
introduce new local taxes (and then the revenue is usu-
ally earmarked for a speciﬁ c purpose) for which they 
will determine freely the taxable base and the rate. 
Many have done so, but their total contribution to 
the budgets is hard to evaluate since they are not usu-
used so that the attributions do not diﬀ er by region 
or type of local unit. Th e central government was in 
charge and the whole process is very much centrally 
driven. Th e principle of correspondence was followed 
most of the time in decentralizing the functions. 
However, there are marginal variations from this 
principle which could be attributed to “subsidiarity 
by default”: for example, when service provision is 
maintained at sub-optimal levels, either because of 
sheer institutional inertia or local opposition to the 
transfer of the service to the next upper level. A good 
case in point is education in small rural communities, 
provided in schools that continue to function with 
very few pupils. 
4.2 Revenues of Local Governments
According to the OECD classiﬁ cation (OECD 
1999), ﬁ scal discretion in local government should be 
evaluated using two criteria: freedom to determine the 
taxable base and the tax rate. Starting from a situation 
of complete local autonomy, when LGs can determine 
both the rate and the base of a tax, the freedom of 
movement is reduced in subnational units as the cen-
tral government can intervene and set the base or the 
rate of a local tax—or both. In addition, the various 
tax-sharing arrangements range from those controlled 
by LGs to those completely controlled by the central 
government. Evaluated on these terms, the situation 
of Romanian LG own revenues is the following:
i) Own revenues proper, the most important of which 
are the local taxes and fees regulated by the LLT:
 • Since 1997–98 until January 2003: LGs had 
some discretion in setting the tax rate, within 
a range speciﬁ ed by law for local property taxes 
(land, buildings, vehicles) and other user fees 
Table 2.1
Th e PIT Shares Assigned to LGs by LLPF and the Annual Budget Laws [Percent]
LLPF 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Municipalities 40 35 35 36.5 36.5 36
Counties, own 10 15 10 10 10
Counties, for equalization 15 15 16 17
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ally shown separately in the aggregated reports. Th e 
percentage is likely to be small, though it may make a 
diﬀ erence for the provision of that particular service. 
Th ough in theory the government encourages 
LGs to become more self-reliant, this does not always 
happen in practice. Th ere have been instances when 
county prefects sued local councils in administrative 
courts when they tried to introduce new local taxes 
(it happened in Bucharest in 2000). Some ministers 
have repeatedly reprimanded local councils that levy 
“unreasonable taxes on the already-impoverished 
population” (on pets, garbage collection, vehicles 
pulled by animals, park entrance fees, etc.). Th e me-
dia, more often than not, is also ready to pour scorn 
on any such local initiative. 
On the other hand, as mentioned above, the same 
government recently rescinded from the new Local 
Taxes Law the authority of LGs to go the other way 
and lower taxes—a minister argued that, for “popu-
list reasons,” irresponsible mayors were threatening 
the local own revenues base. Several large cities were 
given as examples, but no hard data were produced 
Figure 2.4
Local Government Revenues (Annual Average Exchange Rate) [USD]
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to back the allegations. Moreover, there seems in-
deed to be a “race to the bottom” in small towns 
or rural municipalities: the mayors underestimate 
their own revenues in the draft budgets in order to 
secure more equalization funds. Th is is a typical case 
of the substitution eﬀ ect induced by the equalization 
system which has been conﬁ rmed by local CFOs and 
becomes apparent when one analyzes the diﬀ erences 
between the projected budgets and the execution one 
year later: the projected own revenues have systemati-
cally been lower than what was actually collected. 
Th e mayors and CFOs do not seem much aﬀ ected 
by the newly introduced limitations (the shift from b 
to e tax categories). Th ey estimate that the new law, 
because of the zoning policy and other provisions, 
will increase their revenues by at least 20–25 percent. 
5. THE EQUALIZATION SYSTEM
Th e equalization system is an important component 
of intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations, in both federal 
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and unitary states. Even loose confederations like the 
European Union have set up systems to transfer funds 
between their components units—nation-states—in 
order to compensate for disparities in the level of 
development (structural funds) or cross-unit exter-
nalities (environmental or agricultural subsidies). In 
theory, LGs may provide public goods that not only 
beneﬁ t their own residents, but residents of other 
localities as well. Because of these externalities, the 
central government is assumed to set up programs of 
intergovernmental transfers that function as Pigovian 
corrective subsidies (Wildasin 1997). If we consider, 
by stretching a bit the meaning of the concept, that a 
certain amount of equality among regions and locali-
ties is also a public good, then the moral ground for 
ﬁ scal equalization is established: by redistributing a 
portion of local income, the government maximizes 
the general welfare of society. 
However, the basic premise of the theory is that 
public sector decision-making proceeds sequentially, 
in two steps. First, the central government’s program 
of corrective intervention sets normative budgetary 
limitations for localities. Th en, in turn, LGs choose 
their level of local taxes and expenditures according 
to the local autonomy principles. But the circle does 
not close here. After observing the local ﬁ scal deci-
sions, higher-level authorities can intervene in a third 
step with extra subsidies or bailouts, transparent or 
hidden under various disguises, in those places where 
resources do not match “needs.” Knowing this, the 
LGs can anticipate the moves of the central govern-
ment and act in such a way that they become net 
receivers of ﬁ nancial help—either by overspending 
or by not exploiting fully local revenue generating 
power. Th is is a typical moral hazard situation, and 
all those who design equalization systems try to build 
safeguards against it. 
Nevertheless, no matter how carefully these safe-
guards are projected, the basic fact remains that 
equalization grants are subsidies for poor LGs—and 
as with any other good, the more you pay for poverty, 
the more of it you get. In time the agents in cause will 
adjust their behavior creatively to the rules of the sub-
sidy system, and the claims against the equalization 
system will multiply. In order to minimize these per-
verse eﬀ ects, the analysis and recommendations be-
low concerning the equalization system in Romania 
start from a few simple principles:
• Th e simpler, the better. Transparency discour-
ages rent-seeking and makes rule-bending more 
diﬃ  cult.
• Enforcing hard budget constraints (Kornai 1986) 
is a prerequisite for sustainable intergovernmental 
ﬁ scal arrangements. Th e local budgets should be 
“hard” in the sense that the third step of intergov-
ernmental policy mentioned above does not oc-
cur—or is exceptional enough so that it does not 
represent an easy exit for local oﬃ  cials. Moral haz-
ard should thus be prevented, whether it is related 
to municipal borrowing proper, or overspending 
and accumulation of arrears.
• Whenever a change in rules needs to be made, it 
should lead to as few ﬁ scal shocks as possible in 
the short run. In other words, new rules may be 
introduced as long as they assume a gradual depar-
ture from the status quo. Otherwise, it is unlikely 
that the proposed ﬁ scal reforms will be accepted 
by the majority of the stakeholders (Molle 1997). 
5.1 Sources of Funds
Th ere are two main sources of funds used for horizontal 
and vertical equalization in Romania: the Personal 
Income Tax (PIT) and the Value-Added Tax (VAT). 
Until 1999 the ﬁ rst was actually a simple salary tax and 
the central government used to allocate discretionary 
amounts to local governments through the Annual 
Budget Law from the total yield of the tax. It was 
only the LLPF that introduced in 1998 the notion 
of sharing the PIT revenues according to predeﬁ ned 
quotas among the three tiers of government. Th e sums 
are collected by stoppage at origin (the location of the 
workplace) and transferred to localities, counties, and 
the state budget on a monthly basis. Th erefore the 
system works more or less automatically and is fairly 
predictable—because of which people sometimes 
argue that the PIT shares can be assimilated to LG 
own revenues. However, local governments cannot 
control the base, the rate or the collection system, and 
hence this is actually a typical shared tax. Th e sums 
allocated as shared PIT has increased in time from 50 
percent of the total yield indicated in the text of the 
LLPF to 62.5 percent in 2002 (see Table 2.1),4 which 
reﬂ ects a higher degree of ﬁ nancial autonomy at the 
local level. 
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Figure 2.5
Th e Sharing of the Personal Income Tax (PIT, Shared Tax) Revenues among Tiers of Government, 2002
PIT Collected Centrally
100% (USD 1,290 billion in 2002)
(A) PIT Amounts (“Sume”)
transferred on quarterly basis;
total pool set by the government in national budget
(26% in 2002 = USD 336.1 million)
(S) PIT Share (“Cote”)
monthly transfers
62.5%
(USD 806.3 million in 2002)
(E) ‘Equalization’ (“Echilibrare”)
total amount speciﬁ ed 
in national budget
(21.1% in 2002)
5. Producer Subsidy 
for Residential Heating
government decides total sum
(4.9% in 2002)
6. Localities
36.5%
7. Counties’ Own
10%
8. Counties, To Be Allocated
for Equalization
16%
1. Welfare Support
(10% in 2002)
2. Culture, Religion
(1.35% in 2002)
3. Own, Counties
(2.5% in 2002)
4. Equalization 
Proper, To Localities
(7.3% in 2002)
Equalization system: sums (3+4) and share (8).
Counties decide the allocation of horizontal equalization funds (boxes 4 and 8); in theory they should use the same formula as the government in allocating PIT by county. Shaded boxes 
are those where counties can intervene in vertical and horizontal allocation.
The rest of 11.5% of the PIT collected and not allocated to local governments goes to the central government’s budget.
H
A
L
F
W
A
Y
 T
H
E
R
E
: A
S
S
E
S
S
IN
G
 IN
T
E
R
G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
A
L
 F
IS
C
A
L
 E
Q
U
A
L
IZ
A
T
IO
N
 IN
 R
O
M
A
N
IA
47
Figure 2.6
Th e Sharing of the VAT (National Tax) in the 2002 Budget
All sums are earmarked
Total VAT Revenues (100%) = USD 2,746.5 million
Public Primary + 
Secondary Education
(29.3%)
3. Nurseries (Localities)
(0.2%)
4. County/Local 
Agro Consultancy Oﬃ  ces
0.15%
5. Child Protection 
Authority (County)
1.8%
6. Protection system 
disabled persons
2%
1. County
(Special Needs)
1.3%
2. Localty
28%
... Of Which—Disabled
1.5%
VAT Sums Allocated To Local Governments
no formula, amount in National Budget
(USD 918.2 million in 2002 = 33.4%)
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Of the PIT shares they receive, the counties must 
allocate some funds for the purpose of horizontal 
equalization. Th is amount was not deﬁ ned as a speciﬁ c 
share at the beginning, and hence the counties have 
tended to abuse the system by conﬁ scating most of 
the funds. Starting with 2000 the State Budget Laws 
have split the county shares into two parts: own, and 
earmarked for equalization (Table 2.1). 
Th e rest of the PIT revenues (37.5 percent in 2002) 
goes to the state budget—but part of it returns to 
LGs as conditional grants attached to some mandates 
(hence serving the purpose of vertical equalization) or 
block grants for horizontal equalization. Eventually, 
the state budget is left with little more than 10 
percent of the total PIT revenues. Th e actual split of 
PIT revenues by destination in the 2002 budget is 
detailed in Figure 2.5.
As mentioned before, the PIT sharing system 
combines horizontal and vertical equalization. 
Moreover, the conditionality and destination of sums 
should be analyzed in connection with the assign-
ment of functions discussed in the previous section. 
Certain aspects that inﬂ uence the process of ﬁ scal 
equalization should be outlined here. First, the PIT 
revenues transferred to LGs are split into two main 
categories: 
• PIT shares (cote), deﬁ ned according to the per-
centages speciﬁ ed in LLPF and Annual State 
Budget Laws (box S in Figure 2.5). Even though 
the ASBL can alter these percentages, they tend 
to remain stable in time with a slight upward 
tendency that beneﬁ ts LGs (Table 2.1). Part of 
the shares that go to counties is earmarked for 
horizontal equalization (box 8). Th e percentages 
that deﬁ ne PIT sharing are ﬁ xed for one budget-
ary cycle (and fairly stable since their introduc-
tion) and apply to all local government units. No 
county or locality is allowed to change the rates or 
apply surcharges. 
• PIT “amounts” (sume), deﬁ ned as discretionary 
by the central government in the Annual State 
Budget Law (box A in Figure 2.5). Th ere is no 
legal requirement as to the size of this pool of 
funds taken from the central government’s share 
of PIT. However, it has always revolved around 25 
percent of the total collection. 
Figure 2.7 represents in simpliﬁ ed form the ﬂ ow 
of funds for equalization, with their two main com-
ponents, E and S, and the two-step transfer for the 
component E. 
Figure 2.7
Th e Basic Design of the Equalization System 
in Romania 
(E = boxes 3 and 4; S = box 8 in Figure 2.5)
Central Government
Counties
Localities
Th e PIT “amounts” (box A) serve both for verti-
cal and horizontal equalization:
• Welfare support, introduced for the ﬁ rst time in 
the 2002 budget (box 1): general welfare support 
distributed by LGs and based on means testing; 
residential heating supplementary subsidy (heat-
ing vouchers), also based on means testing.
• General price subsidy paid to utilities through lo-
cal budgets (box 5).
• Horizontal equalization grant allocated to coun-
ties; they can withhold up to 25 percent of it for 
their own use (box 3), and distribute the rest to 
localities from their jurisdiction (box 4).
Th e grants depicted in boxes 1, 2, 4, 5 and 8 
(Figure 2.5) are those where county councils can 
intervene in their allocation to localities, because 
the money is transferred ﬁ rst to them and they then 
distribute it further. Th e language of the law is not 
clear—typically it refers to “consultations” among 
county councils, mayors, and the relevant deconcen-
trated ministry oﬃ  ces. Th e issue is important espe-
cially for the process of horizontal equalization (boxes 
3, 4 and 8) and creates problems in the allocation of 
E
S
H A L F W A Y  T H E R E :  A S S E S S I N G  I N T E R G O V E R N M E N T A L  F I S C A L  E Q U A L I Z A T I O N  I N  R O M A N I A
49
funds. We will come back to this in the next section.
Th e counties receive the sums from the state 
budget, following the list annexed to the State Budget 
Law. In turn, the counties transfer the funds further 
to localities—where applicable (boxes 2, 3, 4, and 
6)—according to the local needs that were originally 
incorporated into the draft local budgets. Th ere is still 
not much experience with this process, and no ﬁ rm 
criteria to be followed. As a result, the process is not 
yet very transparent. In practice, the county councils 
decide how much to give and to whom following the 
need estimates contained in the local draft budgets 
sent to the MoF in the ﬁ rst stage of the budgetary 
cycle. If the MoF allocates less money than the LGs 
requested at the aggregate level, then the shares of 
each locality are reduced proportionately. Th e whole 
process is based on consultations among county 
council presidents and mayors, with expert advice 
from the part of the county oﬃ  ces of the relevant 
ministries (ﬁ nance, education, welfare, etc.). 
5.2 Vertical Equalization
Vertical disparities in Romania have ﬂ uctuated widely 
in the last decade. In the early ’90s, when LGs were 
still not consolidated and lacked a reliable base of 
own revenues, most of the spending was controlled 
and ﬁ nanced from the center. As a consequence 
the disparities were high and many functions were 
matched by conditional transfers. By the mid-nineties, 
after the adoption of the Law of Local Taxes, the LGs 
were able to secure their own basis of revenues—the 
most important of which has been the property tax—
and their ﬁ scal independence increased. In 1996–98 
the proportion of own revenues in total expenditure 
increased slowly to 25–30 percent.5 
Th e situation improved even more in 1999 and 
2000 with the introduction of the PIT sharing 
system: if we include the automatic shares of the PIT 
allocated to LGs, the rate of coverage surpassed 50 
percent. In these two years the total transfers from the 
state budget aimed at ﬁ nancing mandated functions 
were roughly one-third of LG expenditure (the rest 
included various subsidies and funds earmarked for 
non-mandated functions). 
But the substantial reassignment of functions 
that begun in 2001 reversed the trend. Section 4.1 
in this chapter explains why this happened: many 
new functions that were transferred to LGs in fact 
created mandates for the subnational government 
(Table 2.2). Th e typical cases are salaries in education 
and the national welfare policy, in which the central 
government maintains many points of intervention. 
In parallel with the assignment of these mandates, 
earmarked grants were created—supplementary PIT 
“amounts” and VAT shares—to ﬁ nance their provi-
sion. As a result, the total LG expenditure increased 
by almost 40 percent in absolute volume, the share 
of own revenues declined proportionately and the 
portion of transfers aimed at making up for vertical 
imbalances surged. 
Th is long-term trend is reﬂ ected in the evolu-
tion of the Hunter coeﬃ  cient—the ratio of own 
revenues to total revenues in LGs—over the last years 
(Figure 2.8). Since 1998, when the sharing of PIT 
was inaugurated and the shares proper have become 
quasi–own revenues (boxes 6 and 7 in Figure 2.5), the 
Hunter coeﬃ  cient can be calculated in two ways: 
• conservatively, by taking into account the own 
revenues only (the black line);
• more broadly, by including among own revenues 
the PIT shares (the grey line).
Table 2.2
Categories of Expenditure in LG Budgets [Percent]
Before 2000 2001–2002
Not mandated General local services 40 25
Public transportation 20 8–9
Mandated Education 10–12 35
Welfare policy 5–6 15
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In both cases, the value is slightly higher if we 
separate the two tiers of local government and refer 
to the ﬁ rst one only (localities). In other words, lo-
calities have a little more control over their own rev-
enues than do counties. However, the numbers may 
underestimate the important role the counties play in 
allocating the equalization amounts (box 8 in Figure 
2.5), especially since they can decide how much of 
these funds to withhold. 
For both counties and localities, the trend is 
clear: the proportion of sums spent covering the 
cost of mandates has risen at the expense of the 
non-mandated functions. Th e situation is unlikely 
to change much in the near future. Th e government 
has set an ambitious agenda for the next one or two 
years—more attributions will be reassigned to LGs. 
Th e list includes police, disaster relief, emergency 
services, and local power plants. Th e exact impact on 
local budgets is hard to estimate, but the direction 
of change will be the same: more mandatory spend-
Figure 2.8
Vertical Imbalance the Hunter Coeﬃ  cient (Own Revenues of Local Governments/Total)
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ing, and probably more dedicated transfers paid from 
VAT revenues collected at the national level. 
In the long run, the government will probably be 
able to transform some of the earmarked sums and 
subsidies into own sources of revenue (or at least gen-
eral purpose transfers with stable allocation formulas, 
such as shared taxes) and the local budgetary proc-
ess will become more stable. Until then, attempts to 
ﬁ ne-tune revenue allocation are probably useless, and 
attention should focus on the few big issues that can 
make a diﬀ erence irrespective of how the ﬁ nal assign-
ment of functions looks. 
Th e process of transfer is complex and unpredict-
able and sometimes even the central government can-
not control it fully. For example, some services that 
will be transferred to LGs must ﬁ rst be demilitarized 
(police, ﬁ reﬁ ghters). Th is is a sensitive and visible is-
sue. Most probably, the stakeholders will ﬁ ercely op-
pose the reforms, not wanting to be made into local 
civil servants and have their special military status 
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abolished. Th is creates uncertainty and political risks 
until the reassignment is completed. Moreover, it is 
diﬃ  cult to make an estimate of the real costs of these 
services as long as they are part of central ministries 
because many auxiliary operations and overheads 
are shared with other departments. Th e only realis-
tic option in this respect is learning by doing—and 
hence the central government has one more reason to 
continue for some time to use earmarked sums and 
preserve some room for maneuvering. 
5. 3 Horizontal Equalization
Th e capacity of LGs to raise their own revenues varies 
substantially from one unit to another. For example, 
the county revenues per inhabitant in the 2001 budg-
etary cycle range more than 1:3 from the poorest to 
the most well-oﬀ  county (Table 2.3). Th is range of 
variation is larger than that of the PIB per capita or 
any other measure of development because it reﬂ ects 
not only the absolute level of poverty in a particular 
area, but also the incapacity of the government, cen-
tral or local, to develop a tax base and collect revenues 
in that constituency. Th e value of property varies more 
than the average salary from region to region; moreo-
ver, the informal economic sector is much larger in 
some areas than in others—for example, in predomi-
nantly rural regions with strip farming and household 
consumption of production. Without valuable prop-
erty to tax and oﬃ  cial jobs that generate PIT within 
the constituency, local governments cannot realize 
own revenues. If anything, the disparities are even 
more pronounced within than among counties. Th e 
power to generate own revenues in the lower tier of 
local government, the localities, varies from 1 to 600 
(Table 2.3). 
Th e formula of PIT sharing introduced in 1999 
is simple and straightforward (Table 2.1), but it has 
a downside: it functions as a generator of horizontal 
imbalances especially at the lowest level of LGs. Since 
the tax is collected at the point of origin and then 
split among national, county and locality budgets, it 
beneﬁ ts those municipalities (usually large cities or 
towns) which have many oﬃ  cial jobs on their terri-
tory. When residents of rural settlements commute 
to work in the nearby town, the latter collects all the 
corresponding share of the PIT. Th us, the diﬀ erences 
in revenue raising capacity are magniﬁ ed, both at the 
local and county levels. Richer counties also beneﬁ t, 
because at the same level of personal income you are 
more likely to have a formal job here than in a poor 
county, where a larger part of the real income tends 
to remain hidden. 
Th erefore, the need arises to mitigate the eﬀ ects 
of these discrepancies. Th ere are many reasons to do 
this: it would be politically unacceptable to decrease 
the provision level under a certain threshold even 
in the poorest communities. Even if, strictly speak-
ing, not all local government functions are national 
mandates, certain general government and local serv-
ices have to be oﬀ ered to every citizen. Moreover, in 
post-communist states almost all local communities 
have inherited a network of local services, more or 
less extended, and a strong expectation that they will 
continue to function. Terminating this tacit social 
contract is diﬃ  cult even in the direst ﬁ nancial situ-
ations. Many local governments are now confronted 
with the issue of overextended services and shrinking 
ﬁ nances—especially small towns, where urban serv-
ices cannot beneﬁ t from economies of scale. 
Before the adoption of the Law of Local Public 
Finance in 1998, it was hard to distinguish in Romania 
between vertical and horizontal equalization. Both 
Table 2.3
Variations in Resources Per Capita in LGs: Own Revenues Plus PIT shares, 2001 
USD/Cap Counties Localities
Average 8.6 33
Max 25.6 705
Min 2.9 1.2
Standard deviation x average 0.48 0.9
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kinds of imbalances were addressed through the 
distribution of conditional transfers. Th e criteria for 
the distributions were numerous and kept changing 
from one year to the next, while vertical negotiations 
at all levels were playing an important role. Th e basic 
idea was to develop a comprehensive set of normative 
criteria that could approximate as closely as possible 
“the real need of the community.” Many things were 
factored in at one moment or another—such as the 
area, number of inhabitants, length of roads, size of 
the running water and sewerage systems, number of 
children in school, hospital beds, persons assisted in 
special institutions, but they were not speciﬁ ed in a 
text of law. Th e problem with this system was that 
the rules were cumbersome, negotiable and thus 
unpredictable. Th ey created perverse incentives: LGs 
had strong motives to oppose any kind of reform or 
rationalization in the social services, since the trans-
fers were not linked with performance but with the 
physical extension of the service. 
Horizontal equalization was not so much a goal 
as such, but rather a byproduct of distribution based 
on normatives. Moreover, the pattern of allocation 
ran against it: the richer and better endowed with lo-
cal services a local community was, the more money 
it was likely to receive. Corrections were applied to 
this distribution, but in a non-systematic manner. 
Th e decentralization reform package initiated in 
1998 separated the objectives and instruments for 
vertical and horizontal equalization. It also intro-
duced the notion of ﬁ scal capacity as a benchmark to 
be used in the process of equalization across LGs. At 
the beginning, ﬁ scal capacity was weighted only 30 
percent in the process of equalization. Th e remaining 
70 percent depended on a combination of normatives 
used as a proxy for the community “need.” Gradually 
all the other criteria were removed one by one, so that 
in 2002 ﬁ scal capacity represents the only element 
used for horizontal equalization.
Th e gradual removal of needs as a factor in hori-
zontal equalization, shown in Table 2.4, is the result 
of a long debate that could not be settled in 1998. Th e 
“fast reformers” (Ministry of Local Administration, 
foreign advisers) tended to favor a simpler solution 
based predominantly on the ﬁ scal capacity principle. 
Th ey also argued for the inclusion of the precise no-
tion of “equalization formula” in the text. On the 
other hand, the “conservatives” (Ministry of Finance) 
wanted to preserve some room for maneuvering by 
continuing with the looser concept of “equalization 
criteria.” Even though the latter prevailed at ﬁ rst, 
the formula-based equalization gained ground and 
eventually won. Currently a formula is included in 
the ASBL that uses the collection of PIT in each local 
government area—a variable beyond the control of 
LGs—as a proxy for local ﬁ scal capacity.
Th e Fiscal Capacity Formula:
  
EL = 
(ORC/PC)/(ORL/PL) x PL/PC
              x EC
  ∑[(ORC/PC)/(ORL/PL) x PL/PC] 
  
L=1
EL  = equalization grant per locality
EC  = equalization grant per county
ORL  = own revenues (including PIT shares) 
per capita—locality
ORC = own revenues (including PIT shares) 
per capita—county
PL  = population of locality
PC  = population of county
Table 2.4
Criteria for Horizontal Equalization, in time
Need Fiscal capacity
1999 Population, length of streets, number of houses, water and sewerage network, 
children in school, children in orphanages, disabled persons 
70% 30%
2000 Population, length of streets, number of houses, water and sewerage network, 
children in school, children in orphanages
70% 30%
2001 Area of LG, children in school, children in orphanages, disabled persons 30% 70%
2002 100%
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Th e system of horizontal equalization works in 
two steps:
• First the MoF allocates by county the total pool of 
funds deﬁ ned as PIT “amounts” (box A in Figure 
2.5, corresponding to the 2002 budget). Th e ﬁ scal 
capacity formula is then applied and the resulting 
distribution of funds is published as an annex to 
the State Budget Law. 
• In the second step, the counties withhold their 
share of the equalization funds (up to 25 per-
cent of the sum received) and distribute the rest 
to localities. Th is stage of equalization is much 
more problematic, since not all the counties use 
the ﬁ scal equalization formula. Actually, few of 
them do so—and only as a base for starting nego-
tiations with the mayors of localities. Most coun-
ties interpret the provisions in the ASBL as mere 
“guidelines” and argue that strictly following the 
formula’s results is not workable in practice. MoF 
has been unable so far to enforce a uniform and 
transparent equalization mechanism at the sub-
county level. 
By design, the ﬁ scal capacity formula aims at 
compensating the counties and localities for both the 
relative poverty of a region and the adverse eﬀ ect of 
the PIT shares stopped at origin. Th e departures from 
this policy goal at the county level are only marginal, 
and are due to the diﬀ erences occurring between the 
budget projection and execution.
Th e problem is that the inclusion of own revenues 
as a ﬁ scal capacity indicator creates disincentives to 
maximize them at the LG level—the typical substitu-
tion eﬀ ect of own revenues with equalization money. 
Th e phenomenon was not apparent in the ﬁ rst years 
of application of the new mechanism, but as people 
become more accustomed to it, especially in rural 
communes, the practice is spreading fast. Since the 
data introduced in the ﬁ scal capacity formula are the 
projected own revenues for the following year, the 
LGs can underestimate them in order to get more 
equalization funds at the expense of their neighbors. 
In time, this triggers a “race to the bottom” among 
the localities in the same county that only skews the 
pattern of distribution, while the total pool of funds 
stays the same. A quick solution is needed here in or-
der to remove the vicious incentives from the system.
Apart from the above, counties get additional 
equalization funds on a monthly basis, as a direct 
share of the PIT yield (box 8 in Figure 2.5, deﬁ ned 
as 15 percent of the PIT in 2001 and 16 percent in 
2002). Th ey distribute this money to “communes, 
towns, cities, and their own budget, after getting 
expert advice from the territorial MoF oﬃ  ces.” Th is 
second pool of money is more reliable and predictable 
than the ﬁ rst, since it depends on the level of PIT 
collection, not on the central government’s wishes. 
However, the legislation ignored a small detail: to 
impose a cap on the share that can be withheld by 
the counties. As a result, predictability only applies to 
counties; the localities are completely at the mercy of 
the county councils and presidents, who in some cases 
have decided to give nothing to the localities. Figure 
2.9 below reproduces the basic logic of the equaliza-
tion system in Romania displayed in Figure 2.7 and 
shows the most important sources of problems in the 
process of ﬁ scal equalization—in the form of loop-
holes or “points of entry” for discretionary decisions. 
E
S
Central Government
Localities
Counties
a) Total pool 
 not deﬁ ned
b) Formula applied 
 inconsistently
c) Pool deﬁ ned, but no cap on the 
share withheld by counties
d) Formula applied 
 inconsistently
Figure 2.9
Main Sources of Problems in the Romanian Equalization System
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Figure 2.10 illustrates the wide range of variation 
in allocating the second PIT share (S) by localities—
i.e., the eﬀ ects of the loopholes described in boxes (c) 
and (d) in Figure 2.9. Th e discretion exerted by coun-
ties is total: in some cases the localities are given next 
to nothing (e.g. Vrancea county); in others, large cities 
get a disproportionate share. Rural communes, who 
are generally most in need, are the most likely to suf-
fer from this erratic distribution. What is more, there 
is no obvious correlation between the general poverty 
of counties and a speciﬁ c pattern of allocation. Which 
suggests that it is entirely up to the county councils to 
decide how to distribute the equalization funds. 
Th e current practices governing the relations 
between counties and localities generate problems for 
both tiers of local government. Lacking appropriate 
instruments to pursue their legitimate goals—invest-
ments with interlocality spillover or economies of 
scale eﬀ ects, regional development, etc.—the coun-
ties resort to informal pressures, conditioning of 
investment allocations, or distorting the equalization 
mechanisms. Th e sums are sometimes used to reward 
political associates, and sometimes as a lever to force 
localities into thinking more broadly and cooperate 
with each other. Th e ﬁ rst goal is illegitimate, the sec-
ond is legitimate—but in both cases the instrument 
should not be the equalization grants system. 
Rural communes are the most aﬀ ected by these 
interventions since in most cases their ﬁ nancial au-
tonomy is weaker. But all the localities suﬀ er, more 
or less. Professional multiannual budgeting becomes 
impossible when they cannot estimate in advance 
the size of the equalization grants. Ideally the grants 
should only depend on the overall size of the equaliza-
tion pool in one year. Th e allocation formula is only 
meant to provide a ranking of localities according to 
their ﬁ scal capacity. If the evaluation is correct, there 
will be relatively little change in this ranking from 
one year to next, and so local oﬃ  cials will know in 
advance with a high degree of probability where they 
stand and what will be the level of resources they can 
rely on. Th eir incentives will thus be to focus not on 
permanent lobbying for larger sums, but on prioritiz-
ing the spending items. 
More speciﬁ cally, several systemic ﬂ aws can be 
identiﬁ ed as far as the rules of equalization grants are 
concerned. 
Unfairness. Th e equalization funds are distributed 
more or less randomly, both at the locality and county 
level as Figures 2.11a–c show. Th ough in theory these 
sums should compensate LGs with low capacity to 
generate own revenues, and hence there should be 
a clear inverse correlation between ﬁ scal power and 
grants funds, legal loopholes allow counties to inter-
vene and bend the rules. First, since there is no limit 
on the portion of the 16 percent PIT share that the 
counties can withhold for their own budget (box 8 in 
Figure 2.5), a wide variation appears in the pattern of 
distributing these funds (Figure 2.10). Some counties 
take much more than others, at the expense of the 
localities in their geographical area—and thus shift 
funds from the horizontal to the vertical equalization 
component. Th e process is not controlled or coordi-
nated, and hence the resulting distribution has noth-
ing to do with equalization: in Figures 2.11a–c there 
is no relationship between the ﬁ scal power of coun-
ties and the per capita sums received (or withheld) 
as equalization funds. Th is creates a serious problem 
for rural communes left at the mercy of cash hungry 
counties. 
Second, the counties do not follow the ﬁ scal ca-
pacity formula when distributing equalization funds 
at the sub-county level. Th ough the reason usually 
put forward by county oﬃ  cials is that the formula 
is too rigid and does not provide enough resources 
to the poorest localities, Figure 2.11 shows that the 
current “ﬂ exible” practices do not actually improve 
fairness. Th e 2,951 Romanian localities are plotted 
on the charts according to the level of own revenues 
(proper + PIT share) and the equalization funds per 
capita they receive. Th ere is very little correlation be-
tween the “need” of localities and what they actually 
get from the equalization system. County discretion 
in deﬁ ning the total pool of equalization funds go-
ing to localities, and the rules of allocation to locali-
ties, create the combined eﬀ ect displayed in Figure 
2.11a and b: cities and towns receive funds almost 
randomly; several dozen rural communities receive 
disproportionately large funds; while many poor LGs 
have no money either from own sources or transfers.
Th ese ﬁ ndings are not surprising, nor are they 
speciﬁ c to the case of Romania. It has been noted 
before that there is a systematic asymmetry in the 
way hard budget constraints are enforced in inter-
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County
Cities
Towns
Communes
Alba
Arad
Arges
Bacau
Bihor
Bistrita
Botosani
Brasov
Braila
Buzau
Caras
Calarasi
Cluj
Constanta
Covasna
Dâmbovita
Dolj
Galati
Giurgiu
Gorj
Harghita
Hunedoara
Ialomita
Iasi
Ilfov
Maramures
Mehedinti
Mures
Neamt
Olt
Prahova
Satu Mare
Salaj
Sibiu
Suceava
Teleorman
Timis
Tulcea
Vasliu
Vâlcea
Vrancea
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 [million USD]
Figure 2.10
Th e Way Counties Have Distributed the PIT Share for Equalization, 2000—15% (box 8 in Figure 2.5)
(Th e absolute sums also show the relative wealth of counties)
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governmental ﬁ scal relations: larger LGs tend to face 
“softer” constraints (Wildasin 1997). Th is tendency 
is manifest both at the level of localities and regions. 
Cities (especially county capitals) often get more than 
their fair share of the equalization funds (Figure 
2.10), sometimes as a result of overspending in previ-
ous years. Counties deﬁ nitely face softer budgetary 
constraints, as was explained above, since they can 
interfere in the equalization process and adjust at will 
the portion withheld for their own budget. A good 
system should counteract this trend that puts smaller 
and poorer LGs at disadvantage. 
Lack of clarity of purpose. Th is refers to many 
things: policy objectives of the equalization system; 
procedures for aggregating ﬁ nancial data; and the 
allocation of investment funds. In theory, LLPF and 
ASBL deﬁ ne, indirectly, two streams of funds that 
are meant to (1) alleviate disparities among the three 
tiers of government (central, county, local), and (2) 
perform some redistribution among local government 
units within the same tier of administration. In the 
terminology used above, the ﬁ rst objective is vertical 
equalization; the second is horizontal equalization. 
In practice, the discretionary power of each county 
in deﬁ ning how much of the PIT equalization share 
(box 8 in Figure 2.5) actually goes toward horizontal 
equalization, and how much is kept in the county 
budget, muddles the process on both components. 
Th e total pools for vertical and horizontal equaliza-
tion thus become uncontrolled and unpredictable. 
Together with the inconsistent use of equalization 
formulas mentioned before, this generates an uncer-
tain environment for localities, especially small rural 
ones, which makes long-term budgetary planning 
diﬃ  cult. 
Th e current reporting procedures of ﬁ nancial data 
is also a problem. Th e procedures are not designed to 
allow modern public management on the part of LGs 
and policy analysis at the macrolevel. Much relevant 
information is lost in the process of aggregating data, 
as data are passed up from LGs to the Ministry of 
Finance. Th e accounting system is still cashbased, 
so that many assets, liabilities, and debts are not 
recorded. Th ere is additional pressure on them not 
to report these, since the law does not allow LGs to 
close the budgetary cycle with deﬁ cits. More gener-
ally, there is no tradition in the Romanian public 
sector of analyzing and reporting ﬁ nancial data to 
external users (banks, ﬁ rms, independent analysts, 
or ultimately, the citizens) in the appropriate format 
and with due diligence. Th is lack of transparency in 
the use of funds, even when there is no need to cover 
something up, eventually turns against the institu-
tions: for example, it would be easier for localities to 
demonstrate that they are abused by counties if they 
were to analyze and present the distribution of equali-
zation funds like in Figure 2.11.
Th e way in which LGs and MoF classify revenues 
can also hide useful information and skew the redis-
tribution rules: the “Other” category is too large and 
unspeciﬁ ed, and it may be that both localities and 
counties divert funds towards it from the “Own rev-
enues” line in order to get more equalization funds. 
Th e special transfers—price subsidies for heating, 
special funds for roads, housing, etc.—also contain 
money that are unevenly and opaquely distributed, 
functioning in fact as a counter-equalizer (Polishchuk 
2001). 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND 
 RECOMMENDATIONS
In spite of the shortcomings mentioned in the previ-
ous section, the current equalization grants system 
introduced in 1998–99 represents an improvement 
when compared with the situation that existed before. 
Th e notions of vertical and horizontal equalization 
have been operationalized separately and it is now 
possible to estimate how much ﬁ nancial eﬀ ort goes 
into each of them, and to follow trends in time. A 
simple and clear allocation formula was eventually 
reached which is applied consistently in the ﬁ rst step 
of the equalization process: the distribution of funds 
from the central government to the counties. Even if 
the formula is not consistently applied in the second 
step—from counties to localities—it remains a bench-
mark against which the process of horizontal equaliza-
tion can be assessed.
In this context, it is now possible to outline an 
agenda for improvement. Th e agenda must ﬁ x the 
ﬂ aws in the system that have become apparent so far
—but on the other hand take into account the need 
for ﬂ exibility and uncertainties that will continue 
for a while. Th e reassignment of functions to LGs is 
not yet complete and substantial transfers are on the 
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Figure 2.11a
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agenda for the next one or two years. Th e calendar—
or indeed costs—of these new transfers of functions 
are diﬃ  cult to foresee. Th erefore, any attempt to ﬁ ne-
tune and write in stone the intergovernmental ﬁ scal 
rules is premature. It is likely that any new major 
reallocation of attributions by the central government 
will be matched with a slice of funds taken from the 
national general budget—most likely, from the state’s 
residual share of the PIT or the VAT revenues. Only 
with the passing of several budgetary cycles with the 
new arrangements, can the policy be stabilized and 
more automatic transfers set up that will minimize 
the vertical imbalances and stabilize the horizontal 
equalization mechanisms in the long run.
Th e agenda for reform has thus to be organized 
in several stages and put into the broader policy con-
text. 
In the short run, several quick improvements are 
possible that will address some of the problems identi-
ﬁ ed in the previous section.
a) Th e total amount of funds distributed as equaliza-
tion grants should be stabilized, by tying it more 
clearly to the total PIT yield. As of now only one 
component is deﬁ ned in this way: the 16 percent 
PIT share (box 8 in Figure 2.5); the other compo-
nent (PIT “sums”—boxes 3 and 4 in Figure 2.5) 
is not, though in practice it has been remarkably 
stable over the last few years, at about 10 percent 
of the PIT revenues. Since counties can be re-
moved from the process of allocation altogether 
(c. below), the two parts should be merged into 
one single equalization fund, deﬁ ned as 26 percent of 
the PIT. In this way, no additional ﬁ nancial bur-
den on the state budget will be created, but one 
fundamental condition will be met for increasing 
the predictability of the intergovernmental ﬁ scal 
relations.
b) Vertical and horizontal equalization have to be 
recognized as legitimate and distinct policy ob-
jectives, and hence two separate pools of funds 
must be created out of the 26 percent of the 
PIT deﬁ ned above. (Th is would be equivalent, 
under the current system, to a cap imposed on 
the percentage withheld by counties for their own 
budget from the second source of equalization 
funds—box 8 in Figure 2.5). Th e total equaliza-
tion funds should be split from the beginning of 
the budgetary cycle into two components: funds 
for counties, and funds for localities. No transfer of 
money would be allowed between them. Th is way 
vertical equalization will be implemented much 
more coherently and no tier of government would 
siphon oﬀ  funds for its own vertical compensation 
at the expense of the horizontal equalization in 
other tiers. Currently the counties keep about ¼ 
of the PIT “sums” (boxes 3 and 4) and 2/5 of the 
16 percent share (box 8). In order to preserve the 
stability of expectations and the current degree of 
vertical balance, the total fund should be split into 
two according to the average ratio of 1/3: of the 
26 percent of the PIT earmarked for equalization, 
8–9 percent would go to counties and 17–18 percent 
to localities. 
c) Counties can be excluded from the process of allocat-
ing equalization funds to localities. Th eir role can 
be very well taken over by an automatic mecha-
nism under the supervision of the central govern-
ment. Right now, the counties only make the 
system unpredictable and permeable to political 
lobby. Th ey have their own speciﬁ c functions such 
as coordinating regional development or supply-
ing services with economies of scale larger than a 
local community. But none of these must interfere 
with the equalization system, which should not 
become an instrument for forcing localities into 
compliance with countywide objectives.
d) After the two pools of funds are separated (a. 
above), the allocation of the two by county and 
locality should strictly follow the ﬁ scal capacity 
formula, so that all LGs can estimate in advance 
how much money they will receive and plan ac-
cordingly. Two adjustments need to be done to 
the ﬁ scal capacity formula currently in use (see 
section 5.3 above):
 • Own revenues should be excluded from the cal-
culation of ﬁ scal power, in order to prevent LGs 
from limiting their eﬀ orts to raise revenue and 
get more equalization money in return. Moral 
hazard will thus be eliminated. As a result, the 
only proxy for ﬁ scal capacity of LGs remains 
the automatic share of PIT collected locally 
(box 6 for localities and 7 for counties), per 
capita. Th e exclusion of own revenues would 
not inﬂ uence much the ranking of LGs by 
ﬁ scal capacity, since PIT share per capita and 
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own revenues per capita are two closely corre-
lated variables. But it would remove the pos-
sibility of substitution: LGs do not collect the 
PIT themselves, and thus cannot adjust their 
behavior so as to maximize the equalization 
grants received. 
 • A cap may be imposed on the per capita equali-
zation sum, so that the outlayers do not receive 
disproportionately high amounts. Th e calcu-
lations below are done for a cap of 45 USD/
capita, which is about 3 times the average per 
capita equalization grant in rural LGs. 
Th e logic of this impoved system of equalization 
is summarized in Figure 2.12, which should be com-
pared with Figures 2.7 and 2.9 above. Its distribu-
tional eﬀ ects are presented in Table 2.5. 
Contrary to the often-expressed opinion that a 
more automatic formula-based allocation cannot take 
care of particular local needs, the analysis shows that 
the equalization system proposed here (I in Table 
2.5) is both simpler and fairer, at the county and 
locality levels. Simplicity is crucial because it reduces 
the administrative costs of implementation, which is 
especially important when such costs are not imme-
diately apparent but spread across many central and 
local public institutions. It also increases stakeholders’ 
conﬁ dence in the system, since everybody can under-
stand how the system works and has little incentive to 
engage in rent-seeking. On the contrary, if rules are 
complicated and depend on data that are either una-
vailable—which is often the case in CEE—or easy 
to manipulate, the system will be perceived as unfair 
and unreliable. 
Figure 2.12 
Proposed System (I): Separating Vertical and Horizontal Equalization
E
S
Central Government
Localities
Counties
 Total pool deﬁ ned 
at about 8–9% 
of the PIT yield; 
formula enforced 
without exception
Pool deﬁ ned at about 17–18% 
of the PIT yield; formula enforced 
consistently; if necessary, 
an “emergency fund” can be set up 
to deal with exceptional situations
Table 2.5 compares the results of the proposed 
system with those of the current practices, and with 
those of an alternative system (II). Th e latter is based 
on allocating the equalization pool (deﬁ ned as the 
same PIT share) not on ﬁ scal capacity but on “need,” 
as measured by the size of population.6 Th e proposal 
I put forward here substantially reduces the variations 
in allocation, especially across rural LGs, where the 
problem is the most serious. 
More important, the proposed system produces 
results that are fairer than the current ones, by better 
targeting the equalizations funds towards LGs that 
really need them. Th is is true in the case of counties, 
towns and municipalities, and rural communes: in 
the annex we present the allocative eﬀ ects of the cur-
rent system (Figures 2.13–15a) alongside those of the 
proposed system (Figures 2.13–15b). It also increases 
exponentially the sum per capita transferred as the 
total revenues per capita before equalization decrease, 
especially in rural LGs, thus reﬂ ecting the economies 
of scale in providing most local services—general 
government included. 
In the medium- and long-term, depending on the 
pace of policy reform in attributions reassignment, 
there are some elements the government would be 
well advised to take into consideration.
• It is important that the government resist the 
temptation to complicate the horizontal equaliza-
tion system by factoring in various “normatives” 
meant to function as a proxy for local needs. Once 
they start to go down this road, the proliferation 
of “needs” will be unstoppable and the system will 
become unmanageable (Hungary is sometimes 
cited as a bad example in this respect). It was 
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noted above that there is a tradeoﬀ  here between 
simplicity and transparency on the one hand, and 
technical reﬁ nement on the other. From the expe-
rience available so far with the current Romanian 
system, which is fairly simple and easy to under-
stand, the biggest problem turns out not to be design, 
but consistent implementation. As long as rules are 
not enforced at the lower levels so that they create 
stable expectations and the right incentives, the 
design is practically irrelevant.
• Th e central government should plan carefully so as 
to allow some degree of ﬂ exibility, without com-
promising the stability and predictability of the 
equalization system. Th e intergovernmental ﬁ scal 
relations in Romania concern about 3,000 local 
units; it is not possible to build it according to a 
predeﬁ ned plan down to the last detail. Feedback 
during implementation should be collected and 
analyzed in order to eﬀ ect corrections when the 
need arises. Th e best way to do this is by creating 
a joint grants commission with the participation of 
central government oﬃ  cials and Parliament staﬀ , 
to conduct periodic reviews of the equalization 
policy. When changes are proposed all the stake-
holders should be consulted—primarily LG asso-
ciations—and suﬃ  cient time should be allowed 
for the local governments to understand them 
and adjust their behavior. As a rule of thumb, all 
changes should be decided at least one budgetary 
cycle before they become eﬀ ective. Th e setting up 
of a grants commission can be useful in the long-
term as more services will be reassigned to LGs. 
Th e commission would periodically evaluate the 
best way to locally ﬁ nance services like education 
and health care, sectors where reforms are not 
likely to be ﬁ nalized soon; study the cases of in-
ter-constituency spillovers from locally provided 
public services; develop benchmarks; and advise 
decision-making bodies on what intergovernmen-
tal instruments—capitation, matching or general 
purpose grants—are most appropriate for a par-
ticular type of service. 
• As reporting procedures and databases improve, 
a more accurate indicator of true ﬁ scal capacity of 
LGs can be developed to replace the current PIT/
capita collected. However, this should remain 
simple and based on elements that are outside the 
control of local government oﬃ  cials. All the in-
dicators should be easily measurable and the data 
put in the public domain. 
Table 2.5
Results of Applying Diﬀ erent Equalization Systems: Total Revenues of Local Governments [USD/cap], 2001
County Level Current Proposed (I) Alternative (II)
Average 17.7 17.7 17.7
Max 32.5 29.8 32.8
Min 11.6 13.1 11.6
Standard deviation/average 0.3 0.22 0.28
Locality Level Current Proposed (I) Alternative (II)
Total Average 81.3 81.3 81.3
Max 782.9 741.7 785
Min 11.8 24.7 14.6
Standard deviation/average 0.44 0.37 0.42
Urban Average 109.3 107
Standard deviation/average 0.43 0.42
Rural Average 53.2 55.5
Standard deviation/average 0.61 0.47
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• In the long run, when all the reassignments are 
complete, the situation stabilized, and LGs have 
accumulated enough experience in managing 
their new functions, local autonomy can be for-
mally increased by transforming most of the ad-
ditional conditional grants (such as PIT shares for 
welfare support, price subsidies, etc.) into general 
purpose transfers, preferably in the form of prede-
ﬁ ned tax shares. Th e Hunter coeﬃ  cient would 
thus increase (Figure 2.8) and the need for verti-
cal equalization will be reduced accordingly. Th eir 
allocation to LGs should not be based on complex 
normatives, but on simple and available data: for 
example, funds can be distributed on a per capita 
basis. 
• In a few cases transfers that are currently ear-
marked would be best kept tied to a speciﬁ c 
service. Th ey could be stabilized in the form of a 
capitation grants system, where the money is made 
conditional on a speciﬁ c level of performance to 
be achieved by local providers. Taking into ac-
count the administrative tradition in the region, 
education (and health care, if it is reassigned to 
LGs) is a sector where earmarking of funds is 
likely to continue.
• Competitive grant-giving funds should replace 
the current discretionary ﬁ nancing of investments 
(roads, housing, etc.) and here counties may 
play a role in administering some of them with 
the purpose of promoting countywide policies. 
More speciﬁ cally, a matching grant system can 
be established to encourage investments in those 
particular projects that generate positive spillovers 
across jurisdictions. Again, the grants would act as 
Pigovian subsidies and contribute to the increas-
ing of eﬃ  ciency in production (Bird 2000).
• Professional ﬁ nancial reporting and data analysis 
should be introduced, starting with the relevant 
MoF units that interact with local governments. 
Under the current procedures, there is a lot of 
uncertainty regarding the true ﬁ nancial position 
of LGs, and as a result the equalization rules can 
be exploited by those who engage in “creative 
bookkeeping.” Elements of accrual accounting 
should be introduced and more reﬁ ned reporting 
standards imposed, so that budgetary categories 
like “Other revenues” are reduced in size. 
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ENDNOTES
1 As a result, there are three ballots in Romanian lo-
cal elections: party lists for county councils, party 
lists for locality councils, and uninominal ballots 
for the oﬃ  ce of mayor. 
2 Romania has adopted the National Treasury 
system of uniﬁ ed cash management.
3 With slightly larger counties: now 41 instead of 
60 before World War II within the current bor-
ders of Romania (or 74 including the ceded ter-
ritories).
4 Th e LLPF was passed in 1998 and the article 
that speciﬁ es the shares was meant to serve only 
as guidance—an ideal target to be met in time—
since the actual shares can be modiﬁ ed by Annual 
Budget Law. In the ﬁ rst year when the new system 
was implemented, 1999, the actual percentages 
were indeed lower than those provided by in 
LLPF (Table 2.1).
5 However, the real ($) values for 1999 are the least 
reliable due to a surge in the inﬂ ation rate that 
occurred in the spring of that year and which 
reduces the signiﬁ cance of the yearly average 
exchange rate. 
6 One of the options currently considered in the 
discussions for amending the Law of Local Public 
Finances. Its main attraction is simplicity.
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ANNEX
Figure 2A.1
Map of Romania
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Fiscal Equalization Policy in the Russian Federation
I l d a r  Z o u l k a r n a y
Th is chapter presents and discusses the problems 
of vertical and horizontal ﬁ scal equalization in the 
Russian Federation. Federal equalization policy and 
sub-regional equalization and its problems are ana-
lyzed. Th e chapter also outlines the Russian federal 
system and discusses vertical imbalance; horizontal 
interregional disparities and their equalization; hori-
zontal and vertical equalization on the sub-regional 
level; the program of intergovernmental ﬁ nance re-
form for 2000–2005 and its implementation in 2000 
and 2001. Th e study uses statistical data for the years 
1992–2001, and in some cases for the ﬁ rst six months of 
2002. Finally, the chapter provides recommendations 
for the improvement of the Russian ﬁ scal equalization 
system on the federal and subnational levels.
During the investigation special interest has been 
paid to the force of budget incentives, their direction 
(“good” or perverse), and the clarity of formulas used 
in the current methodology of resource allocation. 
Th e most signiﬁ cant recommendations concern 
measures to strengthen “good” budget incentives in 
the framework of the current federal mechanism for 
allocation of ﬁ nancial resources, and ways of intro-
ducing formula-based resource allocation on the sub-
federal level.
 
1. INTRODUCTION
Th e Russian Federation is known to be one of the 
grand federations of the world. However, Russia has 
no experience as a real federative state, and therefore 
the country is in the midst of a transition from a 
unitary to federal state. Actually, the long history of 
centralized development (e.g., the former Russian 
Empire and the former USSR), which gave shape to 
corresponding informal institutions of society, creates 
an inertia which works against the development of 
Russian society. Th us, considerable political forces in-
side the country actually represent the interests of the 
unitary state, with similar moods common among the 
population. Th ese factors ensure that Russia’s transi-
tion to federalism will continue to be complicated by 
the legacy of the previous unitary state.1
Th e limited development of civil society is appa-
rent not only with respect to the federal center and the 
subjects of the Russian Federation, but also at the level 
of local self-government. Th e population does not 
want to participate in self-government, nor does it 
have the prerequisite skills for self-governance. More-
over, the staﬀ  of central and subnational governments 
have outdated management skills and tend to hamper 
any innovations.
Th is chapter analyzes the development of inter-
governmental ﬁ scal relations in the Russian Federa-
tion over the last decade while concentrating on the 
current situation and the initial results of the budget, 
tax, and intergovernmental reforms that were initi-
ated at the end of the 1990s.
Th e ﬁ rst section below provides information 
about the assignment of revenue and expenditure 
responsibilities among diﬀ erent levels of government 
in the Russian Federation. Th en in section two both 
federal and regional policy on vertical and horizontal 
equalization is presented and analyzed. Th is is the 
core of the paper. Th e ﬁ nal section is devoted to a 
brief explanation of the results of the analysis and 
policy recommendations on corrections to the con-
tinuing reform of intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations 
begun in 2000.
Th e methodology of this investigation is based on 
a critical analysis of the algorithms employed in the 
equalization mechanism carried out in Russia, with 
simulation of present schemes and possible innova-
tions as proposed by this author. 
Th e state of equalization in the Republic of Bash-
kortostan—one of eighty-nine subjects in the Russian 
Federation—is analyzed and conclusions are drawn 
about the current state of equalization among subjects 
of the federation; possible means for improvement 
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federation), and local governmental level. Within 
the latter there are up to three distinct local levels 
(depending on the subject of the federation), which 
provides the ground for ﬁ ve models of sub-regional 
government:
• Forty-eight subjects of the federation use the 
model that consists of one level of government of 
the subject of the federation and one level of self-
government (Kurlyandskaya, Nikolaenko, and 
Shishkin 2002). Local governments are formed in 
cities and rayons, and create their own bodies in 
city districts and villages. 
• Approximately a dozen regions have two levels of 
government of the subject of the federation and 
one level of self-government. Th e second level 
of regional government is formed from its local 
bodies in cities and rayons. Self-government is 
constituted in city districts and villages.
• Another dozen regions use a model which, like 
the previous one, includes two levels of govern-
ment of the subject of the federation and one level 
of local self-government. However, the second 
level of regional government has representative 
and executive bodies. Legislation of Bashkorto-
stan calls this level “state local government.”
• About two dozen regions use the model with one 
level of regional government and two levels of lo-
cal government. Th ese latter two levels are referred 
to as “municipality of the ﬁ rst level” and “munici-
pality of the second level.”
• Moscow and Saint Petersburg have a special status 
in the RF. Both cities are subjects of the federation 
and are also localities. In Moscow there are no lo-
cal governments at all.
 
Th is sophisticated system is further complicated 
by the fact that there are about forty closed adminis-
trative territorial formations—cities, which are under 
direct subordination to the federal government and 
have intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations only with 
the federal center (Kurlyandskaya, Nikolaenko, and 
Golovanova 2001). Th is last issue is revealing of sub-
national government in Russia.
According to data from 1 September 2000, the 
total number of municipalities in Russia was 11,729. 
Of these, 1,488 of them were administrative rayons, 
592—cities, 126—districts, 519—urban-type settle-
are suggested. Bashkortostan is a very interesting 
region for the application of formula-based schemes 
of resource allocation for the following reasons. First, 
Bashkortostan is one of the ﬁ ve regions that have the 
largest volume of industrial and agricultural produc-
tion. It is also a multiethnic republic with a popula-
tion of four million and a territory which approxi-
mates that of Greece; 65 percent of the population 
lives in cities, 35 percent in rural areas. And ﬁ nally, 
Bashkortostan is one of the ten regions which ac-
counted for 63 percent of federal revenues in 2002. 
List of Abbreviations 
AO  autonomous okrug (type of subjects of the 
federation)
BC  Budget Code of the Russian Federation
EPT  enterprise proﬁ t tax
FG  federal government
FFSR  Fund for Financial Support of Regions
FFC  Federal Fund of Compensations
FL  federal law
GRP  gross regional product
HC  Hunter’s coeﬃ  cient
IBE  index of budget expenditures
ITP  index of taxable potential
LG  local government
MoF  Ministry of Finance
PIT  personal income tax
RB  Republic of Bashkortostan
RF  Russian Federation
RG  regional government (government of the sub-
ject of the federation)
RP  normalized per capita revenue
TTR  total taxable resources 
VAT  value-added tax
 
2. TRENDS IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
 FISCAL RELATIONS 
In the Russian Federation there are three main gov-
ernmental levels: federal, subnational (regions of the 
F I S C A L  E Q U A L I Z A T I O N  P O L I C Y  I N  T H E  R U S S I A N  F E D E R A T I O N
69
ments, 8,790—rural administrations, and 210—vil-
lage administrations (Zavarina 2001).
2.1 Assignment of Expenditure 
  Responsibilities
According to federal legislation there are signiﬁ cant 
restrictions on the amount of discretion exercised by 
regional and local governments in expenditure policy. 
It is possible to classify these responsibilities into three 
groups:
• Federal laws on assignment of expenditure re-
sponsibilities;
• Obligatory expenditure norms introduced by the 
federal government;
• Federal mandates.
Federal legislation on assignment of expenditure 
responsibilities. Th e main idea of ﬁ scal federalism 
is a clear-cut division of powers between the fed-
eral center and subnational units, so that both the 
levels have independent ﬁ nancial sources (Ferejohn 
1998). In connection with this principle there are 
many problems in Russia. Neither the Federal Treaty 
nor the Constitution has clearly deﬁ ned expendi-
ture responsibilities in the Russian Federation. As 
Martinez-Vazquez and Boex consider (2001, 11), the 
de facto assignment of expenditure responsibilities 
that prevailed in Russia as of 1997 primarily com-
plied with the general principle that each level of 
government should be responsible for expenditures 
within its geographical boundaries. However, there 
was, and at present is, some ambiguity in the assign-
ment of responsibilities. Th e 2001 Program of Budget 
Federalism Development in the Russian Federation 
proposes development of expenditure assignment by 
2005 (Table 3A.1 in Annex). From the table, it is 
obvious that many expenditure responsibilities were 
entrusted to two or three levels of government. 
Th e general problem of delimiting expenditures in 
Russia is a mix of two notions: expenditure responsi-
bilities and functions. Federal legislation says nothing 
about the functions of sub-federal governments, or 
their tasks in delivery of public services. For example, 
as a result of the vagueness and contradictions in fed-
eral legislation, local governments frequently refuse to 
fund teacher salaries and cite Article 87 of the Budget 
Code. Th is article states that the organization, main-
tenance, and development of educational infrastruc-
ture is a local responsibility. Local authorities then 
argue that “maintenance of educational infrastruc-
ture” refers exclusively to school buildings and school 
inventory, not to payment of teacher salaries.
Th e Federal Law on Financial Base of Local 
Self-Government (1997) supposes that every subject 
of the federation should adopt its own law to concre-
tize the basic ﬁ nancial regulations of the federal law. 
However, the elaboration of such regional laws is very 
problematic in view of the fact that the main taxes 
that the regional government cedes to local govern-
ment are federal. Every year the federal government 
controls and changes the sharing of not only the 
federal taxes but also of some regional and local taxes 
(Tables 3A.2–4 in Annex), and makes it impossible 
to ﬁ x a particular arrangement of intergovernmental 
ﬁ scal relations within regions.
Obligatory federal expenditure norms. Obligatory 
expenditure norms introduced by FG leave little room 
for discretion on the part of subnational governments. 
For example, federal oﬃ  cials determine key points of 
educational policies such as the elaboration of curric-
ula and selection of textbooks. Th e federal center also 
determines the set of expenditure norms and capacity 
speciﬁ cation to be used in regional and local service 
provision, such as the size of the child allowance. In 
reality, the degree of true discretion in expenditures at 
the regional and local levels is rather low. At present 
there is one set of expenditure norms which is uni-
formly applied across the RF—the so-called general 
tariﬀ  system of salaries in public organizations, issued 
and timely revised by the FG. Th is system regulates 
employee salaries in all the organizations that are 
funded by federal, regional or local government, 
except for employees of governmental administration 
bodies. Th us, the wages of school teachers, staﬀ  in 
public health institutions, university teaching staﬀ , 
and workers of municipal enterprises—all are subject-
ed to this system of norms. In other ﬁ elds of budget 
expenditures, federal legislation formally allows using 
regional and local expenditure norms but introduces 
“minimal expenditure norms” which are obliga-
tory for regional and local governments. Formally, 
sub-federal governments can introduce expenditure 
norms higher than the federal ones. However, in real-
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expenditure needs. Th e general number of laws grant-
ing subsidies and discounts for certain categories of 
citizens ran up to 120. Forty-ﬁ ve of the 120 laws had 
been adopted before 1992, but remained in force until 
2000 (Kurlyandskaya 2000a). To illustrate the nature 
and complexity of these laws: 21 diﬀ erent categories 
of individuals were granted the right to receive medi-
cine at preferential prices and 38 diﬀ erent categories 
of individuals could ride free on public transport. 
After six years of transition, the Parliament began 
to comprehend the extent of damage arising from un-
funded mandates and undertook measures to reduce 
their number. Th us, the 1997 Federal Law on 
Financ-ial Foundations of Local Self-Government 
prohibited RGs from issuing unfunded mandates 
to LGs. Th e Budgetary Code (BC) adopted in 1998, 
and which came into eﬀ ect in 2000, prohibited un-
funded mandates at every level of government. Th e 
Budget Reform Program for 2000–2005 included 
some mea-sures to eliminate unfunded mandates as 
shown in Table A3.6 in the Annex. One can see that 
the primary remedy against unfunded mandates is 
funding from the federal budget; full abolition of the 
mandate with the inclusion of the discount proﬁ t into 
the salary; refusal of discount and beneﬁ t ensured by 
mandates.
Before 2000, in addition to the target of equaliza-
tion, the Federal Fund for Support of Regions (FFSR) 
had included subsidies for some federal mandates to 
regional and local governments. Th ere were man-
dates for the implementation of the Federal Law on 
Veterans and the Federal Law on Welfare Payment for 
Citizens Having Children. Th e FFSR also contained 
subsidies earmarked for other special purposes:
• Financial support for the buying and shipping of 
oil, mineral oil, and fuel to the northern regions 
and to some other regions with a restricted period 
for delivering products/goods;
• Compensation for the tariﬀ s on electricity in the 
regions of the Far East and Arkhangelsk oblast. 
Since 2001, another fund, the Federal Fund of 
Compensations (FFC), has been established alongside 
the FFSR. Th e subsidies enacted through the Law on 
Welfare Payment for Citizens Having Children was 
passed from the FFSR to the FFC. So, the FFC has 
started to subsidize the regional obligations based on 
this federal law and another, Law on Social Security 
ity, they do not have revenues enough to execute as-
signed expenditures at the level required by minimal 
norms and therefore use federal minimal expenditure 
norms as grounds for receiving additional ﬁ nancial 
support from upper level governments. On account 
of this, the FG has discussed delegating to the regions 
the right of determining the salary tariﬀ  system. 
Unfunded expenditure mandates. One of the main 
problems of the Russian intergovernmental system is 
unfunded mandates. Th is issue arose at the start of 
the transition period in 1992 when the federal center 
shifted expenditure responsibilities for many social 
welfare programs to subnational governments. Th e 
federal center did not plan budget reforms and gave 
up expenditure responsibilities to subnational levels 
not with the aim to decentralize, but rather to solve 
its own budget problems. Th erefore, while shifting 
expenditure responsibilities, the FG did not want to 
provide subnational governments with corresponding 
revenue sources.
Th e following mandates were in existence by 
2001 (Kovalevski 2001):
• Mandates concerned with passing some responsi-
bilities to subordinate governments (mostly in the 
social security ﬁ eld)
• Classical mandates to keep new federal standards 
in accomplishing regional and local responsibili-
ties (ecological and construction standards)
• “Voluntary” mandates when LGs have to keep 
federal legislation on social security even if they 
do not have corresponding authorities
• Additional funding of federal institutions such as 
tax oﬃ  ces to improve their work
• Indirect losses of LGs caused by the tax policy of 
the FG
Th e main issues of unfunded mandates were 
intensiﬁ ed by two factors: the drop of revenues in 
budgets on all levels and the adoption by the Federal 
Parliament of some additional laws whose implemen-
tation was imposed on subnational governments.
Th us, from 1992 to 1999 the State Duma (par-
liament) of the RF adopted twenty laws on social 
protection for diﬀ erent categories of the population. 
Th e primary federal mandates in 1998 are listed in 
Table 3A.5 in the Annex; the actual funding for all 
federal mandates was as high as 31 percent of total 
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of the Disabled in the Russian Federation, which was 
previously an unfunded federal mandate. Since 2002 
the FFC has subsidized a few regional and local obli-
gations (Table 3A.7 in Annex).
Development of expenditure responsibilities assign-
ment. After 1992, three processes could be observed 
in government expenditures:
• Th e steady decline of national production: the 
drop in GDP from 1992 to 1997 was over 40 
percent and since the end of 1998 the economy 
has grown slowly.
• Th e share of expenditures of the consolidated fed-
eral budget—excluding extra-budgetary funds— 
dropped from 69 percent of GDP in 1992, to 33 
percent in 1997, and ﬁ nally to 24 percent in 2001 
(see Table 3A.8 in Annex);
• Th e federal share of the consolidated budget 
declined, while the regional and local shares in-
creased in the late 1990s (Figure 3.1).
From Figure 3.1 we can see that roughly half 
of the consolidated federal budget was allocated to 
subnational governments from 1998 to 2000. Th e 
consolidated regional budget was spent by regional 
and local governments in equal parts (Figure 3.2). It 
seems therefore that decentralization of expenditure 
Figure 3.1
Sharing Expenditures between Federal and Sub-federal Governments
Source: Author’s calculations on data of RF MoF, and OECD (Institute of Economic Analysis 1998; Posdnyakov, Lavrovskii, and Masa-
kov 2000; OECD 2002).
Federal Government Sub-federal Government
0
20
40
60
80
100
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
[Year]
[%]
2000 2001
responsibilities occurred, but this is an ambiguous 
conclusion because in many expenditure areas sub-
stantive decisions were made by higher-level authori-
ties—an issue that was brieﬂ y explained above. 
During the transition period there were sig-
niﬁ cant changes in the structure of expenditures. Th e 
most considerable shift took place in the category of 
national economy: in 1992 the FG share was original-
ly 80.8 percent of consolidated federal budget expen-
ditures, whereas by 1997 the FG share was reduced to 
21.6 percent—in the middle of the transition period 
(Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 2001, 15). Regional ex-
penditures in this category were mostly subsidies to 
industry and transportation, while local governments 
provided subsidies for housing services. For instance, 
Bashkortostan continued to ﬁ nance the construction 
of a huge chemical plant, Polief, the funding of which 
had been stopped by the center after the disintegra-
tion of the USSR. Industrial policy still had a rather 
modest share in the federal expenditures in 2001 (3 
percent, Figure 3.3). At the same time, support to 
industry accounts for the largest share of the total ex-
penditures of the Bashkortostan consolidated budget 
(52 percent, Figure 3.4). 
Th ere were also signiﬁ cant shifts in the ﬁ elds of 
education, culture and mass media, where the FG 
share decreased by nearly 30 percent. In some re-
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Figure 3.3
Structure of Federal Government Expenditures in 2001
Source: RF MoF (2002). 
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Figure 3.2
Sharing Expenditures between Regional and Local Governments
Source: Author’s calculations on data of RF MoF, and OECD (Institute of Economic Analysis 1998; Posdnyakov, Lavrovskii, and Masa-
kov 2000; OECD 2002).
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gions, for example in the Republic of Bashkortostan, 
FG did not pay for culture and education (including 
higher education) according to the bilateral treaty 
(before 2000). In 2001, FG spent 4 percent of the 
federal budget on educational services; for the same 
year, Bashkortostan’s expenses on education were 17 
percent of its consolidated budget. Th is disparity re-
ﬂ ects expenditure assignment, according to which the 
maintenance of primary and secondary schools is an 
LG obligation, and the maintenance of universities is 
the responsibility of FG (Table 3A.1 in Annex).
Th e federal share of expenditures on social pro-
tection—excluding pensions, beneﬁ ts for disability, 
or the federal unemployment fund—dropped from 
F I S C A L  E Q U A L I Z A T I O N  P O L I C Y  I N  T H E  R U S S I A N  F E D E R A T I O N
73
Figure 3.4
Expenditures of the Republic of Bashkortostan’s Consolidated Budget in 2001
Source: Author’s calculations using data from RB Statistical Department (2002). 
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71.8 percent in 1992 to 18.5 percent in 1995, but 
increased up to 41.3 percent in 1997. FG social 
policy expenditures remain the most important 
item of the federal budget, being 8 percent in 2001. 
Bashkortostan’s social expenses were 6 percent of the 
consolidated budget for the same period.
2.2 Revenue Assignment
Revenue assignment on the federal level. Th e evolution 
of revenue assignment from 1992 to 2002 is summa-
rized in Table 3A.2 in the Annex. Th ree developmen-
tal periods of revenue assignment can be identiﬁ ed in 
transitional Russia: 
• 1992–1993: characterized by the disintegration 
of the old Soviet ﬁ scal system, when the federal 
government had no program of reforms and re-
gions had to build new relations with the center. 
For example, three ethnic republics Tatarstan, 
Bashkortostan, and Sakha (Yakutia) held to the 
single-channel inter-budget policy according to 
which they retained all tax collections and negoti-
ated a single payment with the federal authorities. 
Additional revenues were partially retained by 24 
of 89 regions. Th e Chechen Republic never paid 
any taxes.
• 1994–1997: a period during which the federal 
government attempted to put in good order its 
ﬁ scal relations with the regions. For example, the 
ﬁ rst version of a formula-based allocation mecha-
nism of federal ﬁ nancial support was introduced 
during this period.
• 1998–2000: a period of reforms.
Th e main innovations of the last period arise from 
the Tax Code, which was adopted in 1998 and came 
into eﬀ ect in 2000 (Table 3A.9 in Annex). Th e Tax 
Code called for the following changes:
• VAT, PIT, EPT, and excises remained federal taxes 
but were to be shared with subnational govern-
ments.
• Regional and local governments lost their right 
to collect many old taxes of the mid-1990s, but 
obtained a few new taxes in return. 
• RGs again gained a degree of revenue autonomy, 
but to a lesser extent than in the 1994–1996 pe-
riod. Th ey had had the power to introduce a ﬁ nal 
sales tax of up to 5 percent for goods not taxed by 
excise, and up to 10 percent on excised goods.
VAT, EPT, custom duties, PIT, excises, and the 
mineral resource payment comprise the main rev-
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Figure 3.5
Revenues of the Regional Budgets in 2001
Source: Kovalevskaya 2002.
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enues of the Russian budget system. VAT and EPT 
accounted for practically half of all revenues of budg-
ets on all levels. Th e greater part of VAT which pro-
vides more than a quarter of all Russian revenues was 
assigned to FG, but as of 2001, 100 percent of VAT 
has been assigned to FG and this tax has become the 
main tax source of the federal budget: 46 percent in 
2001, and 45 percent for the ﬁ rst six months of 2002. 
Other taxes accounted for the following shares of 
regional budgets in 2001: EPT, 35 percent; PIT, 29 
percent; the tax on real estate, 10 percent; the mineral 
22% Personal income tax10% Mineral resource payment
Figure 3.6
Tax Revenues of the Republic of Bashkortostan’s Consolidated Budget in 2001
Source: Author’s calculations using data from RB Statistical Department (2002).
33% Enterprise proﬁ t tax
9% Property taxes
26% Other taxes
resource payment, 9 percent; excises, 5 percent; and 
the sales tax, 5 percent (Figure 3.5).
EPT ranks fourth (12 percent) among the federal 
tax sources and ﬁ rst (35 percent) among the regions 
(Figure 3.5); this tax also ranked ﬁ rst (33 percent) 
among the revenues of the Bashkortostan consolidated 
budget in 2001 (Figure 3.6). PIT, a federal tax, was 
shared with sub-federal budgets in the proportion 1:99, 
and since 2002, it accrues entirely to sub-federal bud-
gets. Th is tax provides a signiﬁ cant part of RG reve-
nues—29 percent in 2001. In Bashkortostan, PIT pro-
F I S C A L  E Q U A L I Z A T I O N  P O L I C Y  I N  T H E  R U S S I A N  F E D E R A T I O N
75
Figure 3.7
Revenue Distribution among Federal, Regional and Local Governments
Source: Author’s calculations on data of the RF MoF and OECD (Institute of Economic Analysis 1998; Posdnyakov, Lavrovskii, and 
Masakov 2000; OECD 2002).
vided 22 percent of revenues in 2001 (Figure 3.6) and 
increased to 36 percent in the ﬁ rst six months of 2002.
As the tax system evolved, changes were made 
annually in the distribution of revenues among the 
federal, regional, and local governments (Figure 3.7). 
Th e share of FG in the consolidated budget was on 
the decline until 1998, by which time the decen-
tralization of revenues in the RF had reached levels 
common in most federal countries. Th en, in accord-
ance with a policy of centralization of revenues, the 
federal share increased to 60 percent. In comparing 
the shift in federal/regional/local total revenue shar-
ing proportions—50:25:25 in 1998 to 60:25:15 in 
2001—it is easy to conclude that the centralization 
of revenues took place primarily at the expense of 
LGs. Some authors argue that revenue sharing is even 
more centralized; for instance, Vladimir Lisenko 
(2002), deputy chairman of the Duma’s Committee 
on Federalism and Regional Policy, suggests that the 
federal/regional/local total revenue sharing propor-
tion is rather 63:27:10.
Sub-federal revenues. According to the Budget 
Classiﬁ cation (1996), revenue sources of subnational 
budgets consist of the following: regional and local 
taxes and duties; regional and local non-tax revenues; 
ceded federal taxes and non-tax revenues; shared 
federal taxes; conditional and unconditional grants. 
Th ese are summarized in Tables 3A.4 and 3A.9 in the 
Annex.
Th e Russian tax system is very sophisticated with 
so-called ceded taxes and the sharing of not only the 
federal and regional taxes, but also of local taxes, 
among three or more levels of the budget system. 
Nine percent of the total tax revenues of the federal 
budget derives from local taxes, whereas 3 percent 
comes from regional taxes; on the other hand, rev-
enues from federal taxes are allocated not only to the 
federal budget, but also to regional and local budgets 
in the proportion 68:20:12 (Kovalevskaya 2002, 21).
2.3 Some Problematic Issues 
  in Intergovernmental Finance 
Relations between the federal and regional govern-
ments. Federal budget and tax legislation formally 
regulates intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations between 
the three governmental levels. However, in reality 
many complications arise in this ﬁ eld, which are dis-
cussed in the literature (Bird, Ebel, and Wallich 1999; 
Wallich 2000; Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 2000, 
2001). 
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Th e ambiguity of the expenditure assignments 
as prescribed by the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation was partly lessened through bilateral agree-
ments between the center and the regions. For exam-
ple, on 3 August 1994 the Republic of Bashkortostan 
signed with the federal center the Treaty of the Russian 
Federation and the Republic of Bashkortostan on 
Distribution of Objects of Jurisdiction and Mutual 
Delegation of Authorities. Besides, every year, begin-
ning in 1993, Bashkortostan established agreements 
with the federal center, which required that the 
Republic take up some federal expenditure respon-
sibilities, for example, university expenditures and 
the construction and maintenance of federal roads 
(initially federal responsibilities). Bilateral treaties 
between federal and regional governments resulted in 
nonuniform expenditure assignments across regions. 
Besides, great diﬀ erences existed among regions in 
the division of responsibilities between the govern-
mental tiers. For example, Bashkortostan implements 
republican programs on paving rural village roads, 
bringing natural gas to villages and industrial set-
tlements, and telecommunications. Th ese problems 
are the responsibility of local administrations in most 
other regions in the RF.
According to federal legislation intergovernmen-
tal ﬁ scal relations between the federal and subnation-
al governments are constituted as symmetric relations 
despite their diﬀ erent names: republic, oblast, auto-
nomous oblast, kray, autonomous okrug; and also 
despite the fact that some subnational units are parts 
of other similar units. Th e practice is quite diﬀ erent. 
Federal equalization policy aﬀ ects 88 of 89 sub-
national units of the federation, with the exception of 
the Chechen Republic where federal ﬁ nancial support 
is calculated by count-up (RF MoF 2001).
Th ere is a peculiarity in the sharing of federal tax-
es amongst subjects of the federation that overlap or 
are parts of one another. Th us, in 2002, the tax on the 
use of mineral resources is shared in such regions in 
the following proportion: the federal budget receives 
74.5 percent; oblast or kray receives 5.5 percent, and 
the autonomous okrug—which is part of the oblast 
or kray—receives 20 percent. In other regions this 
tax is shared in the proportion 80:20, where the 
federal budget receives 80 percent and the regional 
budget receives 20 percent. Moreover, the Republic 
of Tatarstan and the Republic of Bashkortostan had 
special sharing rates until 2000. Th ere is evidence of a 
so-called asymmetrical federation. 
Finally, FG has direct ﬁ scal relations with 40 
closed administrative territorial formations. Th ey 
are excluded from the basic equalization policy of 
the federal center, and their budgets are not included 
in consolidated budgets of the region to which they 
belong.
Relations between regional and local governments. 
Th ere are many LGs in the Russian Federation that 
have no ﬁ scal discretion. Th eir budgets are only an 
estimate of expenditures approved by upper level 
government (regional or local). Th is pattern is at the 
center of discussions between federal and regional 
legislators. Th e Federal Law on the General Principles 
of Self-Government (1995) permits the existence of a 
municipality on the territory of another municipality. 
At the same time, the law prohibits the subordination 
of municipalities to one another. Many legislators 
understand this law to be a prohibition of adminis-
trative subordination, which, however, is not applied 
to budgeting. Th us, the Federal Law on Foundations 
of Budget Rights (1993), which lost validity only in 
2000, had permitted the existence of a few-tier local 
budget system. Th e Federal Law on Foundations of 
Tax System (1991) declares that local tax revenues 
might be either revenues of LGs in cities and rayons, 
or revenues of district, town, and village municipali-
ties dependent on the decision of city or rayon gov-
ernments. Here the discretion of lower level LG is 
limited by decisions of upper level LG. For example, 
budgets of the LGs of city districts can be approved 
and monthly funded by the city government. 
As a result of these legislative collisions, the four 
main models of governmental structure in the RF re-
sult in vertical budget systems that vary from three to 
ﬁ ve tiers: including the federal level and two to four 
tiers on the sub-federal level. Th erefore, municipali-
ties are very diﬀ erent from the perspective of budget 
opportunities. In 2000, the total number of local 
administrations in Russia was approximately 29,500. 
Of these, 12,261 had federal registration as munici-
palities; 11,691 had elected councils; 11,209 LGs pos-
sessed municipal property; and only 4,705 adminis-
trations were real municipalities having some budget 
discretion and the right to introduce their own taxes 
according to federal legislation (Kurlyandskaya and 
Nikolaenko 2001b). 
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3. EQUALIZATION SYSTEM 
Vertical and horizontal imbalances and eﬀ ective ﬁ s-
cal equalization are very signiﬁ cant economic issues 
for Russia due to the Soviet legacy and the prolonged 
absence of an intelligible federal equalization policy 
for the greater part of the transition period. Th e state 
policy pattern in this ﬁ eld depends on the degree to 
which society is democratized. If a country was ini-
tially centralized, as in the case of Russia, this policy 
then depends on the readiness of the center to oﬀ er 
real autonomy and discretion in decision-making 
processes to subnational governments. Russia has 
made some steps in this direction only since the end 
of the 1990s.
3.1 Vertical Imbalance 
  and Its Equalization
Using the measures developed by Hunter (1977), 
the so-called Hunter’s coeﬃ  cient (HC), it can be 
concluded that Russia has a high degree of vertical 
balance with an HC #1 value located between that 
of Germany and the Netherlands, and an HC #2 
Table 3.1
Measures of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance for the Subnational Sector: International Comparison
Country Coeffi cient #1 Coeffi cient #2
Russiaa 0.270 0.841
Belgium 0.156 0.512
Denmark 0.172 0.611
Estoniac 0.088 0.686
Finlandd 0.191 0.654
Germanyb 0.244 0.794
Latviac 0.069 0.491
Lithuaniac 0.111 0.869
Netherlands 0.288 0.345
Note: a Based on 1997 data.
  b Subnational sector includes Laender as well as local governments. 
  c Based on 1994 ﬁ scal data. 
  d Coeﬃ  cients calculated using 1990 local expenditure data.
Source: Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 2001.
which approximates Germany’s (Table 3.1). Further, 
the distribution of revenues and expenditures among 
the federal, regional, and local levels were rather close 
to each other during the period from 1992 to 2001. 
However, this would be an erroneous conclusion be-
cause these coeﬃ  cients do not take into account the 
degree of discretion that subnational governments 
have over their own revenue sources.
In actuality, in view of mandates and the federal 
determination of the norms of expenditure needs dis-
cussed in the previous section, the federal center con-
trolled about 90 percent of the consolidated federal 
budget in 1999. Roughly speaking, both regional and 
local governments had discretion in only about 10 
percent of combined expenditures (Lavrov 2000). 
Figure 3.8 and Table 3.2 show that the distribu-
tion of revenues and the control of expenditures be-
fore the 2000–2005 reform (RF Government 2000) 
was characterized by:
• Decentralization of revenue sources
• High centralization of expenditure control at the 
federal level
• High imbalance between revenue sources and the 
amount of real discretion subnational govern-
ments could exercise in the determination of ex-
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penditures and regulation of quality and quantity 
of public services
Moreover, the relatively high degree of vertical 
balance between the federal and regional levels is 
not replicated between regional and local levels. In 
1999, before starting the last budget reform, LG own 
taxes covered only 13 percent of their expenditures 
(Kurlyandskaya and Nikolaenko 2001b). 
Within the 2000–2005 reform, the intention is 
to increase the federal share of total revenues from 
49 percent to approximately 70 percent. On the other 
hand, there is a corollary plan to increase the discretion 
of subnational governments in expenditures. Th us, in 
2001 HC #1 and HC #2 became equal, respectively, 
0.324 and 0.833. Th e value of HC #2 in 2001 is 
practically the same as it was in 1997. Th is means 
that there still remains a need to equalize transfers to 
counter vertical imbalance. While computing HC #1, 
shared taxes were taken into account, although they 
cannot be considered as own taxes because they are 
often changed. Almost all federal shared taxes were 
taken into account in the calculation of HC #1: EPT, 
PIT, joint tax for small business, tax on imputed earn-
ings, tax on resources. Th eir sharing rates have been 
Figure 3.8
Th e Degree of Federal Expenditure Control and Sub-federal Expenditure Discretion 
Before and After the Reform of the Years 2000–2005
Source: Presented according to Lavrov (2000). 
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changed rather frequently by FG and only the sharing 
rate for excises remains unchanged since 1994; this is 
why they can be seen as “quasi” own taxes. Th e value 
of HC #1, computed in this way for 2001, is higher 
than that for 1997. It means that the contribution of 
shared taxes in countering the problem of vertical im-
balance decreased over that period. Th e vertical ﬁ scal 
gap was bridged by a combined use of shared taxes 
and direct federal transfers. 
Tax-sharing. Federal and regional taxes are used 
as instruments of both vertical and horizontal equali-
zation:
• VAT—a federal tax, 15 to 25 percent of which 
was assigned to regional governments for equali-
zation before 2000. As of 2001, 100 percent of 
VAT accrues to the federal budget.
• PIT—a federal tax, 84 to 100 percent of which 
has been assigned to RGs.
• EPT—a federal tax, two-thirds (66 percent) of 
which has been assigned to RGs and LGs.
• Excise duties—the federal taxes, diﬀ erent kinds of 
these have been assigned to the federal and local 
governments at sharing rates of either 50 or 100 
percent.
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• Regional taxes—the sales tax; the tax on property 
of organizations (a 50 percent share is assigned to 
FG, another 50 percent to the local level, accord-
ing to federal legislation).
Th e Federal Law on the Financial Base of Local 
Self-Government (1997) introduces some conditions 
on the use of these taxes for equalization purposes. 
RGs have to apply at least 50 percent of PIT and 5 
percent of EPT to equalization policy within their ter-
ritory of jurisdiction. Th is same FL also demands that 
RGs introduce some minimal rates of federal shared 
taxes that could be assigned to LGs on a constant ba-
sis. Th ere are additional restrictions that create a need 
for federal control, but only complicate equalization 
policy within the subjects of the federation. 
Conditional and unconditional grants. Conditional 
grants are used for funding federal mandates and for 
executing federal law. Regional budgets are used as 
transit accounts for transmitting the funds to LGs. 
For example, conditional grants are allocated from the 
FFC, which amounted to 1.3 billion USD in 2002, 
and is used for the provision of seven social beneﬁ ts 
(Table 7 in annex). Unconditional grants are used 
mostly for horizontal equalization. On the federal lev-
el they are disbursed from the FFSR—which totaled 
4.75 billion USD in 2002. Th ere is also an account 
named “funds reimbursed on mutual settlements of 
accounts, including compensations from regional 
budgets of the additional expenditures, occurring as 
a result of decisions of the government of a subject 
of the Russian Federation.” Th is account appears 
during execution of the local budget, but not at the 
moment of its adoption. Additional ﬁ nancial support 
is transferred through this account. For example, in 
Bashkortostan the ﬁ nancial ﬂ ow through this ac-
count varied from 20 to 50 percent of LG total rev-
enues. Conditional and unconditional transfers and 
funds disbursed through the latter account comprised 
respectively 1.3, 6.6, and 17.3 percent of the total ex-
penditures of the budget of Bashkortostan in 2000.
3.2 Horizontal Interregional Disparities 
  and Their Equalization
Th e absence of a comprehensive equalization policy 
and/or reform program on the federal level in the 
ﬁ rst years of transition has resulted in ﬁ scal disparities 
among regions, which increase from year to year. For 
example, the diﬀ erence between regions with mini-
mum and maximum values of per capita consolidated 
regional expenditures jumped from 12 times in 1992 
to 40 times in 2000 (Figure 3.9).
Huge disparities in economic development 
amongst the subjects of the federation cause an acute 
Figure 3.9
Horizontal Fiscal Imbalance: Ratio of Maximum per Capita 
Consolidated Regional Expenditures to the Minimum, 1992–2000
Source: Data for 1992–1997: Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 2001. Data for 1998–2000: author’s calculation based on data from RF MoF. 
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problem in identifying donors and recipients, which 
is not only of economic concern but also has politi-
cal resonance in the Russian Federation. Answers to 
the questions, who is a donor and who is a recipient 
and to what degree, depend on the set of factors that 
one takes into account. For example, Lavrov’s (2001) 
computation by formula, which compares FG support 
to the regions with FG tax and non-tax revenues on 
the territory of the regions, identiﬁ es 49 donors out of 
89 regions from 1995 to 1999.2 On the other hand, 
if we take into account FG direct expenditures in re-
gions, the number of donors is reduced to 33 in 1998, 
and 44 in 1999. Th e whole picture is again altered to 
a signiﬁ cant extent if we take into account redistribu-
tion through extra-budgetary funds; the main ones 
of which are the Pension Fund, the Fund of Social 
Insurance, the Fund of Employment, and the Fund 
of Obligatory Health Insurance. Revenues and ex-
penditures of extra-budgetary funds are equal to half 
the revenues and expenditures of the RF consolidated 
budget and are commensurable with revenues of 
Table 3.2
Th e FFSR Share in Federal Expenditures.
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Percentage 6.1 8.3 9.0 10.0 7.8 5.9 6.7 8.4 7.5
Source: Lavrov 2001, 106; and author’s computation based on RF MoF data (2001a, 2002a).
Figure 3.10
Horizontal Fiscal Imbalance: Coeﬃ  cient of Variation of per Capita 
Consolidated Regional Expenditures, 1992–2000
Source: Data for 1992–1997: Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 2001. Data for 1998–2000: author’s calculation based on data from RF 
Ministry of Finance.
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regional budgets. For example, in 1999 revenues of 
regional departments of the extra-budgetary funds 
gained 96.4 percent of regional own revenues (Lavrov 
2001,150).
Th e development of horizontal ﬁ scal equalization 
took place in several stages: (1) before 1993, equaliza-
tion of expenditure needs; (2) 1994–1999, equaliza-
tion of revenues; (3) in 2000 ﬁ rst attempt to equalize 
ﬁ scal capacity; and (4) since 2001 equalization of 
ﬁ scal capacity. Th e main source of equalization funds 
is the FFSR established in 1994. Th e dynamics of the 
FFSR share in federal expenditures is shown in Table 
3.2.
Coeﬃ  cient of variation for per capita consolidated 
regional expenditures also increased for 1992–2000 
(Figure 3.10).
In present-day Russia equalization policy on 
the subnational level is region-speciﬁ c and mostly 
depends on the legislation of the subnational units. 
Federal legislation provides only a framework within 
which the RF regions carry out their own equaliza-
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tion schemes. However, the main problem in this ﬁ eld 
is the instability of tax assignment that is determined 
by the federal authorities. Irregularity of tax-shar-
ing between the federal and regional governments 
has caused annual ﬂ uctuations in regional and local 
budget revenues. In view of these ﬂ uctuations, subna-
tional governments have been unable to practice their 
own formula-based equalization policy.
3.2.1 Equalization of Revenues (1994–1999)
Th e ﬁ rst attempt to introduce transparency, stability, 
and objectivity into the equalization system occurred 
in 1994 when the system of negotiated federal sub-
ventions to subnational units was replaced by the 
formula-driven mechanism of equalization transfers. 
Th at year the FFSR was established with two main 
goals: (a) to ﬁ x the sum of transfers to be allocated to 
subnational units; and (b) to base the calculation of 
transfers upon a set of formulas. 
Th e ﬁ rst formula-based mechanism for the al-
location of transfers amongst RGs was based on the 
calculation of actual revenues and expenditures and 
did not incorporate ﬁ scal capacity and expenditure 
Figure 3.11
Fiscal Equalization in 1999 According to the Principle “Assured Revenue Minimum”
Source: Lavrov 1999, 2001.
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needs. Th e result of this approach to equalization in 
1999 is shown in Figure 3.11. Th is ﬁ gure represents 
the distribution of per capita own revenues of regions 
corrected by the index of expenditures.
We can see that transfers from the FFSR were 
allocated so as to ensure a minimal degree of per 
capita revenues in regions where own revenues were 
insuﬃ  cient. But the ﬁ rst version of the mechanism 
of ﬁ scal equalization remained complicated, unsta-
ble, and nontransparent; formula-based transfer al-
location was not ﬁ xed and remained dependent on 
negotiations. In addition to this, the mechanism did 
not appear to accomplish its main goal: to equalize 
per capita revenues among regions. And as one can 
see from Figure 3.11, regions with a low level of own 
revenues were not given incentives to develop their 
economies and work to increase their tax base. 
As the FFSR accumulates funds for horizontal 
equalization, it determines to a great extent the equal-
izing capacity of the whole system of transfers. For 
example, since 1994 the share of two funds, the FFSR 
and the Federal Fund for Compensations (FFC), in 
total federal ﬁ nancial support had increased by 2002 
from 10.5 percent to 75.5 percent (Table 3A.10 in 
Annex). But still the two funds equalizing capacity 
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has not been very sizeable. In 1995 and 1996, the 
portion of FFSR grants was respectively 8.4 and 6.9 
percent of subnational revenues. Since 1996 the size 
of the FFSR has been determined annually as a per-
centage of total tax collections of the federal budget, 
excluding some exterritorial revenues (Table 3A.11 in 
Annex). 
Th is means of deﬁ ning the FFSR is imperfect be-
cause of the uncertainty it generates in future transfer 
levels for subnational units, and as a consequence, 
for the future transfers and subventions for LGs. It 
might have led, and very likely did lead, to ineﬃ  cient 
decisions on the part of regional and local govern-
ments regarding allocations. Moreover, it presumably 
reduced the overall stability of the intergovernmental 
ﬁ scal relations system and hampered development 
of the economy. From the point of view of FG, an 
advantage of this mechanism was the budgetary ﬂ ex-
ibility it oﬀ ered in times of budgetary crises.
One evident suggestion for improving the system 
is to ﬁ x the FFSR funding rate for a period of a few 
years, for example, for three years as suggested by 
Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (2001). Th e ﬁ xed rates 
could then only be altered in case of a stipulated 
emergency. Th is would mean that any alterations 
could be made only in the direction of diminishing of 
rates. In practice, the rate has hardly changed over the 
last three years. However, legislation is necessary to 
ensure a predictable size of the FFSR. Further, begun 
in 2001, the process of separating funds like the FFC 
from the FFSR, it seems, is not complete—the 2002 
FFSR consists not only of equalization transfers, but 
also of diﬀ erent speciﬁ c subsidies like subventions to 
support the delivery of certain goods to the northern 
regions. 
Instability and unpredictability have inhered 
in practically all types of federal ﬁ nancial support, 
as well as in total ﬁ nancial support. So, as one may 
see from Table 3A.10 in the Annex, the share of total 
federal support in total federal expenditures was 6.87 
percent in 1992. Th is share then rose up to 14.87 per-
cent by 1994, fell to 10.97 percent in 1995, increased 
again to 16.35 percent by 1997, then fell again to 9.37 
percent, and ﬁ nally rose to 13.74 percent by 2001. 
Th e set of formulas applied to the FFSR in the 
ﬁ rst years were unable to achieve the declared goals of 
transparency, objectivity, and stability.
3.2.2 Allocation of Transfers 
  from the FFSR in 1999
A new approach to equalization funds disbursement 
was introduced in 1999. Th e main principles of the 
new transfer allocation techniques were as follows:
• Introduction of a solid formula-based system of 
fund allocation from the FFSR, in place of the 
earlier negotiated mechanism.
• Assistance to regions on the basis of the level of per 
capita own revenues which are adjusted for varia-
tions in the historical level of budget expenditures.
As one can see from Figure 3.11, in 1999 the value 
of the threshold of normalized per capita revenue was 
49 USD. Th is approach and the formulas used in the 
1999 methodology had a few disadvantages:
• Providing a threshold level of revenues for regions 
with a low level of own revenues did not give 
them any incentive to develop their economies 
and increase own revenues (Figure 3.11). Th us, 
68 of 88 regions received transfers with resulting 
per capita revenues equal to the threshold level of 
49 USD.
• Th e methodology used the actual revenues as a 
base for further computation of transfers. Using 
current revenues for the transfer calculation gave 
regions an incentive to raise less revenue, not more. 
In their analysis of the 1999 equalization system, 
Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (2000) identiﬁ ed a fur-
ther three disadvantages:
• Th e possibility of a misallocation of resources arose 
from theoretically calculated norms that can be 
insuﬃ  cient for the delivery of some public serv-
ices. Th is is a case when norms do not reﬂ ect real 
expenditures for the provision of certain public 
goods in the region. For example, real per capita 
cost of primary education in Bashkortostan is 
greater than in Sverdlovsk oblast because the latter 
has a smaller share of rural population. Th e other 
danger that accompanies the use of budgetary 
norms is an increased likelihood of budget exten-
sion with less attention given to budget perform-
ance and the level and quality of public goods.
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Source: Presented according to Martinez-Vazquez, Boex (200).
Figure 3.12
Algorithm of Allocation of Transfers from FFSR in 1999
Hij : is the per capita budget 
norm for region i and 
expenditure category j
S: is the number of 
expenditure categories Hij
Ri : is the amount of 
own-revenues of the 
consolidated budget in 
region i
Ni : is the number of 
inhabitants in region i
normR
PC
 : is the threshold 
of normalized per 
capita revenue. 
  Its value was chosen 
so that the sum of 
the transfers should 
be equal to the size 
of the FFSR:
 Σ
T
 i=1
 ti  = FFSR
Computation of IBEi—the index of budget expenditures 
of region i as the ratio of the total expenditure needs for region i 
and the region with the lowest overall expenditure needs:
Formation of the FFSR—the Fund for Financial Support of Regions 
as 14 percent of the Federal government’s tax revenues 
excluding customs and revenues of earmarked budget funds
Transfers for regions were calculated 
according to the formula:
ti   =  (  normRPC   –  normRiPC  )  x IBEi x Ni
IBEi   =
mini Σ
S
j=1
Hij
Σ
S
j=1
Hij
Computation of normalized per capita revenue
normRi
PC  
=
Ri
Ni x IBEi
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Figure 3.13
Algorithm for Allocation of Transfers from FFSR in 2000
Ni:  is the number of inhabitants in region i
NRF:  is the number of inhabitants 
  in the Russian Federation
T:  is the number of regions
S:  is the number of expenditure needs
ENij: estimation of expenditure need j in region i 
computed by the formula: ENij = Pi x λj x qij x Nij
  where  Pi: is the cost of living index in region i
   λj: is the per capita norm of funding 
  public service j
   Nij: is the population, which needs 
  public service j in region i
   qij: is the correction factor for Nij for the 
  structure of population
GRP
j
i: are Gross Regional Product (value added) produced 
in region i in sectors j: industry, construction, 
agriculture, services
aj:  are the shares of bite of taxes from four sectors
for consolidated regional budgets
6. Computation of normalized per capita TTR:
3. Computation of total taxable resource for 1997 data
1. Formation of the FFSR—the Fund for Financial Support of Regions 
as 14 percent of the Federal government’s tax revenues 
excluding customs and revenues of earmarked budget funds
IBEi   =
Σ
S
j=1
ENij       Ni
2. Computation of IBEi—the index of budget expenditures 
of region i as the ratio of the total expenditures of region i:
Σ
T
i=1
 Σ
S
j=1
ENij         NRF
4. Adjustment of the value of each region’s total taxable resource
for conditions of 2000
TTRi
2000
 = 1.194 x TTR
97
i 
TTR
97
i = Σ( j )   aj x GRP
j
i
5. Adjustment of the value of each region’s total taxable resource
within 20 percent limitation 
of the TTR deviation from actual revenues
TTRi
Ni x IBEi
TTRi
PC  
= 
As a result of this action carried out by complicated 
formula, TTR was within limits 1.2 x Ri > TTRi > 0.8 x Ri, 
where Ri: the total actual revenues of region i in 1998, 
   corrected to the tax conditions of 2000
Continued to 7
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Continued from 6
8. Computation of amount of facilities that region i 
needs to lift its Normalized Per Capita Total Taxable Resource 
up to the average level:
7. Th e FFSR was divided into three parts:
FFSR = FFSR1 + FFSR2 + FFSR3
where parts of FFSR1 and FFSR2 were deﬁ ned as:
FFSR1 = 0.8 x (FFSR – FFSR3)
FFSR2 = 0.2 x (FFSR – FFSR3)
∆TTRi = (normTTR
PC
a ver age – norm TTRi
PC 
) x IBEi x Ni
9. Computation of Transfer 1 proportionally the gap ∆TTRi 
and according to the size of FFSR1
T(1)i = FFSR1
∆TTRi 
Σ
T
i=1
  ∆TTRi 
10. Computation of Transfer 2 which insures 
a certain minimal Normalized Per Capita Total Taxable Resource 
within the limits of  FFSR2
T(2)i = (normTTRPCmin  – normTTRPCi     (T(1)i) ) x IBEi x Ni
11. Computation of Transfer 3 from FFSR3 for regions which 
received less federal ﬁ nancial assistance in 1999 than in 2000
T(3)i = 1.18 x Fi
1999
  – T(1)i  – T(2)i
12. After computation of Transfers 1, 2, 3 they were reduced 
by 2 percent and the resulting amount was allocated 
to the Republic of Dagestan as additional ﬁ nancial assistance.
Source: Author’s presentation based on data from RF MoF (1999).
Fi
1999
: is the federal ﬁ nancial assistance for region i in 1999 
corrected by inﬂ ation factor (= 1.18) for 2000
normTTR
PC
i     (T(1)i): is Normalized Per Capita Total Taxable 
Resource after receiving transfer T(1)i
In accordance with the division of the FFSR into three parts 
the value of total transfer to each region also included three 
parts:  Ti = T(1)i + T(2)i + T(3)i
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• Flawed ﬁ scal management incentives arose from 
using physical norms. For example, a region richer 
in resources would have more school buildings 
and thus would receive more generous transfers 
for education according to physical norms, while 
poorer regions would receive correspondingly 
fewer resources. 
• Th e use of expenditure norms deﬁ ned by federal 
government bodies in the absence of clear and 
transparent formulas may be too complex and 
administratively costly. Besides, overly complex 
and nontransparent procedures for the estimation 
of norms return the equalization system de facto to 
a system of politically negotiated transfers.
3.2.3 Allocation of Transfers 
  from the FFSR in 2000
In 2000 considerable modiﬁ cations were made to the 
methodology for the allocation of transfers from the 
FFSR. Th ree main notions are relevant to the core 
transfer calculation: (1) total taxable resource of a 
region (TTR) and its derivatives such as a per capita 
TTR; (2) tax revenue of a region (R); and (3) index 
of budget expenditures in a region (IBE). Some in-
novations were introduced with this methodology. 
Th e ﬁ rst consisted of two types of transfers that were 
introduced in this same year. Th e second concerned 
the use of the new notion of TTR, instead of actual 
revenues. Th e algorithm of the transfer allocation is 
presented in Figure 3.13.
It is ﬁ rst necessary to make the following remarks 
on the modiﬁ ed algorithm:
1. Th e computation of TTR for 2000 was initially 
based on data from 1997. Th is data was used be-
cause 1997 was the year prior to the 1998 ﬁ nan-
cial crisis in Russia and the data better reﬂ ected 
the economic conditions of the regions. Th erefore 
coeﬃ  cients ai in the formula (box 3) use GRP and 
tax collection information for 1997 (Table 3.3).
Th us, the formula of box 3 took the following 
form for 1997:
 TTR97i = 0.265 x GRPi
ind + 0.163 x GRPi
const + 
  0.066 x GRPi
agriar + 0.113 x GRPi
service
2. Th e expenditure needs taken into account by the 
2000 methodology are divided into three groups:
• Maintenance of public utilities
• Normative expenditure needs: primary and second-
ary education, infant day care, public health ser-
vice, social security, culture and art, public convey-
ances and communication, law enforcement, and 
public administration
• Additional expenditure needs: child allowance; 
expenditure needs for implementation of the Law 
on Veterans; expenditure needs for implementa-
tion of the Law on Social Security of the Disabled; 
maintenance of habitation and cultural objects 
handed over to municipalities; maintenance of 
Table 3.3
GRP and Shares of the Bite of Taxes for Economic Sectors in 1997
Sector GRP 
[Billions Rubles]
Bite of Taxes 
[Billions Rubles]
Including ai
Tax Proceeds Increasing Tax Debt
1 2 3 4 5 6=3/2
Industry 655 010 173 435 149 664 24 371 0,265
Construction 182 308 29 684 24 842 4 842 0,163
Agriculture 91 865 6 077 4 636 1 442 0,066
Services 816 682 92 656 83 751 3 945 0,113
Source: RF MoF (1999).
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the new net and additional personnel of social 
security oﬃ  ces; maintenance of ﬁ nancial oﬃ  ces; 
and subsidies for electricity
3. Regions which had T(3)i > 0 received the third type 
of transfer. Th ere was only one problem. It was 
impossible to know the amount that was needed 
for assignment of T(3) in advance. Th erefore, it 
was necessary to carry out an iterative procedure:
 Step1: Choose ﬁ rst approximation of FFSR3
 Step2: Based on FFSR3 to compute FFSR1 and 
FFSR2 with formulas in box 7 
 Step3: Compute transfers T(1), T(2), and T(3) 
by formulas in boxes 9, 10, and 11
 Step4: In case the sum
      Σ
T
i=1
  T(3)i  
   exceeded or, on the contrary, did not ob-
tain the full amount of FFSR3, it would 
be necessary to decrease or increase the 
latter and repeat steps 1–3 of this proce-
dure. 
4. Reallocation of 2 percent of transfers from all re-
gions into the Republic of Dagestan in 2000 was 
caused by the need of additional ﬁ nancial assist-
ance due to a force majeure.
 5. Th e allocation of transfers from the FFSR in 2000 
not only covered equalization functions but also 
subsidies for some federal mandates. Th us, three 
conditional transfers were included among the 
total number of transfers: child allowance; ﬁ nan-
cial support for the purchase and delivery of oil, 
mineral oil, and fuel to the northern regions and 
to similar regions with limited periods of delivery; 
and compensation for the tariﬀ s on electricity in 
the regions of the Far East and the Arkhangelsk 
oblast. 
Th e key points of the 2000 methodology could be 
summarized as follows. TTR was intended to reﬂ ect 
the ﬁ scal capacity of regions. In practice, as one can 
see from the algorithm in Figure 3.13, in the compu-
tation of TTR a kind of modiﬁ ed GRP (mGRP) was 
used that does not have the limitations for estimat-
ing ﬁ scal capacity (Ma 1997; Martinez-Vazquez and 
Boex 2000). However, the 20 percent limitation on 
TTR deviation from actual revenues (box 5 in Figure 
3.13) reduces this eﬀ ect, and as a result TTR in the 
2000 methodology reﬂ ects something like an aver-
age between real ﬁ scal capacity and actual revenues. 
Nevertheless, the computation of expenditure needs 
(box 2) in the 2000 methodology was better than in 
Figure 3.14
Proportional Equalization Principle
Source: Lavrov (2001).
R1 R2Recipients Donors
Regions
Per capita 
revenues
Average level
After transfers
Before transfers
88
D I L E M M A S  A N D  C O M P R O M I S E S :  F I S C A L  E Q U A L I Z A T I O N  I N  T R A N S I T I O N  C O U N T R I E S
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
the previous mechanism and satisﬁ ed the common 
approaches.
Th e primary idea behind the new allocation sys-
tem was the creation of incentives for regions to boost 
their tax eﬀ orts and develop their regional economies. 
One means of implementing this idea is shown in 
Figure 3.14.
Here the region in position R1 has an incentive to 
increase internal revenues because in this case its total 
revenue increases and the region changes place and 
occupies point R2, where it receives more revenues 
after the allocation of transfers then when it occupied 
point R1. Th is may be possible if some change in re-
gional own revenues is not entirely oﬀ set by changes 
in shared taxes and transfers like in Figure 3.11. But 
this system has one signiﬁ cant disadvantage: the re-
gion in position R1 after receiving transfers may still 
have insuﬃ  cient ﬁ scal resources for the provision of 
public services at some minimal level. In order to 
overcome this problem, the 2000 methodology com-
bined the idea of Figure 3.14 with the approach of the 
1999 methodology (Figure 3.11). Th us, the concep-
tion of transfer allocation from the FFSR in 2000 
pursued the following goals:
• Generating incentives for subjects of the federa-
tion to increase their tax eﬀ orts and enlarge their 
own tax base (by allocation of Transfer 1, box 9);
• Insurance of some minimal level of total revenues 
for regions in order that all regions might obtain a 
certain minimal level of public services (by alloca-
tion of Transfer 2, box 10);
Th e results of the allocation of transfers in 2000 
are shown in Figure 3.15. 
Regions numbered 34–71 received FFSR transfers 
in proportion to the gap between some threshold and 
per capita own tax resources corrected by the index of 
expenditures, so that the total amount of revenue is 
raised according to the growth of their own revenue. 
Figure 3.15
Fiscal Equalization in 2000
Source: Author’s presentation based on RF MoF data (see also Table 3A.12 in Annex).
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Th e ﬁ rst 33 regions were equalized until a certain 
minimal level (USD 104 in 2000). So, incentive ex-
ists for regions 34–71 to increase their own revenues. 
And ﬁ nally, the rate of total revenue growth in these 
regions is less than the rate of growth of their own 
revenues. Th e seventeen regions from 72–88 did not 
receive any transfers from the FFSR.
In summary, one can classify the regions into 
three groups:
• Recipients with a high level of own revenue insuf-
ﬁ ciency (regions 1–33)
• Recipients with a middle level of own revenue 
insuﬃ  ciency (regions 34–71)
• Donors (regions 72–88)
According to the two rules (two goals) of the 
equalization system mentioned above, the FFSR 
transfer money has to be divided into two main parts 
(FFSR1 and FFSR2 in box 7). Th e ﬁ rst part com-
prises 80 percent of FFSR resources while the second 
part comprises 20 percent. Th is proportion between 
the two parts was not changed in 2001 and 2002. 
3.2.4 Allocation of Transfers from the FFSR 
  for the Years 2001 and 2002
Some stabilization of the federal equalization mecha-
nism has been observed since 2001. Essentially, the 
2001 methodology and the 2002 methodology do not 
diﬀ er. Th e main steps of their algorithm are presented 
in Figure 3.16.
Like the 2000 methodology, the goal of the ﬁ rst 
part of the FFSR was to motivate regions to increase 
their own revenues, and the goal of the second part 
was to ensure the delivery of a certain minimal level 
of public services. In accordance with the division of 
the FFSR into two parts, the value of a total transfer to 
each region also included two parts: Ti=T(1)i+T(2)i
In comparison with the 2000 methodology, the 
algorithm in Figure 3.16 contains innovations in the 
computation of the Total Taxable Resource, which 
seems more complicated and incomprehensible. Th e 
methodology (RF MoF 2000, 2001a) does not pro-
vide formulas for a and Vi—clarifying this problem 
requires some mathematical transformations. First, it 
is necessary to formalize the deﬁ nitions of a and Vi. 
From their wording given in boxes 2 and 3 the follow-
ing formulas appear:
  
where 
Ri : is tax revenue in region i, predictable for the 
  next year
 GRPi and GNPRF: GRP in region i and gross na-
tional product of the RF in sense of value-added.
Substituting these formulas for the formulas 
in boxes 2 and 3 of Figure 3.16 and making some 
transformations, it is possible to obtain the formula 
for TTRi:
 TTRi = β x 
where 
 β measures the average eﬀ ective level of regional 
taxation: 
 β =  
 and mGRPi is modiﬁ ed GRP which reﬂ ects the 
industrial structure of region i:  
 mGRPi = GRPi x Ci  
Now it is easy to see that TTR does indeed meas-
ure per capita ﬁ scal capacity as was originally pro-
posed by Martinez-Vazquez and Boex for the 1999 
methodology.
Th e formulas in boxes 4 and 6 (Figure 3.16) are 
more complicated than those of 2000 (boxes 8 and 
10 in Figure 3.13). However, it is possible to show 
mathematically that they are essentially the same 
and, therefore, that it is reasonable to use the formu-
las here.
a =     ,
NRF
Σ
T
i=1
Ri
Vi = 
GRPi
Ni
GNPRF
NRF
mGRPi
Ni
Σ
N
i=1 
Ri
GNPRF
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Figure 3.16
Algorithm of Allocation of Transfers from FFSR in 2000 and 2001
Vi :  is per capita value added in region i divided by per 
capita value added in the Russian Federation
Ci :  is a factor of industrial structure of region i which is 
computed by the consecution of very sophisticated 
formulas that reﬂ ect the regional industry structure 
in detail
A :  factor A is per capita average tax revenue throughout 
all regions of Russia. For example, A was equal 5,413 
rubles for 2001
TTR
PC
min : is a possible value up to which total revenues 
 can be lifted within (0.2 x FFSR)
t(1)i  : per capita transfer 1 for region i
6. Computation of Transfer 2 which insures a certain minimal 
Normalized Per Capita Total Taxable Resource 
within the limits of 0.2 x FFSR2
1. Forming FFSR and computation of IBE like 
in the 2000 Methodology
4. Computation of the amount of facilities that region i needed 
to lift its Normalized Per Capita Total Taxable Resource 
up to the average level
∆TTRi = A x ( 1 –              ) x IBEi x Ni
TTR
PC
i    = A x ITPi 
5. Computation of Transfer 1 proportionally the gap ∆TTRi 
and according to the size of 0.8 x FFSR
3. Computation of Per Capita Total Tax Resource:
2. Computation of Index of Tax Potential of region i:
ITPi = Vi x Ci
ITPi
IBEi
T(1)i = 0.8 x FFSR
∆TTRi
Σ
T
i=1
∆TTRi
7. Picking out some conditional transfers from the amount 
of transfers for ﬁ nancial support of buying and delivering products 
to the northern regions and similar regions with limited periods 
of delivery of products; compensation of the tariﬀ s for electricity 
in the regions of the Far East and the Arkhangelsk oblast
Source: Author’s presentation based on data from RF MoF (2000, 2001).
T(2)i = ( TTRPCmin –                                ) x IBEi x Ni(A x ITPi + t(1)i )
IBEi
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3.3 Horizontal and Vertical Equalization 
  on the Sub-regional Level: 
  The Case of Bashkortostan
As discussed above, HC #1 and HC #2 computed for 
both 1997 and 2001 show a low degree of vertical 
imbalance between federal and sub-federal govern-
ments. However, the situation is diﬀ erent with regard 
to vertical ﬁ scal imbalance on the sub-regional level. 
Th us, these same coeﬃ  cients calculated for LGs in 
2001 show signiﬁ cant vertical imbalance: HC #1 = 
0.142 and HC #2 = 0.676 (based on the data of RF 
MoF 2002b). In the calculation for HC #1, not only 
the federal shared taxes (EPT, PIT, joint tax for small 
business, tax on imputed earnings, tax on resources) 
were taken into account, but also regional shared 
taxes (enterprise property tax, sales tax) and the local 
shared tax (land tax), because the sharing rate of all 
three is deﬁ ned by FG. Th e low value of HC #1 testi-
ﬁ es to the fact that federal and regional governments 
actively use their right to manipulate shared taxes. As 
a result, LGs have no opportunities to predict and 
Figure 3.17
Changes of EPT Rate and Shares of VAT and PIT Assigned to Subnational Governments
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plan their revenues for the future. One might expect 
RGs to “freeze” at least the proceeds from regional 
shared taxes. Indeed, FG recommends that RGs do 
just this—in addition to introducing formula-based 
horizontal equalization mechanisms.
However, the instability in federal equalization 
schemes during the last decade did not allow territo-
ries an opportunity to build formula-based equaliza-
tion mechanisms on the subnational level, not within 
subjects of the RF, nor on the local level. Th e rates 
and shares of the main taxes—EPT, PIT, and VAT—
assigned to subnational governments were changed 
rather frequently and to a considerable extent over the 
last ten years (Figure 3.17). Instability in tax-sharing 
between FG and RGs caused annual ﬂ uctuations in 
regional and local budget revenues. As a result, ex-
cept for a dozen oblasts, at present the subjects of the 
federation do not employ formula-based equalization 
schemes. In fact, the regions show a high degree of 
reluctance toward new approaches in public ﬁ nance 
administration. Still, the federal center encourages re-
gional governments to develop formula-based mecha-
nisms for the computation of transfers for LGs. 
Source: Author’s presentation on the basis of the RF laws on the budget.
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Th us, in 2000 the RF MoF issued the “Interim 
Methodological Recommendations on Regulating 
Intergovernmental Relations in the Regions of 
the Russian Federation” (RF MoF 2000a) and an 
“Explanatory Note” (RF MoF 2000b) with the above 
recommendations. Th e Russian government issued, 
in August 2001, a Decree on the Program of Budget 
Federalism Development in the Russian Federation 
for the Period until 2005 (RF Government 2001). 
Both these documents state that intergovernmental 
relations on the subnational level have the following 
imperfections:
• Unclear and irrational distribution of responsi-
bilities between the local and regional levels
• Disparity between revenues and expenditures en-
trusted to localities
• Ineﬀ ective mechanism for allocation of ﬁ scal sup-
port
Bashkortostan and the majority of the other 
subjects of the federation practice the following pro-
cedure of  allocation. First, the republican and local 
governments, independently of each other, compute 
the size of the gap between the estimated tax and 
non-tax revenues of local governments and their ex-
penditure needs for the next year. Th en they come to 
an agreement through bargaining. Local governments 
tend to underestimate their revenues and overestimate 
expenditure needs. For the forecast of revenues and 
expenditures in the coming year, ﬁ nance departments 
of the republican and local governments use the ob-
solete methodology of the Soviet period. Th us, the 
forecast of future revenues is based on an estimation 
of the actual execution of the previous year’s budget. 
Th is estimation is adjusted by diﬀ erent coeﬃ  cients 
which reﬂ ect changes in taxes and rates. Th e ﬁ nance 
departments also take into account the forecast of the 
performance of enterprises on the territory of their 
jurisdiction. Trying to gain an objective estimation 
of expenditure needs, the republican government at-
tempts to compute the minimal social norms for each 
expenditure need. Obviously, this computation activ-
ity and the regional and local negotiations take up an 
enormous amount of time and incur additional costs 
for the governments, which cannot be justiﬁ ed. 
Table A3.13 in the Annex shows the structure 
of republican and local government expenditures in 
the Republic of Bashkortostan for 2000. LGs spent 
about 30 percent of expenditures on education needs 
and over 17 percent on public health service needs. 
Apparently, this is a accurate picture for other years 
too, and LGs did not have enough of their own reve-
nues to maintain these services and needed the ﬁ nan-
cial support of the republican government. Th us, in 
2000 the republican government spent a quarter of its 
budget on ﬁ nancial support for LGs. As Table 3.4 il-
lustrates, horizontal equalization policy allows for the 
mitigation of diﬀ erences in budget revenues among 
rayons and cities of Bashkortostan. In 2000, before 
equalization, the ratio between the minimum and 
maximum value of the per capita own revenues (tied 
transfers inclusive) was 11 times, after allocation of 
equalization transfers the ratio decreased to 4 times, 
and then further deceased to 3 times after allocation 
of compensations for additional expenditure man-
dates. Figure 3.18 demonstrates the results of all types 
of ﬁ nancial support for LGs from the government of 
the Republic of Bashkortostan in 2000. In the graph, 
LGs are ordered according to the growth of their per 
Table 3.4
Horizontal Equalization in the Republic of Bashkortostan, per capita terms, in 2000
 Revenues 
Before Allocation 
of Tied Transfers
Revenues, 
Tied Transfers 
Included
Revenues, 
Tied and Equalizing 
Transfers Included 
Total Revenues 
(with Compensations 
of Mandates)
Min value [USD] 13.9 22.2 68.5 114.9
Max value [USD] 256.7 256.7 264.0 307.2
Mean value [USD] 68.3 74.5 109.0 163.7
Coeﬃ  cient of variation 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.2
Source: Author’s computations on the basis of RF MoF data.
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capita own revenues (in rubles). One can see that tied 
transfers—such as child allowance—increased local 
revenues slightly but did not change the picture of 
revenue disparity among localities. Untied transfers 
and compensations for additional expenditure man-
dates contributed signiﬁ cantly to the equalization of 
revenues and lifted per capita total revenues up to 
3,500–5,000 rubles for the majority of localities. 
However, the method for allocating ﬁ nancial 
support is not transparent. Only tied transfers such as 
the child allowance are allocated on the basis of the 
number of consumers; but these transfers amounted 
to only 5 percent of total republican support for 
localities in 2000. Th e allocation mechanism of 
untied transfers is based mostly on providing the 
current infrastructure with adequate funding to 
meet the level of actual expenditure needs, or, where 
they exist, the level of minimal norms of expenditure 
needs. Th us, in the computation of ﬁ nancial support, 
Source: Author’s computations on the basis of Bashkortostan MoF data.
Figure 3.18
Fiscal Equalization in the Republic of Bashkortostan in 2000
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Plus compensation of additional expenses 
to cover regional mandates for the year.
Plus united transfers
Plus tied transfers Own-revenues
the Republic of Bashkortostan MoF takes into 
account the following data:
• Th e average number of days of maintenance re-
quired for one hospital bed throughout a single 
year and the number of beds planned for the year; 
e.g., for 2002, the number of planned beds was 
49,442 and each was to be occupied for 320 days 
on average.
• Th e number of visits to a physician.
• Th e number of places in homes for the elderly and 
in boarding schools.
• Actual expenditures on libraries, museums, thea-
tres, clubs and other cultural and sports facilities.
Tied and untied transfers are determined by the 
annual budget law of the Republic of Bashkortostan, 
but they do not constitute the entirety of ﬁ nancial 
support granted. Th us, tied and untied transfers were 
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equal to 31 percent of the total ﬁ nancial support for 
localities in 2000. Th e other two-thirds of support 
was allocated through the special account for funding 
additional mandates. Th ese funds are allocated 
throughout the year and the method of their alloca-
tion by MoF is not transparent.
As a result of this approach in Bashkortostan, 
despite the high level of equalization noted above, 
there were signiﬁ cant distortions in per capita total 
revenues after allocation of all types of ﬁ nancial sup-
port (Figure 3.18). Th us, in 2000, one rural rayon 
with per capita own revenues of 583 rubles ended up 
with 4,624 rubles after receiving all support, whereas 
another rayon with a beginning per capita revenue 
ﬁ gure of 1,373 rubles had only 3,216 rubles after 
receiving all support. Th e same inconsistency can be 
observed in those subjects of the RF who have a large 
number of little municipalities, e.g., Tyumen oblast 
(Kurlyandskaya and Nikolaenko 2001b). 
Th e other important problem concerns the sta-
bility of the tax rate. It has already been mentioned 
(Figure 3.17) that Russia’s tax system was unstable 
over the last decade. Figure 3.19 demonstrates the 
situation with the taxes assigned by the government 
of Bashkortostan to Ufa—the capital of the republic
—which provides approximately half of the republic’s 
collected taxes. Th ere have been permanent changes 
in the EPT and PIT sharing rates and in the rate of 
tax on real estate assigned to Ufa (LG shares of hy-
drocarbon excises, urban and agricultural land taxes 
have been reduced by a factor of ten so that they will 
be comparable with other tax rates in the ﬁ gure).
In summary, the Bashkortostan case illustrates 
the imperfections of intergovernmental relations in 
Russia’s regions, as highlighted by the RF MoF. To 
overcome these, the MoF recommends that RGs em-
ploy the following measures:
• Formalization of the equalization process amongst 
subnational units. Th e use of a formula with in-
dicators for the unbiased measurement of revenue 
capacity and expenditure needs is recommended 
for transfer allocation. 
• Avoidance of unfunded mandates. Localities 
should receive subventions for expenditures del-
egated from a higher level, e.g., the federal and 
regional levels.
 Figure 3.19
Changes of Tax-Sharing Rates in Ufa
Source: Author’s computations on the basis of the laws on the budget of the Republic of Bashkortostan for 2000, 2001, and 2002.
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Figure 3.20 
Algorithm of the Formula-Driven Mechanism of Equalization in a Subject of the Russian Federation
FCi : the tax potential in locality i
Bij :  tax base of tax j in locality i
Rij :  actual tax collection of tax j in locality i
K :  number of taxes
L  :  number of localities
tj :  the average representative rate of tax j:
7.1 Full 
equalization: 
fulﬁ lling the gap 
between ﬁ scal capacity 
and expenditure need
1. Computation of the amount of ﬁ nancial support 
for localities by the formula:
FS = (Total expenditures of the localities) – (Own revenues of the localities)
5. Computation of the tax potential (ﬁ scal capacity) 
in each locality:
6. Computation of each locality’s per capita ﬁ scal capacity 
normalized by the index of budget expenditures
3. Sharing of the amount of ﬁ nancial support among three funds:
a) fund for extraordinary situations
b) fund for conditional support and special investment programs
c) fund for unconditional support of localities
2. Computation of federal and regional government mandates 
and total amount of resources for mandates
8. Insurance or the absence of insurance of a certain minimal level 
of the sum of ﬁ nancial support and per capita ﬁ scal capacity, 
normalized by the index of budget expenditures
Source: Author’s presentation on the basis of RF MoF data (2000a).
7.2 Partial
equalization: 
allocation of transfers 
in proportion to the 
gap between ﬁ scal 
capacity and 
expenditure needs
7.3 Relative equalization: 
allocation of transfers in proportion to the gap 
between each locality’s per capita ﬁ scal capacity 
normalized by the index of budget expenditures 
and its average level throughout all localities
7.4 Combination of 
partial and relative 
equalization
FCi
PC 
= 
FCi
Ni x IBEi
FCi = Σ
K
j=1
BIj x tj
 
Ni
EDU
Ni
N
EDU
N
Ni
HEALTH
Ni
N
HEALTH
N
Ni
SOCIAL
Ni
N
SOCIAL
N
4. Computation of the index of budget expenditures
E
EDU
E
xIBEi =
 Σ
L
i=1 
Rij
Σ
L
i=1 
Bij 
tj =
E
HEALTH
E
x
E
SOCIAL
E
x+ + +
E
OTHER
E
Total expenditures of the localities and their own revenues 
are summed up for all localities using the data of the 
previous year.
N
EDU
, N
HEALTH
, N
SOCIAL
: the numbers of consumers of 
educational, health, and social 
services in the RB
Ni, N: the numbers of inhabitants in locality i and 
in the RB;
Ni
EDU
,  Ni
HEALTH
, Ni
SOCIAL
: the numbers of consumers of 
educational, health and social 
services in locality i
E
EDU
,  E
HEALTH
, E
SOCIAL
, E
OTHER
,  E: expenditures for 
educational, health 
and social services, and 
others in the RB
Choice of means of equalization by the subject of the federation
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• Revenue capacity of localities should not be esti-
mated on the basis of actual taxes collected over 
prior years, but estimates should be based rather 
on the size of taxable resources.
• Expenditure needs should be calculated on the 
basis of the number of budget service customers 
(unemployed, elderly, disabled, and the like).
RF MoF also proposed the key points or frame-
work of a formula-driven mechanism to be intro-
duced by subjects of the RF (Figure 3.20).
Th ese recommendations for subnational units 
are a replica of measures used by the federal center 
in their own horizontal ﬁ scal equalization policy for 
regional units. However, methods appropriate for the 
federal level may prove unsuitable for the regional lev-
el. Th us, the indiscriminative and direct use of the RF 
MoF recommendations can result in underfunding of 
public services. For example, Article 6 of the Federal 
Law on the General Principles of Self-Government in 
the Russian Federation (1995) vests municipal units 
with responsibility for the maintenance of primary, 
secondary and vocational schools, and public health 
services. But these institutions were spread very un-
evenly across localities in the Soviet period. For ex-
ample, a hospital in one rural rayon delivered health 
services not only to the inhabitants of the rayon in 
which it was located, but also to those of neighbor-
ing rayons. If expenditure needs are calculated on 
the basis of the number of budget service customers 
of the rayon, the hospital in question will not receive 
enough funding to deliver services at the intended 
level. Figure 3.21 demonstrates this problem with 
respect to Bashkortostan.
Here we can see a balance between normative ex-
penditure needs computed according to the number 
of customers, and the actual expenditures of the LGs 
of Bashkortostan in 2000. Two-thirds of the 62 lo-
cal governments are rayon governments; these have 
been labelled from 1 to 42. Cities and towns are rep-
resented by numbers 43 to 62. We can suppose that 
the actual expenditures of local infrastructure reﬂ ect 
the expenditure needs of current LG infrastructure 
because the government of Bashkortostan provides 
localities with funds up to the minimal expenditure 
needs of the current infrastructure. To enable com-
parison of the data, the balance is shown in Figure 
3.21 as a relative value, i.e., as a ratio of the value of 
the balance of normative and actual expenditures to 
the value of actual LG expenditures.
Figure 3.21 allows us to draw a few interesting 
conclusions. First, the deviations of the balances are 
Source: Author’s presentation on the basis of RF MoF data.
Figure 3.21
Balance of the Normative and Actual Expenditures of 62 Local Governments of Baskortostan in 2000 
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very considerable. In some localities the actual expen-
ditures exceed the normative ones by up to 40 percent; 
and there are a few localities where, on the contrary, 
the actual expenditures are less than the normative 
ones, again, by up to 40 percent. Th us, the standard 
deviation here is 0.14, whereas if infrastructure were 
arranged in proportion to the population, the stand-
ard deviation would be zero. Th is simulation conﬁ rms 
the above-mentioned opinion of the Bashkortostan 
MoF that full implementation of the approaches sug-
gested by the RF MoF may result in underfunding 
of schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure in a 
majority of local jurisdictions in Bashkortostan. Th is 
explains the regional governments’ reluctance to fol-
low the federal recommendations. 
Both approaches (the current one and that recom-
mended by the RF MoF) have advantages and disad-
vantages. Nonetheless, the second approach is more 
favorable. Th e best path of development seems to be 
an evolutionary transition from the ﬁ rst approach to 
the second. It seems reasonable that a new model of 
intergovernmental relations in Bashkortostan satisfy 
the following requirements: 
• Financial support has to be allocated among locali-
ties on the basis of a formula, which should imme-
diately create good budget incentives. However, 
the allocation should not result in underfunding 
of organizations that deliver budget services. 
• Th is formula should gradually transform into an-
other formula described in the recommendations 
of the RF MoF. 
• Under the new conditions local and republican 
authorities need recommendations on how to 
reorganize the work and ﬁ nancing of their infra-
structures (schools, hospitals, etc.). For example, 
one recommendation might be that LGs reach an 
agreement among themselves on joint ﬁ nancing 
of schools and hospitals on their territories; with 
LGs able to provide services for their neighbors.
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Th e transition process in the public sector of the 
Russian Federation has developed over the last dec-
ade without adequate consideration of equalization 
policy. As a result, 
• Th e majority of regional and local governments 
had perverse budget incentives because any 
changes in their own revenues were almost com-
pletely oﬀ set by changes in transfers and regula-
tory taxes. Only during the last three years has the 
federal government adhered to a formula-driven 
mechanism of allocation to subjects of the federa-
tion.
• Th e federal and regional governments issued un-
funded mandates to lower level governments. In 
recent years the federal government has reduced 
the number of such mandates but the problem 
remains.
• Horizontal disparities among regions increased by 
a few multiples.
• Vertical imbalance between the federal and regio-
nal levels is not high in Russia, when compared to 
Germany and other developed countries. However, 
there is signiﬁ cant imbalance between own reve-
nues and expenditure discretion of subnational 
governments. Local governments especially suﬀ er. 
4.1 Current State 
  of Intergovernmental 
  Fiscal Relations in the Russian 
  Federation and Equalization Policy 
  Recommendations
Only for the last 2–3 years has FG implemented 
reasonable steps toward the improvement of inter-
governmental ﬁ scal relations. Th e new Tax Code and 
the 2000–2005 Budget Reform Program are the bul-
warks of ﬁ scal reform. Based on the above analysis, we 
may draw the following conclusions concerning the 
current situation and make policy recommendations:
Vertical Equalization in the Federation
1) Federal legislation has failed to assign expenditure 
responsibilities between the regional and local 
governments in a way that could be optimal for 
all subjects of the federation, in view of their 
signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences in degree of economic de-
velopment, models of sub-regional government, 
and the preferences of their populations. In order 
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to solve this problem Russia needs to clarify the 
distribution of powers according to the subsidiary 
principle. Only then will an eﬀ ective equalization 
procedure be possible. Further, federal legislation 
provides for the separation of expenditure respon-
sibilities, but not for the separation of functions 
and tasks for the delivery of public services. For 
example, Article 87 of the 2000 Budget Code as-
signs to LGs the construction and maintenance 
of public health institutions but not the delivery 
of public health services. As a result, local gov-
ernments do not have incentives to improve the 
delivery of public services and goods. Th e other 
consequence is the eruption of conﬂ icts between 
local and upper level governments as to which 
government must bear the expenses for a certain 
expenditure need. Th us, federal legislation, in 
particular the Budget Code and Tax Code, could 
be developed in the direction of the distinct sepa-
ration of federal, regional, and local functions in 
the provision of public services. It is also necessary 
to avoid contradictions and ambiguity in the as-
signment of expenditure responsibilities. Th is can 
be achieved on the basis of the conclusions of the 
RF Presidential Commission on the development 
of suggestions for delimitation of responsibilities 
among federal, regional, and local governments. 
However, some changes in responsibility assign-
ments are obvious. Road construction and main-
tenance should be vested to the appropriate level 
of government depending on the location and 
primary purpose of the road in question: federal 
roads should be federal responsibility; regional 
roads should be regional responsibility; and local 
roads should be local responsibility. And, obvi-
ously, they should be formulated as functions. 
Fire protection should not be the subject of joint 
responsibilities and should remain exclusively a 
local responsibility. If sub-regional government 
has insuﬃ  cient funds for road maintenance or 
for ﬁ re protection, this problem then needs to be 
solved within the framework of horizontal equali-
zation policy.
2) Today, subjects of the federation do not have their 
own laws on the assignment of functions and re-
sponsibilities, which prevents local governments 
from forecasting their own revenues and from 
pursuing their own ﬁ nancial policy. For their part, 
regional legislators cannot elaborate such regional 
law in view of the fact that the main tax proceeds, 
which the regional government allocates to LGs, 
are federal taxes and FG regulates the sharing of 
not only federal taxes, but also some regional and 
local taxes. Irregularities in tax-sharing between 
the federal and regional governments cause an-
nual ﬂ uctuations in regional and local budget 
revenues, in view of which regional governments 
cannot practice a formula-based regional equali-
zation policy. Th us, for regional governments to 
elaborate and adopt regional legislation, which 
would serve to deﬁ ne the ﬁ nancial base of local 
governments, the following measures are advis-
able:
 • Th e Federal Constitution or a constitutional 
federal law should prescribe that amendments 
to the Tax Code and the Budget Code may be 
done only once within a three-year period.
 • Before its introduction, a new budget and 
tax arrangement should be discussed on 
all governmental levels within the Russian 
Federation. Th e new tax and budget arrange-
ment should then come into force as a single 
legislative act, for a period of no less than 
three years.
 • To ensure that RGs have time to prepare 
amendments to regional legislation, approxi-
mately one year should elapse from the 
moment a new amendment is adopted to its 
enforcement on the federal level. 
 To improve the federal tax system, it would rea-
sonable to:
 • Eliminate the practice by which the federal 
government regulates regional taxes: the base, 
the rate, and the sharing of regional taxes 
must be deﬁ ned only by the regional govern-
ments. 
 • Simplify the so-called ceded taxes and the 
system of sharing federal, regional, and local 
taxes among three or more levels of the budget 
system. Th e federal budget obtained 9 percent 
of its total tax revenues from local taxes, and 3 
percent from regional taxes. It is necessary to 
move in the direction of tax separation: one 
tax for one government (federal, regional, or 
local).
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Horizontal Equalization Policy 
of the Federal Government
1) Th e tax-sharing system continues to cause inter-
regional distortions: collection of EPT is based on 
the location of corporate headquarters, collection 
of VAT is based on the place of sales, collection of 
PIT is based on a taxpayer’s place of employment 
and there is no system for the redistribution of 
these taxes according to the economic activity of 
regions. It is necessary to elaborate and to intro-
duce a formula-based mechanism of redistribution 
for at least some part of VAT and EPT proceeds, 
among the subjects of the federation according 
to their economic contribution. Indicators such 
as the number of employed, productivity, and so 
on, could be used. Such redistribution would cer-
tainly provide incentives to the regions to develop 
their economies, but may lead to considerable in-
terregional distortions in their own revenues. Th is 
negative consequence can be oﬀ set with equaliza-
tion transfers from the FFSR. 
  Such redistribution is especially signiﬁ cant 
in view of the fact that VAT proceeds have been 
assigned to the federal budget since 2001. Th e 
federal center promised to redistribute an addi-
tional 15 percent of VAT revenues through the 
FFSR. FG planned to collect 516 billion rubles in 
VAT in 2001, and 15 percent of this (77 billion 
rubles) was to be additional federal income that, 
according to the arrangement of 2000, would 
go to subnational governments. However, the 
FFSR was 57 billion rubles in 2000 and grew to 
only 100 billion rubles in 2001—instead of the 
planned 134 billion rubles. Th is is evidence that 
the “centralization of revenues for equalization” 
actually leads to increased federal expenditures 
for other goals and to an undermining of RG 
incentives. It would be reasonable to redistribute 
the additional federal VAT revenues (15 percent) 
among the regions in proportion with the GRP 
of each region. Th e FFSR must be formed from 
revenue sources that were used until 2000 as a 
percentage of the total tax collection. Figure 3.22 
shows the results of a simulation. In the ﬁ gure, 
a part of the funds has been extracted from the 
FFSR for 2001, amounting to revenue of as much 
as 77 billion rubles, and was redistributed as the 
additional VAT revenue among the regions in 
proportion to GRP. In this case, only the three 
wealthiest regions would not receive these funds. 
Th e other part, 23 billion rubles, was allocated 
according to the 2001 methodology. Th is meth-
odology does not show a signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence in 
results from those for 2000, but does have the ad-
vantage of intensifying incentives for RGs. Th us, 
in the simulation only 13 regions are equalized up 
to the minimal level in 2001, whereas the actual 
number of equalized regions was 38 in 2001 and 
31 in 2000 (the minimal levels in Figure 3.16 and 
Figure 3.22 are approximately the same).
2) Over the last two years (2001–2002) the method-
ology for the computation of horizontal transfers 
has stabilized, due largely to the implementation 
of well-known recommendations in the ﬁ eld of 
equalization:
 • For estimation of ﬁ scal capacity modiﬁ ed 
GRP is used, which takes into account the 
speciﬁ cs of regional economies. Th ese data 
are corrected by the index of budget expen-
ditures that reﬂ ects the expenditure needs 
of the region. Computation of this index is 
based on indicators of needs such as the share 
of population that is unemployed, elderly, 
disabled, and the like. However, the formu-
las used in the 2001–2002 methodology are 
more sophisticated than that of the 2000 
methodology, with the obvious disadvantage 
of being absolutely incomprehensible without 
deeper analysis. Th ey can be represented in a 
simpliﬁ ed and more understandable form. 
 • Among the indicators employed there are 
some glaring absences, such as indicators of 
needs for higher education and some other 
needs that are funded directly by the federal 
government. Th is arrangement then preserves 
interregional diﬀ erences in the delivery and 
consumption of certain public goods. 
 • Th e allocation of transfers serves to create 
incentives for regions with a low level of own 
revenues to develop their economies. Th us, 
80 percent of the FFSR funding consists of 
transfers that are computed in proportion to 
the gap between normalized own revenues 
and the average level of revenues. And only 20 
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percent of that funding can be recognized as 
transfers that raise up to some minimal level 
the total revenues of those regions with low-
est own revenues. However, incentives in the 
transfer allocation system prove not to be very 
great—about 40 percent of all regions receive 
transfers from the second part of the FFSR, 
but gain only a minimal level of revenues. 
Th us, the remaining 60 percent of regions 
have incentives to develop their economies 
and tax collection systems. A better solution 
would be to choose the number of regions 
which must have incentives and then to dis-
burse the FFSR into two parts. For example, 
if 80 percent of regions were to have incen-
tives, then 14 percent of the FFSR should be 
allocated in 2001 to raise up to some minimal 
level the total revenues of those regions with 
the lowest own revenues. 
Figure 3.22
Simulation of Fiscal Equalization in 2001: With Additional VAT Revenues of the Federal Government 
Allocated in Proportion to GRP
Source: Author’s simulation on RF MoF data.
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 • Th e size of the FFSR varies with every com-
ing year which makes it an unpredictable 
funding source for regional governments. 
Improvement to the system could be had if 
the funding rate were to be ﬁ xed legislatively 
for a period of several years and further altera-
tions could only be justiﬁ ed in the case of a 
stipulated emergency.
 • Since its introduction in 1994 the FFSR has 
served diﬀ erent targets. Th e FFC, designed in 
2001, released the FFSR from seven of these 
specially targeted needs. However, the 2002 
FFSR continues to consist of subsidies for a 
few special needs, which together comprise 
about 10 percent of the fund. It is necessary 
to separate out tied grants from the FFSR, 
leaving it only one function—the allocation 
of equalization transfers.
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4.2 Current State 
  of Intergovernmental 
  Fiscal Relations in Bashkortostan 
  and Other Subjects of the 
  Federation and Equalization Policy 
  Recommendations
Th e main conclusion to be drawn is that local govern-
ments are not given incentives to increase their own 
revenues and optimize their expenditure policy. Th e 
limited autonomy of local governments in budgeting, 
slack budget decisions, and a subjective means of al-
location—all result in reduced budget incentives for 
local governments. Local governments can grant un-
justiﬁ ed tax credits to enterprises, use ineﬀ ective tech-
niques in delivering services, maintain or obtain inef-
fective social infrastructure. Th ey are also interested 
in concentrating revenues in oﬀ -budget funds, and to 
develop informal relations with potential taxpayers. 
According to the analysis presented in this paper, 
the following speciﬁ c problems relating to local 
governments have to be solved during the reforms:1
1) Th e ambiguous status of local governments. Federal 
legislation addresses only three levels of govern-
ment—federal, regional and local—and fails to 
provide a comprehensive explanation of extant 
models of government in regions for which the 
strict three-tier model of intergovernmental ﬁ scal 
relations is unﬁ tting; for the resulting collisions 
between federal and regional governments account 
for many of the shortcomings of local govern-
ment institutions. Bashkrtostan’s experience shows 
that a system with two local levels of government 
is reasonable: LGs of cities and rayons with elected 
councils (referred to as “state local governments”), 
and LGs of villages and city districts. It would 
thus be rational to include this arrangement in 
federal legislation.
2) Vertical imbalance. Th e high level of centralization 
of revenues contrasts with the fact that a consider-
able part of the expenditure responsibilities of the 
regional consolidated budget is entrusted on the 
local level. Before the last reforms in 1999, own 
tax revenues covered 13 percent of local expendi-
tures (Kurlyandskaya and Nikolaenko 2001b). It 
is therefore necessary to assign additional revenue 
sources to LGs. For example, it seems reasonable 
that all taxes on small business should be assigned 
to LGs because the development of small business 
depends on institutional conditions that are most-
ly formed locally. Th ereupon, it is necessary to 
introduce amendments to federal legislation. For 
instance, present federal legislation institutes a tax 
rate on imputed earnings of up to 20 percent, 33 
percent of which will be a federal share of tax col-
lection for ﬁ rms. If the taxes on small business had 
been assigned to local governments, the tax col-
lection from small business would have been 1.7 
percent of Bashkortostan’s local own revenuers for 
2001. Obviously, this tax collection cannot create 
considerable incentives for local governments to 
develop small business, and it is unreasonable to 
diminish these incentives. Th erefore, it would be 
reasonable to introduce amendments to the Fed-
eral Tax Code, where 100 percent of the collected 
tax on gross receipt and on imputed earnings 
should be assigned to sub-federal governments. 
In its turn Bashkortostan should assign 100 per-
cent of these collected taxes to local governments 
through regional legislation. Also, it is reasonable 
to assign 100 percent of land tax revenues to LGs 
through federal and regional legislation, which 
presently divides land tax proceeds among federal, 
regional, and local governments.
3) Slack budget decisions. Th ere are at least two areas 
where budget decisions of regional governments 
are not ﬁ xed. Th e ﬁ rst area is allocation of ﬁ nan-
cial support to local governments. Even if regional 
government uses formula-based techniques to al-
locate subsidies and equalization transfers, and al-
location of transfers are ﬁ xed in the regional budg-
et law, in practice, during the ﬁ nancial year, these 
decisions are not fully executed. Th e second and 
most signiﬁ cant area of shortcomings in the budg-
eting process is concerned with the local budget 
sheet account #03020303 named “funds received 
on mutual settlements of accounts, including 
the compensations from regional budgets of the 
additional expenditures, occurring as a result of 
decisions of the government of a subject of the 
Russian Federation.” Th is account allows regional 
executive bodies to allocate additional funds with-
out transparency and practically without control 
on the part of regional councils. For example, in 
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Bashkortostan the ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows through this 
account varied from 20 to 50 percent of total reve-
nues of local governments. As a result of this 
system of allocation, the size of ﬁ nancial support 
to local government often depends on the politi-
cal power of local leaders. Th e other possible con-
sequence is that the local government can pursue 
unsound budget policy. Moreover, the ﬁ scal equal-
ization systems in Bashkortostan and the majority 
of the other subnational units of the Russian Fed-
eration preserve outmoded principles: the annual 
changing of tax shares and use of physical norms. 
Obviously, to solve these problems it is necessary 
to introduce regional laws on the budget system, 
where tax rates and shares would be ﬁ xed for at 
least three years, and a formula-driven mechanism 
of allocation of ﬁ nancial support would be used. 
4) Problems with the introduction of a formula-based 
mechanism for resource allocation. Th ere are some 
federal government documents that recommend 
RGs to introduce a formula-based mechanism 
for the allocation of ﬁ nancial resources. As the 
simulation with the Bashkortostan data shows, 
the indiscriminate implementation of the RF 
MoF recommendations could result in under-
funding of the current infrastructure and in 
social problems. Today LGs are unable to fulﬁ ll 
expenditure responsibilities, which according to 
federal legislation they are required to bear. Th ere 
are diﬀ erent ways to solve to the problems which 
arise in the course of implementing the RF MoF 
recommendations: 
 • Th e move from the physical measurement of 
ﬁ scal capacity, e.g. based on the number of 
hospitals and schools, to a measurement which 
accounts for the number of consumers must 
be carried out slowly, in an evolutionary man-
ner. Th e entire budget needs to be divided into 
two parts, so that the ﬁ rst part includes needs 
that are very disproportionately distributed 
among localities; while within the second part 
the needs of all localities are treated relatively 
equally. Th e regional government has to 
subsidize the ﬁ rst part of local needs directly 
and by formula-based mechanism, i.e., to 
allocate transfers for localities that do not have 
suﬃ  cient own revenues to cover expenditures 
from the second group. With regard to 
the other needs, the allocation of transfers 
according to the number of customers does 
not cause distortions on the scale of those in 
Figure 3.21. On 16 May 2002, Bashkorto-
stan’s Parliament submitted to the RF Parlia-
ment a bill on changing the Federal Law on 
the General Principles of Self-Government 
in the Russian Federation (1995). Th is bill 
proposed reducing the number of local man-
datory functions from 30 to 20; among the 
10 unwanted local functions were the main-
tenance of primary, secondary and vocational 
schools, and public health service institutions. 
If this bill is passed, it will be possible to in-
troduce a formula-based allocation of support 
as well as to escape underfunding of schools, 
hospitals, and cultural objects because they 
will be funded directly by the Bashkortostan 
government. For this interim period, three to 
ﬁ ve years, the Bashkortostan government will 
be able to implement measures aimed at the 
reorganization of infrastructure in accordance 
with the normative expenditure needs of cus-
tomers. 
 • Another solution is to utilize opportunities to 
establish horizontal agreements between lo-
cal governments, and form alliances of local 
governments that would collaborate to solve 
their common problems—as has been sug-
gested by federal and Bashkortostan legisla-
tion. Th us, the disproportion between actual 
expenditure needs of the infrastructure and 
those of customers can be regulated by the 
contracts among neighboring LGs.
 • A third way is to carry out a reorganization 
of local infrastructure as a ﬁ rst step, and after 
a few years, introduce a formula-based al-
location of resources and supplement it with 
horizontal cooperation.
 • Finally, a fourth solution is to introduce a 
transition formula. Th is formula would ac-
count for the upcoming transformation in 
the allocation of resources—from the present 
method to the method recommended by the 
RF MoF. Th us, if Bashkortostan were to 
decide on full equalization by the algorithm 
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Figure 3.23
Possible Transition from Present Method of Resource Allocation in Bashkortostan 
towards the Method Recommended by the Federal Government
Source: Author’s presentation.
1. Computation of
Ei(consumer)—Total normative expenditure need of locality i 
computed according to the number of consumers by the algorithm 
in Figure 3.20
Ei(infrastructure)—Total normative expenditures of locality i 
computed using expenditure norms and the physical needs 
of the infrastructure
4. Allocation of the compensation transfer for each locality, 
which should mitigate the gap
TRi = (4 – Y) x Gapi / 4
3. Allocation of equalization transfers according to RF MoF 
recommendations (the algorithm in Figure 3.20). 
Th is algorithm takes into account the number of consumers 
and causes distortions as large as Gapi.
2. Computation of the gap between the expenditure needs of the 
infrastructure and the expenditure needs computed according 
to the number of consumers
Gapi = Ei(infrastructure) – Ei(consumers)
Th e local governments have to adapt to the new formula-
based system and transform their infrastructure within four 
years.
Y = 1, 2, 3, 4—the number of the years using the formula
presented in Figure 3.20, the result will be a 
gap between the expenditure needs of the in-
frastructure and expenditure needs computed 
according to the number of consumers. Th e 
special transfer computed by the method 
presented in Figure 3.23 partly compensates 
for this gap over a period of a few years. In 
the ﬁ rst year this compensation covers three-
fourths of the diﬀ erence, half in the second 
year, and one-quarter in the third year. Dur-
ing this transition period LGs can adapt to 
the new formula-based system and transform 
their infrastructure.
 Th e other problem concerning the implementa-
tion of the RF MoF recommendations has to do 
with the fact that some minimal norms of public 
services—such as education or public health and 
also the salary tariﬀ  system—are established by 
the federal center, without ensuring suﬃ  cient 
ﬁ nancial resources for their implementation. Two 
decisions seem reasonable here. One is to elimi-
nate all minimal norms—the policy of deregula-
tion. Th e second possible proposal is for the fed-
eral center to ﬁ nance the provision of the minimal 
social standards that it introduces through federal 
legislation. Subnational units would then have to 
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ﬁ nance service delivery only for those institutions 
that were established in accordance with regional 
minimal social standards. In other words, mini-
mal norms of public service delivery, e.g. the child 
allowance, have to comprise three parts: federal, 
regional, and local. In this case citizens can see 
how each government meets its own obligations.
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ENDNOTES
1 According to Douglas North’s terminology “path 
dependence” (North 1996).
2 Th e computation was done for 1995, because 
this was the ﬁ rst year when allocation of transfers 
became the most signiﬁ cant form of federal ﬁ nan-
cial support. 1999 was the last year for which the 
authors of the investigation (Lavrov 2001) had 
complete information.
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ANNEX 
Tables and Figures 
Table 3A.1 
Assignment of Expenditure Responsibilities in Russia by 2005 According to the Program of Budget Federalism 
Development in the Russian Federation for a Period Until 2005
Expenditure Federal Regional Local
Defense 100 percent None None
Justice/Internal Security 100 percent None None
Foreign Economic 
Relations
National programs Some regions maintain their 
own relations, especially on 
RF frontiers
None
Education Research institutes Technical and vocational 
schools
Wages, operation, construction, 
and maintenance of primary 
and secondary schools
Universities
Culture and Parks National museums and theaters Regional museums Local objects
Health Care Highly particularized services Tertiary, psychiatric and veteran 
hospitals, diagnostic centers, 
and special service hospitals 
(cardiology, etc.)
Medicines
Secondary hospitals, primary health clinics
Sport National reserve sport Facilities for amateur  sport
Roads Construction and maintenance 
of federal roads
Construction and maintenance of regional roads
Maintenance of rayon and city roads
Public Transportation Air and sea transport Long distance transport Some transportation facilities
Motor, river transport and subway systems
Fire Protection Most ﬁ re protection services Voluntary, military, 
and enterprise services
Libraries National libraries Special library services Most local library services
Police Services National militia Traﬃ  c police and national 
militia
Local security police
Sanitation 
(Garbage Collection)
None None Garbage collection
Sewage None Infrastructure capital 
investment
Most of the operational 
expenditures
Public Utilities (Gas, 
Electricity, and Water)
None Subsidies to enterprises Subsidies to enterprises
Housing None None Housing construction, subsidies 
and maintenance
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Expenditure Federal Regional Local
Price Subsidies Part of food and medicine 
subsidies
None Fuels; mass transport; food 
(bread, milk); medicines
Welfare Compensation Partly FG responsibility Partly RG responsibility Managing programs funded 
by upper level governments
Environment National environmental issues Regional environmental 
problems, (the preservation of 
forests)
Regional environmental 
problems (for example, 
in agriculture)
Economic Policy Modernization of industry, 
conversion of military and coal 
industry; Federal investment 
programs, subsidized credits, 
subsidies to particular sectors
Subsidies to particular sectors, 
investments, grants, tax beneﬁ ts
Various explicit and implicit 
subsidies and beneﬁ ts
Support of agriculture
Development of market infrastructure
Source: RF Government 2000. 
Table 3A.1 (continued) 
Assignment of Expenditure Responsibilities in Russia by 2005 According to the Program of Budget Federalism 
Development in the Russian Federation for a Period Until 2005
108
D
IL
E
M
M
A
S
 A
N
D
 C
O
M
P
R
O
M
IS
E
S
: F
IS
C
A
L
 E
Q
U
A
L
IZ
A
T
IO
N
 IN
 T
R
A
N
S
IT
IO
N
 C
O
U
N
T
R
IE
S
L
O
C
A
L
 
G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
 
A
N
D
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
S
E
R
V
I
C
E
 
R
E
F
O
R
M
 
I
N
I
T
I
A
T
I
V
E
Table 3A.2
Legislated Sharing Rates of Federal, Regional and Local Taxes, 1994–2002 [Percent]
Tax Period Federal Budget Regional Budget Local Budget
Federal Taxes
Enterprise Proﬁ t Tax (EPT) 1994–1Q 1999 13 No more than 22; 
No more than 30 for banks and ﬁ nancial companies
2Q 1999–2000 11 19 and 27 accordingly
2001 11 19 and 27 accordingly No more than 5
2002 7.5 14.5 2
Value-Added Tax (VAT) 1994–1Q 1999 75 25 
2Q 1999–2000 81 15
2001–2002 100 0
Personal Income Tax (PIT) 1994 0 100
1995–1996 10 90
1997–1999 0 100
2000 16 84
2001 1 99
2002 0 100
Excise on Spirit, Vodka and Alcohol 
Drinks
Since 1994 50 50
Other Excise, Except Excise on Import 
Goods, Oil Gas, Petrol, Coil, Cars
Since 1994 0 100
Tax on Buying Foreign Currency 1997 100 0
1998 60 40
Tax on Gambling Business Since 1998
Joint Tax for Small Business Since 1996 3.33 of total receipt 6.67 of total receipt
Tax on Imputed Earnings Since 1998 25 for company;
0 for entrepreneur
50 for company; 75 for entrepreneur
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Tax Period Federal Budget Regional Budget Local Budget
Special Enterprise Tax for the Support 
of Industry (cancelled since 1997)
1994 80 20
1995–1996 67 33
Fees for the Use of Resources:
a) Hydrocarbon Resources Since 1995 40 30 30
2002 80 20 0
b) Water Resources Since 1998 40 60
c) Forest Since 1997 40 or 0 depending on wood-
cutting area
60 or 100 depending on wood-cutting area
Regional Taxes
Enterprise Property Tax Since 1994 0 50 50
Sales Tax Since 1998 0 40 60
Local Taxes
Land Tax 1994–1995 20 20 60
1996–2001 30 20 50
Source: Lavrov 2001.
Table 3A.2 (continued)
Legislated Sharing Rates of Federal, Regional and Local Taxes, 1994–2002 [Percent ]
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Table 3A.3
Summary of Legislative Control over Regional Taxes, 2002
Tax Legislative Level 
Introducing 
the Tax
Legislative Level 
Determining 
Tax Base
Legislative Level 
Determining 
Tax Rate
Legislative Level 
Determining 
the Sharing Rate
Budget(s) 
to which Tax 
Revenues Accrue
Enterprise Property 
Tax
Federal Federal Regional 
within the federal 
limitations
Regional 
within the federal 
limitations
Regional 
and local
Duty for Needs 
of Educational 
Organizations
Regional Federal Regional Regional Regional
Sales Tax Regional Federal Regional 
within the federal 
limitations
Regional 
within the federal 
limitations
Regional 
and local
Tax on Imputed 
Earnings 
Regional Federal 
and regional
Federal Federal, 
then regional
Federal, 
regional
Joint Tax for Small 
Business
Regional Federal 
and regional
Regional within the 
federal limitations
Federal Federal, 
regional
Forest Tax Federal Federal Regional within the 
federal limitations
Federal 
and regional
Federal, regional 
and local
Source: Ministry of Finance and Center for Fiscal Policy.
Table 3A.4
Summary of Legislative Control over Local Taxes, 2002
Tax Legislative Level 
Introducing 
the Tax
Legislative Level 
Determining 
Tax Base
Legislative Level 
Determining 
Tax Rate
Legislative Level 
Determining 
the Sharing Rate
Budget(s) 
to which Tax 
Revenues Accrue
Individual Property 
Tax
Federal Federal Local within the 
federal limitations
Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local
Land Tax Federal Federal Local within the 
federal limitations
Federal, then 
regional
Federal, regional 
and local 
Registration Fee for 
Private Enterprise
Federal Local within federal 
legislation
Local within the 
federal limitations
Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local
Tax on Industrial 
Construction in 
National Resort 
Areas2
Local Federal Local Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local
Resort Duty Local Federal Local within the 
federal limitations
Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local
Duty for the Right 
to Sell1
Local Federal Local Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local
Duties Earmarked 
for Education, 
Militia Maintenance 
and Other Goals
Local Federal Local within the 
federal limitations
Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local
1 See also RF MoF 2000a, 2000b; RF Government 2001. 
2 According to the Federal Law #150-ФЗ adopted on 31 June 1998, this tax is revoked if the regional government introduces the sales tax.
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Tax Legislative Level 
Introducing 
the Tax
Legislative Level 
Determining 
Tax Base
Legislative Level 
Determining 
Tax Rate
Legislative Level 
Determining 
the Sharing Rate
Budget(s) 
to which Tax 
Revenues Accrue
Tax on Advertising Local Federal Local within the 
federal limitations
Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local
Tax on Resale of 
Cars and Computers 
Local Federal Local within the 
federal limitations
Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local
Dog Tax Local Federal Local within the 
federal limitations
Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local
License Fee for 
the Right to Sell 
Alcohol 
Local Federal Federal Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local
License Fee for 
the Right to Issue 
Lottery 
Local Federal Local within the 
federal limitations
Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local
Fee for Issue of the 
Flat Voucher 
Local Federal Local within the 
federal limitations
Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local
Fee for Car Parking Local Federal Local Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local
Duty for the Use of 
Local Symbols 
Local Federal Local within the 
federal limitations
Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local 
Racing Charges Local Local Local Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local
Duty on Race 
Winning 
Local Local Local within the 
federal limitations
Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local 
Duty for Bidding at 
the Race Track 
Local Local Local within the 
federal limitations
Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local 
Duty for Stock 
Exchange Deal 
Local Local Local within the 
federal limitations
Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local 
Duty for the Right 
to Produce Cinema 
and Tele-exposure 
Process 
Local Local Local Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local 
Duty for Clearing 
the Territory 
Local Local Local Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local 
Tax on Opening 
Gambling Business 
Local Local Local Regional within the 
federal limitations
Local 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Center for Fiscal Policy.
Table 3A.4 (continued)
Summary of Legislative Control over Local Taxes, 2002
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Table 3A.5 
Th e Main Federal Mandates in Russia, 1998
Federal Laws Year of Law 
Adoption
Total 
Expenditure 
Responsibility, 
Percent of GDP
Actual Funding, 
Percent of 
Needs
Th e Law on Veterans 1995 1.64 29
Th e Law on Social Defense of Enables in the Russian Federation 1995 0.64 21
Th e Law on Welfare Payment for Citizens Having Children 1995 1.16 39
Th e Law on Social Provision of Citizens Who Were Exposed to 
Radioactivity of Tchernobilskaya Atomic-electro Power Station
1991 0.02 35
Th e Law on Status of Servicemen 1998 0.15 69
Th e Presidential Decree on Social Support of Many-Children Families 1992 0.16 25
Th e Law on Blood Donor System 1993 0.02 55
Th e Law on Education 1996 0.15 31
Th e Law on Undertaker Work 1996 0.01 57
Th e Law on Proving Victims of Political Repression in the Rights 1991 0.08 31
Th e Law on Compensation for Pupils’ Food 1996 0.28 16
Th e Law on Militia 1991 0.07 36
Th e Government Resolution on Urgent Measures on Social Protection 
of Children-Orphans
1992 0.12 26
Th e Law on Additional Guarantees on Social Protection 
of Children-Orphans and Children Without Parental Support
1996 0.08 34
Th e Law on Fire Safety 1994 0.03 23
Th e Law on Social Services for Elderly Citizens and the Disabled 1995 0.58 8
Th e Supreme Council Resolution on Work in Domestic Aﬀ airs Services 1992 0.08 47
Th e Government Resolution on State Support for Development 
of Medical Industry
1994 0.3 18
Th e Government Resolution on Facilities for Qualiﬁ ed Workers 
in Rural Areas and Industrial Communities
1930 0.06 42
Th e Government Resolution on Urgent Measures for Improving the Status 
of Children in the Russian Federation
1992 0.1 11
Th e Law on State Guarantees and Compensations for Persons Working 
and Living in the Northern Regions and Regions with Similar Status
1993 0.99 19
Th e Law on the Social Development of Rural Areas 1990 0.23 96
Th e Presidential Decree on Militia of Security (Local Militia) 
in the Russian Federation
1993 0.23 96
Th e Government Resolution on Arrangement for Free Maintenance 
of One to Two-Year-Old Children by Milk Formula
1997 0.08 12
Th e Law on Medical Insurance of Citizens in the Russian Federation 1997 0.23 13
Total 7.74 31
Source: RF Ministry of Finance.
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Table 3A.6 
Th e Plan for Elimination of Federal Mandates for the 2000–2005 Period
Type of Mandates Examples First Actions Result
Federal Oﬃ  ces 
and Institutions
Public utilities of universities, 
federal oﬃ  ces and property
Regulation of federal 
funding, limits
Funding from federal budget
Professional Facilities Public utilities and free ride 
for military men 
Partial abolition, including 
to ministry expenses
Full abolition, including 
salary 
Territorial
Facilities
Northern regions, 
rural population
Partial abolition, including 
to budget worker salary
Full abolition, including 
special grants
Social Allowances 
and Facilities
Child allowance, 
laws about veterans, disabled 
Federal subventions to regions Payments from the 
federal budget
Salary in the Budget Sphere Regional factor for salary
of Ural population 
(15 percent)
Partial funding by federal 
subventions
Reduced regulation: 
abolition of the ﬂ at rate 
system
Financial and Material Norms Expenditure norms for state 
schools, hospitals
Abolition of obligatory 
character of norms
Introducing indicators 
of public service quality 
Source: RF Government 2000.
Table 3A.7 
Federal Mandates Funded Since 2002 from the Federal Fund of Compensations 
Federal Mandate
1 Federal Law on Welfare Payment for Citizens Having Children: the part attributed to consolidated budgets of the 
subnational units according to federal legislation
2 Federal Law on Social Security of the Disabled in the Russian Federation: the part attributed to consolidated budgets 
of the subnational units according to federal legislation 
3 Federal Law on Proving Victims of Political Repression in the Rights
4 Federal Law on the Status of the Heroes of the Soviet Union, Heroes of the Russian Federation and the 
Awarded by the Glory Orders of All Levels
5 Federal Law on Delivering Social Services to the Heroes of Labor and the Awarded by the Labor Glory Orders of All Levels
6 Compensations for Discounts to Citizens who were Exposed to the Radioactivity of the Chernobil Nuclear Power Station 
and Nuclear Explosions on Semipalatinsk Testing Area on their Payment for Public Utilities, Telephone Services, 
Using Public City Conveyances and the Local Train
7 Compensations for Discounts to Military Men, Militiamen, Staﬀ  of Bodies of Internal Aﬀ airs, and Tax and Customs 
Police on Payment for Public Utilities and Communications 
Source: RF MoF 2001b. 
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Table 3A.8
Distribution of Revenues and Expenditures between Governmental Levels, 1992–2002, as a Percentage of GDP
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996* 1997* 1998 1999 2000 2001
H1**
2002***
Federal Budget
Revenues 14.6 13.0 11.9 12.0 12.8–12.5 10.9–10.2 8.9 12.6 16.0 17.8 16.8
Expenditures 59.2 28.6 22.5 17.4 20.5–20.9 17.4–17.1 13.7 13.9 13.7 13.7 15.2
Transfers to 
Regions
1.7 2.5 3.6 1.8 2.5–2.4 2.0–1.9 1.6 1.3 1.4 3.1 —
Regional and Local Budgets
Revenues 13.8 16.1 19.0 14.3 14.7–15.0 15.5–16.7 14.5 13.6 15.1 14.8 —
Including 
Transfers
1.7 2.5 3.6 1.8 2.5–2.4 2.0–1.9 1.6 1.3 1.4 3.1 —
Expenditures 11.9 16.3 18.0 14.8 15.7–16.0 16.7–18.0 14.9 13.6 14.6 13.7 —
Consolidated Budgets
Revenues 26.7 26.6 27.3 24.5 25.0–25.1 24.5–25.0 21.8 24.9 29.7 29.5 —
Expenditures 69.4 42.4 36.9 30.4 33.7–34.5 32.2–33.2 27.0 26.2 26.9 24.3 —
* Th ere are two ﬁ gures for 1996 and 1997 because two sources provide diﬀ erent data, resulting from a diﬀ erence in the methodology of 
computation: the ﬁ rst part of the table is computed with the International Monetary Fund methodology, the second part is computed 
with the OESD.
** Only ﬁ rst half of 2001.
*** Budget draft data.
Source: Institute of Economic Analysis 1998; Federal Intergovernmental Relations 2002. 
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Table 3A.9
Assignment of Taxes in 1998 Due to Tax Code (came into eﬀ ect in 2000).
Federal Taxes Regional Taxes Local Taxes
Value-added tax Tax on property of legal entities Land tax
Excises on speciﬁ c goods Tax on real estate Individual property tax
Excises on raw materials Road tax Tax on advertising
Enterprise proﬁ t tax Transportation means tax Inheritance or gift tax
Capital gains tax Sales tax Local license tax
Personal income tax Tax on gambling
Contributions to state oﬀ -budget funds Regional license fees
Customs duties
State duties
Tax on subsoil use
Tax on rehabilitation of minerals 
Tax on additional income from 
hydrocarbons production
Fee for the right of use of fauna 
and water biological resources 
Forest use tax
Water use tax
Ecological tax
Federal license fees
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Table 3A.10
Federal Financial Support for Subjects of the Russian Federation from 1992–2002
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Donations  0.02 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.15 0.14 0.11
Subventions 0.79 0.69 0.42 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.02 0.20 0.03 0.11 0.04
Transfers from Fund for Financial Support of Regions — — 0.36 1.17 1.04 1.22 1.12 0.98 0.95 1.19 1.34
Transfers from the Fund of Compensations — — — — — — — — — 0.54 0.37
Transfers from the Fund for Regional Development — — — — — — — — — 0.04 0.16
Transfers from the Fund of Development of Regional 
Finances
— — — — — —  -— — — 0.01 0.01
Transfers from the Fund of Co-ﬁ nancing Social 
Expenditures
— — — — — — — — — — 0.17
Balance of Mutual Settlements 0.61 1.95 2.54 0.42 0.81 0.43 0.36 0.14 0.16  
Loans Minus Repayment to Other Governments 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.23 0.64 -0.03 -0.28 0.01  
Other Kinds of Financial Support          0.37 0.06
Total Transferred Funds 1.49 2.70 3.4 1.8 2.3 2.5 1.60 1.37 1.30 2.40 2.26
Share of Financial 
Support in Expenditures of the Federal Government
6.87 12.73 14.87 10.97 14.76 16.35 11.07 9.35 11.11  13.54 12.7
Share of FFSR and FC Transfers in the Federal 
Financial Support of Regions (loans excluded)
0.0 0.0 10.5 65.6 49.3 65.4 68.5 59.4 71.37 72.04 75.76
Share of Federal Financial Support in Revenues of 
Regional Budgets
6.4 18.1 21.0 14.3 16.7 18.3 11.9 8.9 9.0  
Share of Federal Financial Support in Expenditures of 
Regional Budgets
6.5 18.1 19.8 12.5 14.1 15.2 10.2 7.9 8.1  
Source: Data from 1992 to 2001: Sinelnikov et al. 2001. Data for 2002: Author’s estimations on the basis of RF MoF data (2001a, 2001b, 2001d).
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Table 3A.11
Development of the Methodology of Allocation of Transfers from the FFSR from 1994 to 2002
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source 22% of VAT 
incoming to 
the federal 
budget
27% of VAT 
incoming to 
the federal 
budget
15% of total tax revenues 
excluding customs
14% of total 
tax revenues 
excluding 
customs and 
revenues of 
earmarked 
budget funds
14% of total tax revenues 
excluding customs
Sharing none 56.04% 
for needy 
support; 
43.96% 
for extremely 
needy units 
support
65.79% for 
needy support; 
34.21% 
for support 
of  extremely 
needy units
None 80% for all regions that are 
lower than the average level;
20% for extremely needy
regions support
Revenue Base Actual revenues for 1993 Estimation of 
1994 revenues 
under 1996 
conditions
Estimation of 
1995 revenues 
under 1997 
conditions
Estimation of 
1996 revenues 
under 1998 
conditions
Estimation of 
1997 revenues 
under 1999 
conditions
Estimation of 
1998 revenues 
under 2000 
conditions with 
corrections for 
GRP
GRP
Expenditure 
Base
Actual expenditures of 1993 
under conditions of the current 
year
Actual 
expenditures 
of 1991 
corrected for 
1994 and 1996
Actual 
expenditures 
of 1991 
corrected for 
1995 and 1997
Actual 
expenditures 
of 1991 
corrected for 
1996 and 1998
Index of 
budget 
expenditures 
on basis 
of actual 
expenditures 
of 1997
Index of budget expenditures on 
basis of expenditure norms and 
inﬂ ation coeﬃ  cients
Source: Lavrov 2001.
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Table 3A.12
Regional Per Capita Revenues Before and After Allocation of Transfers 1 and 2 [rubles]
Region Before 
Equalization
After Allocation 
of Transfer T(1)
After Allocation 
of Transfer T(2)
Region Before 
Equalization
After Allocation 
of Transfer T(1)
After Allocation 
of Transfer T(2)
Aginsk Buriat AO 356 1,637 2,813 Habarovsk K 2,548 3,006 3,006
Ingushetia R 474 1,710 2,813 Kaliningrad O 2,568 3,018 3,018
Tiva R 550 1,758 2,813 Chuvash R 2,613 3,046 3,046
Ust-Ordin Buryat AO 619 1,801 2,813 Karel R. 2,622 3,052 3,052
Dagestan R 638 1,813 2,813 Tula O 2,634 3,059 3,059
Komi-Permyak AO 740 1,876 2,813 Vladimir O 2,660 3,075 3,075
Evenk AO 745 1,879 2,813 Voronezh O 2,753 3,133 3,133
Koryak AO 873 1,960 2,813 Astrakhan R 2,800 3,163 3,163
Jewish AO 949 2,007 2,813 Krasnodar K 2,808 3,168 3,168
Kabardini-Balkaria R 1,045 2,067 2,813 Novosibirsk O 2,829 3,181 3,181
Chukotsk AO 1,149 2,132 2,813 Kirovskaya O 2,891 3,220 3,220
Altay R 1,379 2,276 2,813 Razan O 2,906 3,229 3,229
Karatchay-Cherkes R 1,385 2,279 2,813 Tomsk O 3,048 3,318 3,318
North Osetia R 1,463 2,328 2,813 Omsk O 3,079 3,337 3,337
Adigea R 1,565 2,392 2,813 Kursk O 3,124 3,365 3,365
Buryatia R 1,625 2,429 2,813 Hakasia R 3,150 3,381 3,381
Pskov O 1,650 2,445 2,813 Kemerovo O 3,182 3,401 3,401
Magadan O 1,673 2,459 2,813 Irkitsk O 3,253 3,446 3,446
Altay K 1,687 2,468 2,813 Murmansk O 3,292 3,470 3,470
Bransk O 1,702 2,477 2,813 Udmurd R 3,300 3,475 3,475
Chita O 1,786 2,530 2,813 Orenburg O 3,379 3,524 3,524
Kamtchatsk O 1,807 2,543 2,913 Saratov O 3,387 3,530 3,530
Ivanov O 1,811 2,545 2,813 Volgograd O 3,498 3,598 3,598
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Region Before 
Equalization
After Allocation 
of Transfer T(1)
After Allocation 
of Transfer T(2)
Region Before 
Equalization
After Allocation 
of Transfer T(1)
After Allocation 
of Transfer T(2)
Amursk O 1,882 2,589 2,813 Belgorod O 3,503 3,602 3,602
Morgovia R 2,001 2,664 2,813 Ulyanovsk O 3,538 3,624 3,624
Sahalin O 2,023 2,677 2,813 Leningrad O 3,598 3,661 3,661
Penza O 2,055 2,698 2,813 Moscow O 3,779 3,779 3,779
Taymir AO 2,062 2,702 2,813 Cheliabinsk O 3,879 3,879 3,879
Sasha-Yakutia R 2,066 2,705 2,813 Komi R. 4,052 4,052 4,052
Tambov O 2,096 2,723 2,813 Vologodsk O 4,062 4,062 4,062
Nenetz AO 2,148 2,756 2,813 Yaroslavl O 4,171 4,171 4,171
Primorski K 2,169 2,769 2,813 Krasniyarsk K 4,181 4,181 4,181
Mary El R 2,198 2,787 2,813 Bashkortostan R 4,203 4,203 4,203
Arkhangelsk O. 2,221 2,801 2,813 Nizhniy Novgorod O 4,477 4,477 4,477
Kurgan O 2,308 2,855 2,855 Lipetsk O 4709 4709 4,709
Kaluga O 2,309 2,856 2,856 Sverdlovsk O 4790 4790 4,790
Rostov O 2,372 2,896 2,896 Tumen O 5,013 5,013 5,013
Stavropol K 2,375 2,897 2,897 Tatarstan R 5,236 5,236 5,236
Kalmik R 2,404 2,915 2,915 Perm O 5,321 5,321 5,321
Orel O 2,455 2,947 2,947 St.Petrsburg city 5,656 5,656 5,656
Tver O 2,486 2,967 2,967 Samara O 6,646 6,646 6,646
Novgorod O 2,525 2,991 2,991 Yamal-Nenetsk AO 9,581 9,581 9,581
Smolensk O 2,531 2,995 2,995 Hanti-Mansi AO 9,771 9,771 9,771
Kostroma O 2,547 3,005 3,005 Moscow city 10,667 10,667 10,667
Source: RF MoF data.
Table 3A.12 (continued)
Regional Per Capita Revenues Before and After Allocation of Transfers 1 and 2 [rubles]
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Table 3A.13
Structure of Republican and Local Expenditures in the Republic of Bashkortostan in 2000 [Percent]
Function Republican Budget Local Budgets
Government 2.4 4.5
Agriculture Support 9.5 7.4
Education 4.0 29.6
Culture 2.1 3.3
Public Health 6.0 17.4
Public Security 1.2 2.6
Communications 3.5 1.3
Capital Development 7.2 21.7
Public Assistance 2.4 6.7
Road Building 16.6 —
Support of Local Governments 25.6 —
Other Expenditures 19.5 5.5
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Author’s computations on basis of Bashkortostan MoF data.
Figure 3A.1
Allocation of Transfers from FFSR Among the Subjects of the Russian Federation in 2002 [rubles per capita]
FFSR Transfers 
Per Capita [Rubles]
 22,700 – 30,200 (4)
 6,300 – 22,700 (10)
 1,800 – 6,300 (23)
 800 – 1,800 (17)
 500 – 800 (6)
 10 – 500 (11)
 0 – 0 (18)
Source: Center for Fiscal Policy. From http://www.fpcenter.org/russian/map/map2_site.htm.
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Ukraine: Steps towards Eﬀ ective Fiscal Equalization
Yu r i y  L u k o v e n k o
During the last decade of independence, the decen-
tralization policy of the Ukrainian central government 
did not create strict budget constraints for local gov-
ernment bodies, nor did it make them “spend accord-
ing to existing resources.” Now, however, the Budget 
Code has introduced serious changes into the public 
ﬁ scal system. It redeﬁ nes the revenue and expenditure 
responsibilities of local governments. It also pro-
poses implementation of a formula-based approach to 
equalization on the regional and sub-regional levels. 
Unfortunately, however, the changes in legislation 
barely address the issue of interregional ﬁ scal inequity 
and vertical and horizontal disparities. Th e history of 
decision-making in this policy area shows that the 
good intentions of government very often fail because 
critical analysis of the driving forces behind the issue is 
lacking. It looks like the government now repeats the 
mistake, which could create diﬃ  culties for the imple-
mentation of these important decisions. 
Th e aim of this study is to investigate reasons for 
interlocality ﬁ scal inequity. Th e real origins of the 
inequity can be seen in the long period of nontranspar-
ent decision-making in intergovernmental ﬁ scal rela-
tions, and the lack of community participation and 
consistent public policy. As a result, the budget process 
in Ukraine is still not under public control. Th e solu-
tions require readjustment of equalization instruments 
on the basis of the involvement of territorial commu-
nity and local government in policy formulation and 
the policymaking process. Such an approach clari-
ﬁ es local and central government responsibilities in 
public service delivery and creates stable “rules of the 
game” and conditions for permanent evaluation and 
improvement of the equalization mechanism. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Disparities in public resource redistribution in 
Ukraine are very high, and there is a crucial need for 
equalization. One of the major problems impeding 
the eﬀ ective provision of public services on the local 
level is the absence of clearly deﬁ ned responsibilities 
of relations between central and local governments. 
Th e Constitution of Ukraine declares that all local 
governments are equal and that none of them can 
be subordinated to (or dominate over) another. But 
in practice the responsibilities for providing services 
by the diﬀ erent tiers of local government have not 
been clearly outlined. Relationships among the state, 
oblasts, the diﬀ erent types of localities, and consum-
ers of public services are to a very great extent still 
stipulated by traditions, legal acts, and instructions of 
the Soviet era.
During the Soviet period communal services, so-
cial protection, health care, and education were state 
functions executed through the centralized system of 
social services: the entire population was obliged to 
work in state-owned enterprises through which al-
most all social goods and services were redistributed. 
After the collapse of the Soviet system, too many peo-
ple were left without access to public services. Terms 
like “local government budget,” “territorial (local) 
community,” “responsibilities of local and central 
governments in delivering public services,” as well as 
concepts of  “ﬁ scal decentralization” and “intergov-
ernmental ﬁ scal relations” are not familiar even today, 
and remain unclear for many citizens of Ukraine. 
Up to now, the revenues of Ukrainian local 
governments consist mostly of central government 
transfers and most of the expenditure responsibilities 
of local governments have been delegated (and very 
often are unfunded mandates) by the central govern-
ment. Th e disorder in expenditure responsibilities and 
revenue assignments, combined with the dependence 
on upper level governments, are the reasons for the 
continued reliance of local governments upon central 
or upper-level government donations. One of the 
results is a decline in ﬁ nancial discipline in the dif-
ferent tiers of power, which creates possibilities for 
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shadow negotiations—some of which aim to cover 
gaps between LG expenditure needs and revenues 
which result in disparities between diﬀ erent local 
governments. Others are connected with the buying 
of power, privileges, and the use of public resources 
for private economic gain. Such shortfalls in ﬁ nanc-
ing result in arrears and inequality of access to public 
services, with the greatest (negative) impact on the 
low-income population.
Th is study aims to disclose some hidden causes of 
the reduction in quality and the increase in disparities 
in public resource distribution by local governments 
in Ukraine. For its analysis, the study relies on inter-
views with representatives of local and central govern-
ments and statistical data from 1998–2001.  
List of Abbreviations
ACU  Association of Cities of Ukraine
APU  Administration of the President of Ukraine
AR  Autonomous Republic
ASD  average square deviation
BC  Budget Code
CIDA  Canadian International Development 
 Agency
CG  central government
CM  Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 
EPT  enterprise proﬁ t tax
GDP  gross domestic product
GRP  Gross regional product
FY  ﬁ scal year
HC  Hunter’s coeﬃ  cient
ICPS  International Center for Policy Study, 
 Ukrainian NGO
LG  local government
MATRA Netherlands’ Government Assistance 
 Program for Developing States
MoEEI  Ukrainian Ministry of the Aﬀ airs of Econo-
 my and European Integration
MoES  Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Sci-
 ence
MoF  Ukrainian Ministry of Finance 
NGO  nongovernmental organization
OR  Oblast Rada (Council)
OSA oblast state administrations
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
between EU and third countries
PIT personal income tax
RSA Rayon State Administration
RR  Rayon Rada (Council)
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
SNG subnational government
STA Ukrainian State Tax Administration
VAT value-added tax
WB Th e World Bank
UAH Ukrainian national currency (hryvnya), 
exchange rate: 5.2–5.5 for US $1.
2. FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
 IN UKRAINE: MAIN ISSUES
Ukraine has twenty-ﬁ ve administrative-territorial units 
of regional level: oblasts and the Autonomous Repub-
lic (AR) of Crimea, plus two cities—Kyiv and Sevas-
topol. To show relations between levels of power, the 
local administrative units of Ukraine can be depicted 
as in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 shows that only a small portion of 
local governments in Ukraine—oblast centers, and 
Kyiv and Sevastopol (as cities with special stat-
us)—are not directly subordinate to the “upper level” 
of power. Th e relations between local governments 
in Ukraine are inherited from the Soviet past when 
all administrative-territorial units were vertically 
subordinated.  
Th e authorities of oblast and rayon administra-
tions are not clearly deﬁ ned and overlap with the 
functions of the councils of these levels. As a result, 
rayon and oblast administrations are not accountable 
to the local community and are able to intervene 
in the authority of local governments of the “lower 
level.” Th is vertical subordination determines the 
structure of ﬁ scal relations in Ukraine. 
According to data from the Association of Cities 
of Ukraine (ACU), Ukraine now has a total 451 lo-
cal governments in cities and towns, and more than 
29.5 thousand in urban and rural settlements (Kuibid 
2000; ACU 2001).
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Rayons
Cities of 
rayon signiﬁ cance
Autonomous Republic 
(AR)
Cities of the oblast 
(rayon in AR Crimea) signiﬁ cance
Cities of Kyiv 
and Sevastopol
Urban rayons 
(districts)
Oblasts
Settlements, 
villages
Figure 4.1 
Administrative Structure of Public Sector in Ukraine 
Table 4.1
Distribution of Expenditures Between Tiers of Budget System (without transfers and pension fund) [%]
Levels of 
Budget System
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
State Budget 68.57 62.18 60.49 64.66 52.70 56.36 60.10 51.86 54.58 64.70 59.7 60.0
Oblast 8.13 11.51 9.44 8.04 17.21 15.42 11.89 16.97 16.74 11.85 — —
Cities of Oblast 
Signiﬁ cance 
12.63 15.47 18.88 17.78 17.02 15.83 15.82 17.14 14.71 11.95
Rayon 7.43 7.66 7.52 6.28 9.19 8.74 9.01 10.92 10.76 8.72 — —
Sub-rayon Total 3.25 3.1 3.67 3.23 3.88 3.65 3.17 3.12 3.22 2.77 — —
Source: Slukhai 2002.  
One of the issues of Ukrainian ﬁ scal decentraliza-
tion is the limited capacity of newly established local 
governments to manage their public ﬁ nances. Th e im-
mediate relevance of this issue is demonstrated by the 
very rapid increase in the number of rural communi-
ties (which has almost tripled since 2000). Many of 
them cannot eﬃ  ciently provide public services; they 
do not have their own budgets; and the incentives to 
improve their revenue base are very limited or almost 
absent.  
Fiscal decentralization has not progressed in Uk-
raine since obtaining independence in 1991. Subna-
tional government expenditures as a share of general 
government expenditures are shown in Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1 shows that only shares of oblast and 
rayon government budgets increased, while budgets 
of cities and sub-regional governments now redis-
tribute fewer public resources then during the ﬁ rst 
years of independence. Similar tendencies can be seen 
in the case of local government budgetary revenue. 
Instead of real ﬁ scal decentralization, Table 4.2 shows 
a strong concentration of public resources at the ob-
last and rayon levels.
Taking into consideration the nature of the oblast 
and rayon governments, increases in the shares of 
budget revenue and expenditure on these levels have 
very little real impact on the improvement of public 
service delivery at the subnational level. A decrease 
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in shares at the sub-oblast and sub-rayon level in the 
redistribution of public ﬁ nance is evidence of perma-
nent resistance by interest groups against the process 
of transparent ﬁ scal decentralization in Ukraine. 
Th e Soviet legacy has led to three kinds of diﬃ  -
culties in Ukrainian subnational policy and intergov-
ernmental ﬁ scal relations. Th e ﬁ rst is connected with 
the above-mentioned regional disparities caused by 
the disproportions and ideological biases of central-
ized Soviet economic planning. Some regional elites 
use their inherited privileged position to support 
disparities, defending their advantages by diﬀ erent 
means: through corruption, by buying power, or by 
inﬂ uencing policymaking. Second, there is a high 
degree of government intervention of diﬀ erent types
—explicit and implicit—in the economy and indus-
trial development. Th ird, local governments have 
limited capacity to defend the rights of its citizens. 
Soviet power did not need local governments in the 
European sense; moreover, they were dangerous for 
the regime.  Power was based on the extreme depend-
ence of the population on government intervention 
in the personal life of citizens and community aﬀ airs 
within a centralized planned economy. Under the 
Communist regime, communal services were dis-
tributed to consumers through, as well as maintained 
Table 4.2
Share of Subnational Government Revenue in GDP (without pension fund and transfers) [%]
Budget Types 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Consolidated State 
Budget 
25.15 24.40 33.47 35.62 30.27 28.24 30.40 28.19 25.20 28.40 25.71
State Budget 13.60 12.80 18.28 20.64 14.41 14.81 17.27 15.31 15.12 20.12 17.32
Total SNG 11.55 11.61 15.19 14.98 15.85 13.44 13.12 12.88 10.08 8.28 8.39
Oblast 2.47 3.50 5.44 4.57 7.50 6.42 6.61 6.38 4.87 3.45 —
Total Sub-oblast Levels 9.08 8.11 10.59 10.40 8.35 7.01 6.52 6.50 5.19 4.82 —
Cities of Oblast 
Signiﬁ cance
6.43 5.15 6.87 7.49 5.33 4.38 4.50 4.13 3.22 2.91 —
Rayon 1.58 2.12 2.94 2.13 2.28 1.94 1.34 1.74 1.45 1.38 —
Total Sub-rayon LGs 1.07 0.84 0.78 0.78 0,.74 0.70 0.68 0.63 0.53 0.53 —
Cities of Rayon 
Signiﬁ cance
0.30 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.19 —
Urban Settlements 0.29 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.13 —
Rural Settlements 0.47 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.20 0.22 —
Source: Slukhai 2002.
by, industrial facilities. Taxes were collected auto-
matically (though the socialist economy does not 
have a need for taxes). Nearly the entire population 
enjoyed access to communal services (of a very low 
level, but, nevertheless, almost free for consumers). 
After the collapse of the Soviet regime, local govern-
ments were needed to ﬁ ll key positions in economic 
and social development, but they have so far failed to 
live up to this role. Th ese three diﬃ  culties, inherited 
from the Soviet legacy, must be taken into account in 
any analysis of ﬁ scal decentralization policy issues in 
Ukraine. 
After 1991 funding from central to local govern-
ment budgets was redirected through the oblast level. 
Oblast administrations today are not empowered 
self-government bodies representing real interests of 
local communities. Th ey have no representatives di-
rectly elected by the population. Th e lack of political 
and ﬁ nancial capacity of local self-governments at the 
sub-oblast level makes the oblast a convenient place 
for the operation of “invisible power.” Th e role of the 
oblast in redistribution of public ﬁ nances has resulted 
in a decreased share of expenditures for other local 
governments, like cities and rural and urban settle-
ments, and in an increase of the concentration of 
public ﬁ nance at the oblast level. 
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At the same time, the rayon level’s share of expen-
ditures did not change suﬃ  ciently—it was 2.42 per-
cent of GDP in 1991 and remained nearly unchanged 
in 2000. To compare, the share of expenditures of the 
oblast level grew from 2.65 in 1991 to 4.47 in 1999, 
and then fell back to 3.30 in 2000 (Slukhai 2002). 
Th e share of revenues of cities and towns and other 
local authorities like urban and rural settlements de-
creased, in terms of GDP, more then 2.5 times on av-
erage during this period. While the share of revenue 
accumulated on the oblast level increased from 2.47 
in 1991 to 3.45 percent in 2000 (Slukhai 2002). 
Th is increased concentration of public resources 
at the oblast level took place together with a parallel 
concentration of power. But this was not real decen-
tralization—rather a multiplication of central govern-
ment bodies at the subnational level. Th e task of dis-
tributing the budget money among local authorities 
was transferred to oblast administrations. In an eﬀ ort 
to secure their access to public resources, shadow 
interest groups supported this process by all possible 
means on all levels of decision- and policy-making.
Along with expansion of the administrative 
functions of oblast state administrations (OSA), the 
process of restricting the self-government role at this 
level of power also took place. Formally, OSA is repre-
sentative of the central government on the territory in 
question, but in fact, OSA (not local councils) make 
decisions concerning the budget process. Th is is one 
of the reasons why until now ﬁ scal decentralization 
in Ukraine has not been very successful. And at the 
same time, awareness of this fact was an argument in 
favor of the decision to displace the oblast level from 
intergovernmental budget relations. But this deci-
sion was unable to solve the problems of increasingly 
centralized decision-making and the strengthening of 
informal vertical administrative subordination on the 
subnational level, which create additional obstacles 
for the reform of intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations.  
Since 2001 oblast governments have been formal-
ly displaced from the direct redistribution of public 
resources. Instead, rayon governments started to play 
a decisive role in the redistribution of central budget 
resources on the local level. An interesting fact is that 
own revenues of local government budgets increased 
suﬃ  ciently over the last few years. Th e share of local 
taxes and duties has grown dramatically especially in 
small urban and rural communities—from 0.83 and 
0.61 in 1991, to 16.41 and 6.48 in 1999 and 14.27 
and 5.29 in 2000, respectively (see Table 4A.1 in 
the Annex for reference). Such an increase in local 
revenues is a “delicious piece,” and attractive for the 
forces of the shadow economy who use the hierarchy 
of power in their illegal access to public resources. 
Th e existing vertical subordination of sub-rayon to 
rayon level governments paralyzes the decision- and 
policy-making of local governments of the sub-rayon 
level. Such subordination can make real positive 
change of intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations doubtful. 
Ambiguous responsibilities and the uncertain legal 
framework of rayon power create a convenient envi-
ronment for interest groups to exert their inﬂ uence, 
exploiting the strong formal and informal depend-
ence of sub-rayon governments on the upper levels 
of power. Th ere is a risk that rayon governments will 
play intermediary roles in similar shadow schemes 
abusing the vertical subordination of power, which 
existed while oblasts redistributed a large share of 
public resources. Th is creates serious diﬃ  culties in 
the implementation of ﬁ scal decentralization policy.
Lessons must be learned from the recent period 
of ﬁ scal decentralization when oblasts redistributed 
a large share of the public ﬁ nances of the sub-oblast 
governments. Decentralization is possible only if the 
capacity of local authorities is strengthened, and the 
responsibilities and functions of the diﬀ erent local 
governments of the subnational, sub-oblast, and sub-
rayon budget levels are clearly deﬁ ned. 
When the responsibilities of government A are 
delegated to it by another government B, and if A 
is subordinated to B like to an “upper level gov-
ernment,” then this type of ﬁ scal relation is called 
matryoshka or “budget within budget.” Th is hierar-
chical relationship inevitably leads to disparities in 
expenditure and revenue between governments as 
a result of nontransparent decision-making; it also 
leads to the concentration and abuse of power and 
the ineﬀ ective use of available resources. As recent 
history shows, matryoshka cannot be changed by 
mere decrees or policy documents, for in present-day 
Ukraine oﬃ  cial government lacks suﬃ  cient executive 
power to implement constructive public policy and is 
under the control and strong inﬂ uence of an “invis-
ible power”—interest groups, who attain their goals 
through their privileged positions and their access to 
public resources (in short, through corruption). 
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Th erefore, eﬀ ective implementation of equaliza-
tion instruments in intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations 
is impossible without enhancing the capacity of local 
governments in exerting their right to decide about 
the provision of public goods and services, and their 
right to autonomy in policymaking. Absence of stable 
and equal “rules of the game” in the intergovern-
mental budget process creates a basis for informal 
relations between the main actors. Formulation of 
the existing relations and making them transparent 
is urgently needed; and would strengthen the public 
and legal accountability of the main actors of inter-
governmental ﬁ scal relations. 
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL FINANCE 
 AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
 FISCAL RELATIONS 
3.1 Local Government Finance 
From year to year there is much discussion in Ukraine 
about the expansion of the powers and ﬁ nancial re-
sources of local government budgets.  However, in 
reality local governments have not become more in-
dependent and powerful. Table 4.3 shows the general 
relative decrease of local government revenues.
Since independence the share of local budgets 
in the aggregated state budget in incomes (tax and 
non-tax incomes, without taking into account trans-
fers and revenues of state-owned enterprises) has de-
creased to 33.9 percent as of 2001. At the same time, 
the share of transfers in incomes of local budgets dou-
bled: the share grew by 30 and 31 percent in 2000 
and 2001, respectively (in comparison with 1999 ﬁ g-
ures). Almost one-third of local expenditures in 2001 
are special fund, whereas transfers approached about 
Table 4.3
Share of the Local Governments in Combined Budgets of Ukraine 1996–2001 [%]
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Revenues 36.2 43.2 45.7 40.0 29.1 25.1
Expenditures 34.4 39.9 48.1 45.4 35.3 33.9
Source: AHT 2001. 
70 percent (the share of transfers in the special fund 
of local budgets in 2000 was equal to zero). Local 
government planned revenues and expenditures are 
executed as concerned to special funds. At the same 
time, ﬁ nancing of the expenditure part of the general 
fund decreased. Such high densities of the targeted 
and tied expenditures of local governments (the latter 
are connected with implementation delegated by cen-
tral government responsibilities) come into contradic-
tion with social issues and hinder remedies to social 
problems which have accumulated in regions. A re-
distribution of budget revenues is going on in favor of 
the state budget in Ukraine without a corresponding 
transfer of functions to the state level, leaving local 
governments with a signiﬁ cant portion of functions.
Some of the increase in local government rev-
enues, as shown in oﬃ  cial statistical data, is virtual 
because the increase is the result of the so-called mu-
tual settlements—calculations discharging the recip-
rocal debts of counteragents in an economic chain 
without an actual transfer of money. As a rule, the 
counteragents in the chain originate from one of the 
following institutions: oblast and rayon governments, 
enterprise-monopolist, and state-owned or communal 
entities located on the territory of local governments. 
Th e mutual settlements are done in favor of enterpris-
es—monopolists and shadow interest groups—who 
exploit the diﬀ erence between real (market) prices 
and the prices paid by energy carriers and other lo-
cal providers of goods and services. Th e later prices 
are dictated by upper levels to local governments 
(and the budget entities located on their territory). 
Th e power of oblast and rayon administrations is a 
signiﬁ cant factor: for the settlements are grounded on 
alliances or “informal relations” between the appara-
tus of oblast and rayon powers and shadow business. 
Such power alliances continue to operate due to the 
conservation of the roles of these two levels of power 
U K R A I N E :  S T E P S  T O W A R D S  E F F E C T I V E  F I S C A L  E Q U A L I Z A T I O N
129
in the distribution of budget resources between local 
governments; and because of the low ﬁ scal capacity 
of smaller local governments, weak community voice, 
and limited information and little skill or experience 
on the part of citizens in defending their interests.  
Th e situation with local government revenues 
cannot be understood outside the context of trends 
in state revenues. In spite of economic growth (MoF 
reports a 9.1 percent increase of GDP in 2001), the 
main revenues of the state budget have not increased 
suﬃ  ciently. Th e growth of PIT in 2000–2001, to a 
certain degree, was caused by a reduction in the debt 
of enterprises for employee wages. But the most im-
portant factor in the growth of PIT proceeds is the 
infringement of the principle of tax relief for the poor, 
more speciﬁ cally, for those living below the poverty 
level. Th is principle is considered an obligatory con-
dition of social justice in the ﬁ scal policy of many 
countries, but not in Ukraine.
Th e revenues of local governments in Ukraine 
can be divided into three groups: (a) own revenues, 
or revenues derived from local government territories 
and assigned to certain local governments; (b) na-
tional taxes, which are redistributed among central 
and local budgets; and (c) transfers from upper level 
government. Th e amounts from own revenues and 
national taxes are small. So, in fact, donations from 
the central budget make up the main source of subna-
tional government revenues.
 Changes in the central government budget proc-
ess work against the generation of own revenues in 
local budgets. As a result, local government budgets 
become “artiﬁ cially donated.” In 2001 as many as 
eleven oblasts received 1.3–1.9 times more from the 
state budget than from their own revenues (Fomenko 
2001).
Revenues from real estate tax, including land 
tax, could become a signiﬁ cant funding source for 
local governments. Several draft laws in this ﬁ eld 
have been submitted to Verkhovna Rada in previous 
years, but none of them were adopted. Moreover, the 
draft Tax Code, prepared in 2001, does not increase 
the ﬁ nancial independence of local governments. Th e 
local taxes provided for by the draft cannot become a 
reliable and suﬃ  cient revenue source for local budgets 
(Pyatachenko 2001).
3.2 Shortcomings of Ukrainian 
  Intergovernmental Finance
Since gaining independence, Ukraine has tried to 
function with the system of public ﬁ nance inherited 
from Soviet times. Th e inherited system’s more nota-
ble features consist of its high degree of nontranspar-
ent and discretionary decision-making, its unstable 
expenditure and revenue assignments for local gov-
ernments, and its disincentives for local governments 
to raise additional revenue and spend money more 
eﬀ ectively. Th e following shortcomings of Ukrain-
ian intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations deserve closer 
inspection: 
• High degree of ﬁ scal turbulence. Almost every year 
since independence has been marked by a diﬀ er-
ent pattern of tax-sharing and transfer payment 
arrangements. Moreover, local budgets consist-
ently receive less than the whole sum of subsidies 
from the state budget as estimated in the budget 
law. 
  Th erefore, until 1997, VAT was shared in 
varying proportions between the central and 
local budgets. Variable tax-sharing also char-
acterized the income taxes paid by individuals 
and businesses. For example, in 1997 and 1998 
proceeds from the personal income and enterprise 
proﬁ ts taxes (EPT) were assigned exclusively to 
local budgets. In 1999, however, these income 
tax sources were once again shared between the 
central and oblast budgets. For the year 2000, the 
PIT was assigned entirely to local budgets and the 
EPT became an exclusively central government 
revenue source.
• No  clear deﬁ nitions of “who should do what.”  On 
the expenditure side, responsibility for diﬀ erent 
tasks has suﬀ ered from the absence of clear deﬁ ni-
tions of “who should do what.” Since independ-
ence the central government has steadily shifted 
most elements of social protection spending to 
regional and local governments. Such a policy 
has proved its eﬀ ectiveness in most EU coun-
tries, where welfare support is a competency of 
local or regional governments. Th is approach 
is based on the assumption that the cost of life 
diﬀ ers markedly across communities, so unique 
national standards would be unfair; if you want 
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to target assistance through means testing, this 
can only be implemented at the local level. But 
these arguments do not work in the conditions of 
contemporary Ukraine, where a large part of the 
population lives below the poverty level and can-
not “vote by feet.” Moreover, people suﬀ er from 
arrears and disparities in public service provision, 
caused by the unfunded expenditure respons-
ibilities. 
  Before FY 2001, oblast and rayon govern-
ments distributed public ﬁ nances amongst the lo-
cal governments. Very often it was done without 
any apparent rational purpose or criteria. As of 
2001 this function remains only with rayon au-
thorities. 
Table 4.3
Coeﬃ  cient of Variation in Expenditures on Medical Services on Diﬀ erent Governmental Levels, 2000
Levels of Government Number of Places [%] Number of Visits [%]
Oblast Centers 42 18
Cities of Oblast Signiﬁ cance 90 63
Rayons and Cities of Rayon Signiﬁ cance 67 66
Source: Calculated on ACU 2000.
• Inequality in service delivery. Because of unstable 
revenue patterns and unclear expenditure respon-
sibilities, ﬁ scal inequality between diﬀ erent local 
governments has grown. It is especially obvious 
when looking at variation in per capita service 
levels and expenditures on certain public services 
(Table 4.3; also Table A4.2 in the Annex). Th ese 
variations result both from uneven distribution 
of revenue sources and informal redistribution of 
state donations.
Th e same factors have also led to a wide ﬂ uctua-
tion of arrears in educational expenditures. Table 4.4 
shows that arrear shares were 120 percent in rayons 
and cities of rayon signiﬁ cance in Lviv oblast and 189 
percent in cities of oblast signiﬁ cance in Odessa oblast 
Table 4.4
Variations in Educational Expenditure Debt at Sub-oblast Level, 2000
 Total Debt [%] Salaries Debt [%] Communal Services [%]
Rayons and Towns of Rayon Signiﬁ cance in Oblasts
Lviv 120 217 124
Odessa 94 112 103
Luhansk 90 94 108
Kharkiv 83 83 110
AR Crimea 78 89 82
Cities of Oblast Signiﬁ cance in Oblasts
Lviv 123 160 86
Odessa 189 135 117
Lugansk 106 77 126
Kharkiv 168 173 172
AR Crimea 89 105 99
Source: Calculated according to data from FAO 2000.
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(an example of a sub-rayon level is depicted in Table 
A4.3 in the Annex). One explanation is that some 
local governments are more successful in personal 
contacts and use a permanent hidden budget deﬁ cit 
for leverage in nontransparent negotiations. Under 
such conditions equalization instruments are not ef-
fective, especially when the service level is decided by 
a central government which does not fulﬁ ll its own 
funding commitments. Th e survey of FAOs shows 
that, in FY 2000, in Lviv and Odessa oblasts the 
central government owed more than UAH 14 and 23 
million, respectively, to local budgets for educational 
expenditures; in Luhansk oblast more than UAH 36 
million; in Kharkiv and AR Crimea—more than 41 
and 49 million respectively (FAO 2000).
3.3 Budget Code: New Approaches 
  and Old Problems
Th e Budget Code (BC) proposed four important 
structural changes in intergovernmental ﬁ nance. 
Th ese changes comprise a rational set of expenditure 
and revenue assignments among diﬀ erent types of 
government, a targeted transfer program for certain 
kinds of social protection, and a formula-based trans-
fer system connecting the state budget to all local 
governments, oblasts, cities, and rayons.
To meet their obligations, state and local budgets 
have distinct sources of revenue. Th e most important 
revenue sources prescribed by the BC for local govern-
ments are: local taxes and duties; PIT and land tax 
(shared between levels of subnational government); 
EPT of enterprises of communal property; incomes 
from selling communal property; own incomes of 
budgetary entities and organizations; industry tax; 
and taxes on owners of motor vehicles.
For ﬁ nancing expenditures calculated using 
budget norms, a basket of revenues has been deﬁ ned 
to fund the budgets of territorial communities. Th is 
revenue basket comprises all of the proceeds raised in 
a local jurisdiction from the PIT, stamp duties arising 
from court actions, fees collected for issuing licenses 
and trade patents, for registering business entities, 
and fees generated from ﬁ nes and penalties for legal 
infractions (except those collected by the state road 
patrol). Th e elements of this revenue basket are the 
logical components of a rationally designed local tax 
base because they all represent taxes and fees paid by 
local residents rather than by “outsiders” (though the 
current PIT does not fully meet this criterion and is to 
be eliminated by the future Tax Code). Th e composi-
tion of these taxes is in agreement with international 
practice and supports a linkage between the payment 
of local taxes and locally provided public services that 
will strengthen the accountability of local govern-
ment oﬃ  cials to local taxpayers. A fraction of PIT, 25 
percent, collected on the territory of an oblast or the 
AR Crimea will be allocated to fund, at least in part, 
the expenditures of regional budgets. In addition, the 
state establishes a special algorithm for the distribu-
tion of the PIT among towns, villages and settlements 
on the one hand, and rayons on the other—25:50 (the 
remaining 25 percent, as mentioned above, is paid to 
oblast budgets). For the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol, 
their budgets will receive 100 per cent of the revenue 
basket. Th e full amount of other revenue sources in 
the deﬁ ned “basket” is used to fund territorial com-
munities. In this way, every subnational government 
will have access to a pool of locally generated revenue 
that, depending on the size of the tax base in an area, 
may or may not be adequate to ﬁ nance transfer-related 
expenditure responsibilities. Transfers play a residual 
ﬁ nancial role in balancing local budgets in situations 
where the pool proves to be either inadequate or, in 
some cases, more than adequate.
To provide towns, villages, and settlements with 
some degree of revenue independence, rayons are 
required to leave no less than 25 percent of the PIT 
paid by citizens who work in the respective territo-
rial unit. Th is distribution algorithm set for the most 
promising revenue source of local governments is 
designed to provide the communities with some ﬁ scal 
autonomy.
Local governments receive 75 percent of the land 
tax (60 percent for towns, villages, and settlements) 
and some other minor sources for funding expendi-
ture assignments that are not calculated on a norm 
basis and hence are actually own expenditures that 
are intrinsic for local self-government. It is important 
that the above-mentioned sources are not included in 
the “main” revenue basket and thereby are excluded 
from the base for transfer calculations. In other words, 
in contrast to the current practice, each “additional” 
UAH of local revenue does not “crowd out” transfer-
related UAH from local revenues.
132
D I L E M M A S  A N D  C O M P R O M I S E S :  F I S C A L  E Q U A L I Z A T I O N  I N  T R A N S I T I O N  C O U N T R I E S
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
Some of the weaknesses of this revenue source 
pattern can lead to perverse incentives for the local 
governments of sub-rayon level. Relations of prop-
erty are deﬁ ned on the upper (rayon and/or oblast) 
governmental level, and very often decisions are not 
made in the interests of the local community. Even 
now there is no clear framework for municipal prop-
erty, especially that of the basic local community 
level. Meanwhile oblast administrations are de facto 
owners of many state and communal enterprises and 
property. Another source of disincentives is the fact 
that local government revenues are determined by, 
and managed from, the rayon and oblast levels; thus 
many services—like land cadastre, city construc-
tion and planning, sanitary and ecological control, 
etc.—are concentrated in oblast centers and as a rule 
are subordinated to rayon or oblast administrations, 
or central agencies. 
BC also sets a framework for the ﬁ nancial activ-
ity of local governments: oblast, rayon, city rayon and 
settlement budgets must be adopted without deﬁ cit in 
the operational budget (Article 72). To cover gaps in 
the execution of budgets, subnational governments are 
permitted—after the decision of related councils—to 
take short-term loans by upper-level subnational 
governments. Maximum time of crediting is three 
months and a loan must be repaid within one budget 
period. Other loans from one budget to another are 
prohibited. Such regulation limits the opportunities 
for local governments to attract additional resources, 
investments, or to raise their tax bases by working 
with real estate, land improvement, constructing new 
property and making contributions to infrastructure 
and human resources development. Instead, such limi-
tation, preserved by BC, causes perverse incentives 
and hampers provision of public services and local 
economic development. It is especially harmful for 
poor and small local governments, which have very 
few possibilities to develop their revenue bases and in-
crease the welfare of their citizens. Moreover, in con-
ditions of arrears and unfulﬁ lled obligations by the 
central government, such regulations—prohibition 
to adopt deﬁ cit budgets and restrictions on the use 
of ﬁ nancial market instruments—push local govern-
ments to nontransparent negotiations with the upper 
level of power and other shadow and unfair activities. 
Adoption of a deﬁ cit budget would mean ﬁ rst of 
all formalization of needs, and could be a stimulus to 
look for resources to cover this deﬁ cit, in such forms 
as borrowing on the ﬁ nancial markets and horizontal 
cooperation. On the contrary, with such regulation, 
the BC legitimizes hidden deﬁ cits, at a time when lo-
cal governments are interested in showing unreason-
ably exaggerated expenditure needs, in an attempt to 
establish a stronger position in shadow negotiations. 
In fact, the limitation preserved by the BC in this 
area pushes LGs away from ﬁ nancial management of 
municipal resources with the goal of increased own 
revenues, toward the old Soviet scheme of intergov-
ernmental relations within centralized planning. 
Th ere are some changes in expenditure responsibi-
lities of SNGs. Delegated expenditures are prescribed 
for the rayons and cities of oblast signiﬁ cance: on the 
state management (for cities of oblast and towns of 
rayon signiﬁ cance, for self-government bodies of rayon 
signiﬁ cance); education (preschool and secondary, 
residential schools, and other state education pro-
grams); health care; state programs of social provision 
and protection; implementation of the governmental 
policy towards children, youth, women, and family.  
SNG spending is divided into three separate ex-
penditure “pots”: for oblasts; for cities and rayons; and 
(a smaller one) for towns, villages, and settlements. 
Th e content of each expenditure pot is diﬀ erent. Each 
pot is designed to have a comparative advantage over 
other “pots” in carrying out the functions that have 
been assigned to it. Choice concerning the content of 
each pot is guided by the principle of subsidiarity, or 
assignment of a particular task to the type of govern-
ment capable of eﬀ ectively carrying it out. Th e BC 
does not use the word “level of government” with 
respect to SNGs as the document is steeped in the 
ideology of subnational independence and autonomy.
Expenditures which potentially aﬀ ect all residents 
of an oblast have been assigned by the new BC to ob-
last budgets (e.g., specialized secondary educational 
institutions for disadvantaged students; secondary 
boarding schools; vocational and higher education 
institutions; general hospitals of oblast signiﬁ cance; 
specialized medical services; specialized social protec-
tion facilities for orphans, disabled persons, and the 
elderly; hospices; and specialized sports programs). 
Expenditures whose scope of beneﬁ ts does not ordi-
narily extend beyond the boundaries of the local area 
have been assigned to city and rayon budgets (e.g., 
general secondary education, general health care serv-
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ices including health education programs, and social 
protection programs that provide physical services to 
the socially disadvantaged residing in a local area such 
as residential home care for the elderly). Expenditure 
tasks of purely local signiﬁ cance have been assigned 
to the budgets of towns, villages, and settlements, all 
of whom will be responsible for preschool education, 
primary medical care oﬀ ered through local clinics, 
ﬁ rst aid and obstetric centers, and cultural and en-
tertainment programs. Larger towns with secondary 
schools and district hospitals will be responsible for 
the services provided by these facilities. Of course, 
cities will also undertake other responsibilities as de-
scribed in the previous item.
Kyiv and Sevastopol take all of the expenditure 
responsibilities that are assigned to oblasts, cities and 
rayons, and towns, villages and settlements, taking 
into account other laws of Ukraine which deﬁ ne their 
special status.
For social protection programs that are of a cash 
nature and have a nationwide scale of beneﬁ ts, cit-
ies and rayons provide the mandatory beneﬁ ts to be 
compensated by targeted subventions from the state 
budget. Aid to families with young children, subsi-
dies for communal services, and beneﬁ ts to war and 
labor veterans are examples of the targeted transfer 
that will be provided to local budgets from the state 
budget.
All of the expenditure tasks that have been men-
tioned are transfer-related whose funding is calculated 
on the basis of ﬁ nancial norms of budget suﬃ  ciency. 
In other words, the state plays an important role in 
deﬁ ning those resources that are designated to fund 
these functions, since the state is interested in pro-
viding these services at comparable levels in terms of 
volume and quality across administrative-territorial 
units. Th e state has the authority to regulate budget-
ary performance in these areas, as well as the respon-
sibility to ensure that the areas are adequately funded 
through a combination of assigned tax revenues and 
either targeted or non-targeted transfers.
Th ose expenditure tasks that are left at the discre-
tion of local governments and hence are not taken 
into account in deﬁ ning the amounts of transfers, 
involve public services that are of a housekeeping na-
ture such as water and sewerage supply, roads, refuse 
removal, and the general maintenance of local public 
sector infrastructure.
From the perspective of the budgetary process, 
at the stage of preparing their budgets local govern-
ments must strive to ﬁ nance their total expenditures 
from their own source revenues, transfers, and the 
basket of revenues designated to fund transfer-related 
expenditure assignments. At the stage of budget ex-
ecution, however, all moneys ﬂ ow into a common 
revenue pool and can be used to ﬁ nance any type of 
expenditure.
Within the limits of available resources, adjusted 
per capita expenditure norms (adjusted for geographic 
diﬀ erences in the cost of providing social services as 
well as regional and local variations in socioeconomic 
conditions, climatic, environmental and other natural 
factors) are established for each type of delegated ex-
penditure responsibility and guaranteed by the state.
One article of the BC proposes a mechanism for 
the reconciliation of relations between the budgets 
of rayons and cities (which serve at the same time 
as centers of rayons). In practice, residents of a rayon 
may use services provided by entities funded from the 
relevant municipal budget. In the past no payments 
from the rayon budget were made, and this led to 
conﬂ icts. Th e BC has provided for both contract-
based reconciliation of such cases and for transfer 
liabilities (if budget-funded entities of the rayon or 
city are not capable of providing funds in the needed 
amount). It should be noted that both the MoF and 
local ﬁ nancial departments were to consider this 
problem when preparing the 2001 budget, but there 
is always some room for improvement and this will be 
demonstrated by the 2002 budget.
Among unresolved issues, one in particular is 
worthy of note: the BC’s forbidding execution of 
expenditures during one budget year from sources 
within more than one government budget. Th is 
prohibition reﬂ ects the unstable situation with pro-
perty relations (transfer of property from one tier of 
government to another) and the changing respon-
sibilities of diﬀ erent local governments for this or 
that kind of expenditures. Th e roots can be traced 
back to the Soviet legacy, when public services were 
very often tied to the facilities of enterprises, not 
to local governments. Now upper levels of power 
try to keep the “better pieces” and to “get rid” of 
the less attractive ones. But the interests of commu-
nity are not a decisive factor in the midst of these 
turbulent changes. Th e decision to exclude the oblast 
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level from provision of some services in these condi-
tions has made the issue even more complex. Oblast 
administrations have not been distanced from pro-
perty relations. Moreover, OSAs are in fact main 
communal property owners; they are also co-owners 
and corporate managers of main state enterprises, 
like electric power stations, heavy industry, and 
communications infrastructure. Th erefore, the posi-
tion of the oblast level in property and intergovern-
mental ﬁ scal relations is very strong. Facilities and 
related expenditure responsibilities are distributed 
with the participation of OSAs. But at present the 
OSA is not engaged like local government but rather 
as an “invisible power,” usually playing on the side of 
interests groups and using informal relations within 
the vertical of power (between the apparatus of oblast 
and rayon governments). Together with the above-
mentioned reduction in ﬁ nancial autonomy of local 
governments, the unstable property relations lead to 
the deterioration of infrastructures because small and 
poor local governments cannot maintain facilities, 
that belonged before to oblast or rich enterprises. 
Improved quality and eﬀ ectiveness in the delivery of 
services requires strong political will and increased 
local government capacity, as decisions concerning 
the adjustment of old facilities and the development 
of infrastructure require strategic skill and program 
management techniques. At present local governments 
are inclined toward populist decisions, or those that 
have been dictated by shadow interests.
Th ough it initiated many positive changes, 
the introduction of the BC raised many questions 
which have yet to be answered. Th e optimization of 
intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations cannot be achieved 
solely by shifting the LG distributive function from 
oblast to rayon level. Just like some years before, when 
informal bargaining was topical on the relations 
between oblast and sub-oblast levels, such bargaining 
is now timely for the relations inside rayon levels 
because MoF does not deﬁ ne expenditures for govern-
ments of small communities. According to the BC, 
in regard to revenue base and the collection of re-
venue, rayons are disaggregated into rural and urban 
settlements and towns of rayon signiﬁ cance. At the 
same time, these sub-rayon governments are lumped 
into a single administrative-territorial unit when 
transfers are calculated. In respect to expenditures, 
the BC has rayon governments divide expenditures 
within their territories amongst other self-govern-
ments. Interviews with authorities of small local 
governments reveal that very often expenditures 
and revenue distribution is done in an arbitrary and 
nontransparent way. In fact, there is a continuation 
of the “budget within budget” approach or the 
matryoshka relations, on the rayon level. 
4. FISCAL EQUALIZATION: 
 TOWARDS NEW TECHNIQUES 
4.1 Previous Policy in Local Government 
  Expenditure Equalization
During the previous period, the equalization pro-
cedure—the so-called budget regulation—was per-
formed by altering rates of shared taxes and transfers 
from the central budget. MoF also tried to control the 
expenditures of local government budgets by estimat-
ing minimum and maximum deviations from planned 
ﬁ gures and using appropriate information to aﬀ ect the 
expenditure distribution. However, the eﬀ orts of the 
government in equalizing expenditures were not eﬀ ec-
tive. Planned expenditures of local governments on all 
levels were usually changed or “corrected” many times 
during the ﬁ scal year. Quite typical were cases when 
local governments “adopted” or “conﬁ rmed” ex post 
expenditures, which “explained” and “justiﬁ ed” some 
extra spending of public resources.
Th e result was that execution of local government 
budgets never corresponded to MoF projections. In 
many cases interregional disparities in actual expen-
ditures diﬀ ered drastically from the planned ones. So, 
MoF insisted that 85 percent would be the minimum 
and 120–125 percent the maximum deviation from 
the national average per capita expenditures (See Table 
4A.4 in the Annex). For example, according to the 
calculated normative in 1998, expenditures of the lo-
cal budget in Zhytomyr oblast should have increased 
up to 120.6 percent, relatively to the national average. 
While in fact the expenditures reached only 99.8 
percent. Expenditures in Lugansk oblast were not 
only less then planned, but were much lower than the 
national average—only 77 percent, etc. At the same 
time, expenditures in Kyiv reached 181 percent of the 
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national average, whereas the planned were 109.6 
percent.
As Figure 4.2 below shows, there were large dis-
parities in expenditures of local government budgets. 
Th erefore, average expenditures of the local (con-
solidated oblast) budgets per capita in 1999 were 
UAH 317. In eight oblasts—Vinnitsa, Luhansk, 
Sumy, Ternopil, Kherson, Khmelnitsky, Chernigiv, 
Chernivtsy—the expenditures were lower than UAH 
270. In other words, the expenditures in these eight 
oblasts were 15 percent lower than the country av-
erage (UAH 316.9). During the same period, in 
Zaporizhzha, Kyiv, Poltava, and Rivne oblasts the 
expenditures were 15 percent higher than the country 
average. Th e maximum level of average per capita ex-
penditures of local budgets was in Kyiv—its estimates 
were 2.5 times higher then lowest one registered in 
Chernivtsy oblast (Lunina 2000).
 Th ese disparities can be explained by demo-
graphic diﬀ erences, but the generally negative fea-
tures of Ukrainian intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations 
 
Legend:
Black—UAH 200–270 (Volyn, Khmelitsky, Luhansk, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kherson, Ternopil, Vinnitsa, Chernivtsi oblasts)
Dark grey—UAH 270–310 (AR Crimea, Zhytomir, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Lviv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovograd oblasts)
Grey—UAH 310–440 (Poltava, Rivne, Zaporizhzhia, Zakarpattia, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts) 
Bright—UAH 500–520 (Kyiv, Kyiv oblast) 
 Figure 4.2
Local Government Per Capita Budget Expenditures, 1999
are the primary cause. Th e ﬁ nancing of certain serv-
ices followed from the responsibilities of a particular 
tier of government for the provision of this or that 
educational, health care, social service, cultural, or 
industrial facility. In Soviet times, the central govern-
ment permitted exceptional conditions for certain 
territories based on economic planning; even today 
the territories developed under these plans continue 
to assert their will upon the central government. 
Some local governments received additional resources 
for the development of facilities and communal infra-
structures for social, medical, and cultural services, 
if in the past there were large factories or enterprises 
situated on their territories. Some local governments 
were motivated by the perverse incentives of the 
system to use economically ineﬃ  cient infrastructure 
to prove a further increase in expenditure needs. Th is 
situation was reinforced by the List of Expenditures 
of the Republican Budget of the Crimea Autonomous 
Republic and the Local Budgets that was included in 
the Law on the Budgetary System of Ukraine (1995). 
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In 2001, the BC abolished this law and introduced 
a new formula-based approach in ﬁ nancing the ex-
penditures of local governments. 
4.2 Vertical Imbalance
One might suppose that the vertical balance in 
Ukraine is quite high. Th e scale of vertical imbalance 
can be depicted by Hunter’s coeﬃ  cients (HC); where 
values closer to zero indicate a larger vertical imbal-
ance because SNG total expenditures are covered 
mostly by revenue sharing and transfers. But these co-
eﬃ  cients are indicative of a general vertical imbalance 
at the macroeconomic level. Th ey are valid for stable 
countries with a transparent budget process and rule 
of law, and where democratic principles dictate inter-
governmental ﬁ scal relations. However, these data can 
oﬀ er us little insight into the conditions of a transition 
economy with a high level of normative turbulence, 
where written rules are often transgressed and shadow 
negotiations are common.  
In Ukraine, in 1999, HC #1 was 0.275 and HC 
#2 was 0.814, which are very high even in comparison 
with well developed economies. In 2000, HC #1 rose 
signiﬁ cantly—up to 0.609, and HC #2 fell to 0.742 
owing to a re-shifting of public revenues (the system 
of revenue sharing was superceded by the system of 
ceded taxes). According to preliminary calculations 
in 2001, HC #2 would be 0.874, higher than it was 
in 1999.
From these calculations one could conclude that 
Ukraine is successfully covering its vertical imbalance 
from year to year, with HC #1 doubling and HC #2 
close to 1. But the truth is that these coeﬃ  cients do 
not reﬂ ect the degree of discretion that subnational 
governments like oblast and rayon administrations 
have over diﬀ erent public resources. Very often re-
distribution of public ﬁ nance within an oblast or 
rayon is done in a nontransparent manner. Small lo-
cal councils, responsible for delivering public goods 
and services to their citizens, are not allowed to man-
age their own resources; they do not have their own 
budgets. Th rough such means upper levels of power 
try to control the revenues of small councils, with 
the unfortunate consequence that the functioning of 
small councils is impeded as they do not receive (or 
do not receive on time) the full amount of funding 
or resources to enable them to execute responsibili-
ties connected with local government expenditures. 
Arbitrary decision-making in money allocation to 
small local councils results in arrears, disparities, and 
insuﬃ  cient ﬁ nances for the fulﬁ llment of everyday 
responsibilities.
4.3 Horizontal Equalization 
  in the Recent Past
One issue of Ukrainian ﬁ scal equalization policy was 
the lack of stable “rules of the game” in the collec-
tion of taxes. Analysis of the available data shows that 
in many cases low tax receipts were related not to a 
region’s level of economic development and, accord-
ingly, not to a low base of taxation, but rather to dif-
ferences in actual regional tax collection.
Table 4A.5 in the Annex shows that, for ex-
ample, in Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhya ob-
lasts— which are permanently counted in the top ﬁ ve 
oblasts for total added value per capita—the amount 
of taxes paid in 2000 was 17 kopecks per 1 UAH of 
added value; i.e., it was lower than the country aver-
age (19 kopecks), and is lower than, for example, in 
Volyn oblast which in total added value per capita 
was ranked 21st in 2000. In Luhansk oblast, which 
places 9th in per capita added value, the amount of 
taxes collected (without VAT) was only as much as 
13 kopecks from each UAH of added value. Th is is 
less than in the Chernivtsy oblast, which occupies the 
last (27th) place in the total added value parameter. 
Th e Lviv oblast—which by the level of taxation can 
be included into the top ﬁ ve oblasts—occupies only 
the 18th place by the measure of regional total added 
value. In six oblasts of Ukraine, the level of taxation 
did not exceed 70 percent of the national average, i.e., 
was less than 13 kopecks from 1 UAH of the added 
value produced in the region, while the national aver-
age was 19 kopecks (Lunina 2000; AHT 2001).
Th e large disparities in the revenue share trans-
ferred from local to central budgets observed in 
Ukraine can also be explained by the annual writ-
ing-oﬀ  of debts and other obligatory payments to 
the budget. Large sums of money were not paid to 
the central (as well as to local government budgets) 
because of the tax privileges granted to diﬀ erent com-
munal, state-owned, and private enterprises. Th ese 
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negative tendencies were especially harmful as they 
destroy the incentives for enterprises to pay taxes, 
knowing that at some point in the future the accu-
mulated tax debts will be written-oﬀ  or restructured. 
Th e result is a loss of revenue for both central and lo-
cal government budgets.
At the same time, together with strong central-
ized decision-making, intergovernmental ﬁ scal rela-
tions reveal the weakness of the central government’s 
policy management. An example is the PIT forecast 
calculation. During 1998–2000 some local govern-
ments covered arrears in the budget sphere, connect-
ed with arrears in salaries to education, health and 
social workers, and some other services that were not 
provided. Th erefore, the central government provided 
additional funding for this purpose. SNGs which 
covered these debts received additional revenues from 
the PIT. In 2001 such a covering of debts was not 
planned in those oblasts which had no debts. At the 
same time, the central government planned a further 
increase of PIT collection, as if these oblasts had to 
continue to cover debts. Th e conclusion is that the 
central government was badly informed and simply 
did not take into account the fact that in some oblasts 
debts had been covered, while in others they had not 
(Fomenko 2001). 
Th is example further shows that the central 
government, taking enormous responsibility in the 
redistribution of public ﬁ nances, poorly managed 
the forecasting and regulation of the revenues and 
expenditures of local governments. It is clear that 
current disparities cannot be corrected by existing 
mechanisms.
4.4 New Equalization Procedure1
In order to correct the ﬁ scal imbalance, the BC has 
introduced new ﬁ scal equalization techniques aimed 
at establishing a workable decentralization process. A 
key element of the new Ukrainian equalization policy 
is that transfers are computed on the basis of a formula 
that takes into account the diﬀ erence between a local 
government’s estimated transfer-related expenditure 
needs and its estimated revenues. 
Th e BC does not spell out the precise formula to 
be applied, but rather identiﬁ es the following set of 
principles with which the formula should conform:
• Equalization transfers are to be based on a percent-
age of the diﬀ erence between a local government’s 
estimated per capita expenditure needs and its 
estimated per capita revenue capacity multiplied 
by the size of the population served by the local 
government.
• In the event a city or rayon enjoys estimated rev-
enue surplus to its estimated expenditure needs, 
a negative transfer or contribution, calculated ac-
cording to the same formula, is to be made to the 
state budget.
• Estimates of revenue capacity reﬂ ect a local gov-
ernment’s index of relative ﬁ scal capacity, meas-
ured on a historical basis as the ratio of a SNG’s 
per capita revenue basket relative to the national 
average.
• Once calculated, indices of relative ﬁ scal capac-
ity cannot be revised more frequently than once 
every three years. Th is is intended to encourage 
local government revenue eﬀ orts.
• A transfer is equal to the diﬀ erence between a local 
government’s estimated per capita expenditure 
needs and its estimated per capita revenue capac-
ity multiplied by the number of residents. To 
encourage local government revenue eﬀ orts, the 
central government will not withdraw the so-
called surplus which stems from the formula (in 
case the need in expenditures is lower than the 
anticipated revenue). 
Th e algorithm for allocating transfers among 
diﬀ erent SNGs was ﬁ rst adopted by the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine in December 2000 (CM 2000). 
According to this document, the calculations of the 
equalization transfer should be done according to the 
following rules. In 2001, the volume of the equaliza-
tion transfer—from the central budget to oblast, city 
of Sevastopol budgets; from budget of AR Crimea and 
oblast budgets to local government budgets of cities 
of republican (in AR Crimea) and oblast signiﬁ cance 
and to the rayon budgets; as well as transfer to the 
upper level budget (Ti)—was determined on the basis 
of general fund of budget as the diﬀ erence between 
the calculated volume of expenditure of a given 
administrative-territorial unit (Vi), and the forecasted 
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volume of revenues accumulated on its territories 
(Di), according to the formula:
Ti = Vi – Di;
In 2002, however, two equalization coeﬃ  cients, 
“alpha” and “beta,” were introduced (these coeﬃ  cients 
are explained below); as a result the formula of the 
equalization transfer calculation received the follow-
ing expression:
      Ti = αi (Vi - ∆Di βi).
4.4.1 Revenue Calculation
Th e forecasted volume of revenues for the general 
budgets of AR Crimea, oblast budgets, and the budg-
ets of cities Kyiv and Sevastopol consists of (1) nation-
al ceded taxes and duties and own revenues, (2) EPT, 
accounted to the budgets of AR Crimea and Kyiv, and 
(3) excise duties on goods produced in Ukraine (with 
the exception of those on oil/petroleum products) 
that is accounted to the budget of AR Crimea, and is 
calculated according to the following formula:
Di = Dizak + Divl + Direg
where 
Dizak: calculated volume of ﬁ xed revenues of the 
local government budget in the next year
Divl: calculated volume of own revenues of next 
year’s local government budget
Direg: calculated volume of incomes from EPT, 
which is accounted to the budgets of AR Cri-
mea and Kyiv, and excise duties from goods 
produced in Ukraine which are accounted to 
the budget of AR Crimea for the next budget 
year (with the exception of the duties on oil/
petroleum products)
Calculation of volume of ceded revenues of the gen-
eral budget of AR Crimea, oblast budget, and Kyiv 
and Sevastopol (Dizak) is deﬁ ned according to the 
formula:
Dizak = Dikzak + Disp + Dipz
where
 Dikzak—calculated volume of the revenue basket 
ﬁ xed to the general budget of AR Crimea, oblast 
budgets, and budgets of Kyiv and Sevastopol 
which is calculated according to index of relative 
ﬁ scal capacity, deﬁ ned according to individual 
calculation (CM 2000)
 Disp—calculated volume of ﬁ xed agricultural tax 
in part belonging to the particular budget which 
is deﬁ ned according to individual calculation
 Dipz—calculated volume of income from selling 
land plots of non-agricultural usage (with the ex-
ception of those plots owned by the state), deﬁ ned 
according to the individual calculation
Th e calculation of the volume of the revenue 
basket of the general budget of AR Crimea, oblast 
budgets, and budgets of Kyiv and Sevastopol is 
deﬁ ned with the help of the index of relative ﬁ scal 
capacity which is calculated on the basis of factual 
incomes of taxes, and duties (revenue basket) assigned 
to these budgets during the last three budget periods 
(basic period).
Th e forecasted volume of the revenue basket of the 
general budgets of the AR Crimea, oblasts, and Kyiv 
and Sevastopol budgets which is deﬁ ned by means of 
index of relative ﬁ scal capacity, consists of the follow-
ing national taxes and duties: (1) PIT; (2) land tax; (3) 
state duty; (4) payment for licenses for certain kinds 
of economic activity and certiﬁ cates, which are pro-
vided by AR Crimea Council of Ministers and execu-
tive powers of local councils and local governments; 
(5) payment for the state registration of subjects of 
entrepreneurial activity; (6) payments for commercial 
patent for certain kinds of entrepreneurial activity 
(not including payments for the commercial patent 
for selling oil/petroleum products); (7) incomes from 
ﬁ nes paid to the budget of the local government on 
whose territory the transgression was committed 
(except for those ﬁ nes which are exempted by the em-
powered oﬃ  cials of the Anti-monopoly Committee 
and State Automobile Inspection of Ukraine); (8) 
ﬁ nancial sanctions, ﬁ nes and penalties for violation 
of ﬁ scal legislation; (9) uniﬁ ed tax for the subjects 
of small business, in part belonging to related local 
government budgets.
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Volumes of the revenue basket ﬁ xed to the general 
budget of AR Crimea, budgets of oblasts and the cit-
ies of Kyiv and Sevastopol are calculated on the basis 
of the forecasted volume of revenues of the general 
budget of Ukraine, deﬁ ned on the basis of the main 
macroeconomic indicators of national economic and 
social development in the planned ﬁ nancial year, as 
well as by way of the index of related ﬁ scal capacity of 
administrative-territorial unit, calculated by the fol-
lowing formula: 
Dikzak = Du4 / (Nu1+Nu2+Nu3) × Ki (Ni1+Ni2+Ni3)
where Ki = 
KI: index of related ﬁ scal capacity of the administra-
tive-territorial unit (is deﬁ ned with four ﬁ gures 
after coma)
Du1, Du2, Du3, Di1, Di2, Di3:
 the revenue basket assigned to LG and to the 
budget of the administrative-territorial unit ac-
cording to the factual incomes over the last three 
budget periods (basic period)
Xu1, Xu2, Xi1, Xi2:
 increase (+/–) of nonpayments (noncollection) 
of taxes and duties, included in the revenue bas-
ket ﬁ xed to all local government budgets and to 
the budget of the administrative-territorial unit 
during the basic period
Pu1, Pu2, Pi1, Pi2: 
 increase (+/–) of overpayments of taxes and du-
ties, included in the revenue basket ﬁ xed to all 
local government budgets and to the budget of 
the administrative-territorial unit during the ba-
sic period
Lu1, Lu2 , Li1, Li2:
 the sum of preferentials and privileges, given by 
the LGs from the taxes and duties included in 
the revenue basket ﬁ xed to all local government 
budgets and to the budget of the administrative-
territorial unit during the basic period
Tu1, Tu2, Ti1, Ti2: 
 the sum of written-oﬀ  debt for unpaid taxes and 
duties as of January 1st, included in the revenue 
basket ﬁ xed to all local government budgets and 
to the budget of the administrative-territorial 
unit, accounted during the basic period
Ru1, Ru2, Ri1, Ri2:
 the sum of the restructured debt for unpaid 
taxes and duties as of January 1st, included in 
the revenue basket ﬁ xed to all local government 
budgets and to the budget of the administra-
tive-territorial unit, accounted during the basic 
period
Nu1, Nu2, Nu3, Ni1, Ni2, Ni3:
 the population of Ukraine and the population of 
the administrative-territorial unit as of January 
1st during the basic period
Du4: forecasted volume of the revenue basket ﬁ xed to 
all budgets in 2001
In 2002 the CG introduced some changes to the 
calculation of the index of relative ﬁ scal capacity (CM 
2001). Th e calculation is now deﬁ ned according to 
the following formula:
Ki = [((Di1 + Li1) / (Du1 + Lu1)) x Nu1 + ((Di2 + Li2) / 
(Du2+ Lu2)) x Nu2 + ((Di3 + Li3) / (Du3 + Lu3)) x Nu3] / 
(Ni1 + Ni2 + Ni3)
As one can see, some parameters were eliminated 
while new equalization coeﬃ  cients and techniques 
were introduced. According to changes introduced 
in 2001, when a local government budget in 2002 
(the planned budget period) has a forecasted increase 
in volume of revenues exceeding 1.65 (comparatively 
with the factual data of 2000), the forecasted vol-
ume of revenues in 2002 (∆Dizak) is decreased by the 
value of (∆Dizak x βi), where ∆Dizak is the diﬀ erence 
between the volume of revenues of the budget of 
the administrative-territorial unit in 2002 and is 
deﬁ ned by implementation of the index of related 
ﬁ scal capacity and factual level of revenues in the 
year 2000, increased by 1.65 times. It is calculated by 
formula ∆Dizak = Dizak2002 –Dizak2000 x 0.65; βi is 
the coeﬃ  cient of “slowing of relative tempo of devel-
opment,” which can have values from 0 to 1.0 and is 
dependent on the intensity of the volume increase of 
(Di1±Xi1±Pi1+Li1+Ti1+Ri1) /                                        +
Du1+Xu1+Pu1+Lu1+Tu1+Ru1
Nu1
(Di2±Xi2±Pi2+Li2+Ti2+Ri2) /                                         +
Du2+Xu2+Pu2+Lu2+Tu2+Ru2
Nu2
Di3 /         / (Ni1+ Ni2 + Ni3)
Du3
Nu3
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the ﬁ xed revenue basket of the (i) administrative-terri-
torial unit during the period between 2000 and 2002. 
Th is coeﬃ  cient is calculated by the following 
formula:
           
βi =
 βi1 – βi2 =
 βi1 – 1
 βi2  βi2 
where 
βi1 = Dizak2002 / Dizak2000
βi2 = Dizak2000 / Dizak1999
Introduction of β also foresees that “when the 
forecasted increase of a local government’s budget 
revenues in 2002 is less than 1.65, then ∆Dizak x βi
would have a value of zero” (CM 2001). 
Th e alpha coeﬃ  cient is applied for transfers of 
local government budget resources to the central 
budget. Th is coeﬃ  cient can have individual meaning 
and vary within the diapason between 0.8 and 1.0, and 
depends on the annual average tempo of increase of 
the revenue basket volume of the i’th administrative-
territorial unit’s budget. Th is coeﬃ  cient is calculated 
according to the data of the basic period, using the 
following formula:
                         1/2
αi = 1 - ((((Di3 + Li3) / (Di1 + Li1)) – 1) x Kp)
where
K(p): equalizing coeﬃ  cient of the year’s average 
revenue basket increase of the i’th administ-
rative-territorial unit’s budget during the basic 
period. In 2002 K(p) equals 0.4; for the oblast 
budgets its value is 1. 
Th e introduction of this equalization coeﬃ  -
cient did not clarify the situation. Th e government 
document introducing this change contains a pas-
sage that reads “during the calculations of the 
intergovernmental budget transfers for the FY 2002, 
αi is taken as equal to 1 in case of local government 
budgets which are considered to be recipient ones.” 
Who and how such a status is ascribed to a local 
government budget is not clear. Th e document does 
not contain a deﬁ nition, and therefore, it in fact 
creates perverse incentives for local governments. 
4.4.2 Expenditure Calculation
Th e allocation principle reﬂ ected in the use of norms 
is that LGs with higher than average demand for 
public services should receive a higher than average 
amount of resources to meet those needs. Norms 
that satisfy these requirements and can be applied in 
practice meet several criteria. First, the needs assessed 
according to norms should be common to all local 
governments. Second, these needs should be amena-
ble to objective measurement. Th ird, they should be 
clearly linked to observable diﬀ erences in the level of 
local government expenditure. Finally, it should not 
be possible to inﬂ uence them through expenditure de-
cisions of local governments. Th e generalized formula 
introduced in 2001 can be presented in the following 
way (FAO 2002): 
Vi/Pi = V/Pu[ϕA + ϕHKi + ϕE(Si/Pi ÷ Su/Pu) 
+ ϕCS + ϕS(Ri/Pi ÷Ru/Pu)]            (Equation 1)
where
V: the volume of total LG spending in the state 
budget
Vi: the volume of estimated expenditure needs in the 
i’th oblast; the subscript “i” refers to an entire ob-
last
Pi: population of the i’th oblast
Pu: population of Ukraine
Ki: a coeﬃ  cient measuring the extent to which health 
needs in the i’th oblast diﬀ er from the national 
average need, as approved by Cabinet Resolution 
no. 1170 of 5 September 1996
Si: the weighted number of students in the i’th ob-
last
Su: the weighted number of students in Ukraine
Ri: the number of social protection recipients in the 
i’th oblast
Ru: the number of social protection recipients in 
Ukraine
ϕ: the share of total expenditure, V, allocated to the 
k’th expenditure function
In the case of weighted student numbers, for 
example, students are distinguished by type (kin-
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dergarten, general secondary, specialized, part-time, 
vocational and higher) by location (city or rayon), as 
well as by topography. Diﬀ erential weights are ap-
plied to each type and location reﬂ ecting diﬀ erences 
in the cost, as estimated by the Ministry of Finance, 
of educating diﬀ erent kinds of students in diﬀ erent 
settings.
Recipients of social protection beneﬁ ts are also 
broken down by type of LG and by type of social pro-
tection program for the purposes of determining the 
appropriate size of the targeted transfer. For example, 
for cities and rayons separate expenditure calculations 
are made for recipients of communal service subsidies, 
recipients of beneﬁ ts for war and labor veterans, and 
recipients of cash aid to families with children.
Th e provision of these services will aﬀ ect the 
calculation of the expenditure needs of each local 
government and the size of the equalization transfers. 
Th e variable “R” above is therefore to be interpreted 
as the number of recipients of this limited subset of 
social protection beneﬁ ts, rather than the number of 
recipients of all kinds of social protection.
Th e formula also foresees the distribution of 
spending among oblasts. Th e use of expenditure 
norms must aﬀ ect the pattern of local government 
spending across diﬀ erent oblasts. Although under 
the BC the oblast will no longer be the focal point 
of the state budget, the issue of inter-oblast resource 
distribution remains relevant because, from a regional 
perspective, each oblast can be considered as the sum 
of its LG parts, the oblast level administration, and all 
the cities and rayons within the oblast.
Given the total amount of local government 
expenditure in the state budget (V), the MoF sets 
expenditure priorities for local governments by al-
locating that total among ﬁ ve broad expenditure 
functions: state administration (VA), health (VH), 
education (VE), culture and sports (VCS), and social 
protection (VS). Expenditure norms are then applied 
to allocate these functional amounts among oblasts 
according to the formula.
Th e equation (Equation 1 above) is complicated 
only because it pays close attention to the detailed 
expenditure composition of local budgets. It simply 
states that per capita oblast spending for transfer re-
lated expenditures will be equal to average per capita 
spending in all oblasts, V/Pu, modiﬁ ed by the degree 
to which a particular oblast’s expenditure needs in 
diﬀ erent functional areas depart from the national 
average. In particular, if an oblast were average in 
every respect, that is, if its health coeﬃ  cient were 
unity, and its weighted per capita student enrolments 
and number of social protection recipients per capita 
were equal to the national average, then its per capita 
expenditure needs would be equal to the national av-
erage per capita spending. Th is result follows because, 
by deﬁ nition, the sum of all the expenditure shares, 
ϕk, must be equal to one.
If, however, an oblast has a health coeﬃ  cient 
larger than unity and its per capita level of weighted 
students and social protection recipients exceed 
national average values for these same variables, its 
expenditure needs will be greater than average and its 
per capita expenditure needs will exceed the national 
average. Conversely, if an oblast has below average 
values in all of these expenditure norms, its average 
per capita expenditure will be less than the national 
average.
Another way of looking at this result is to sum-
marize the information contained in the calculation 
of expenditure norms in the form of an oblast index 
of relative budget needs. Th at is, the sum of the terms 
in the large bracket above objectively measures the 
extent to which the expenditure needs of a particular 
oblast depart from the average need taking into ac-
count the economic, demographic, and environmen-
tal peculiarities of the oblast. If this index is denoted 
as IBNi, the preceding expression can be further sim-
pliﬁ ed so that it appears as:
Vi/Pi = V/Pu (IBNi)                             (Equation 2)
4.4.3 Possible Obstacles 
  to the Successful Implementation 
  of the New Equalization Procedure
Th e limited eﬀ ectiveness of the previous CG equali-
zation policy is not likely to disappear with the im-
plementation of the new formula-based equalization 
approach. As mentioned earlier, the CG tried to intro-
duce expenditure norms, to monitor the budget proc-
ess, and to control SNG activity before introduction 
of the formula. However, the interterritorial dispari-
ties and nontransparent use of money were not the re-
sult of bad norms or the absence of uniﬁ ed criteria of 
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expenditure distribution. Nor could the reasons for 
the ineﬀ ectiveness of the previous equalization policy 
be found in poor mathematics or the methodology 
of calculation, but rather in the weakness of the gov-
ernment’s policy implementation, in the continued 
existence of implicit and nontransparent “rules of the 
game.” SNGs, empowered by law to function in the 
interests of local community, are not strong enough; 
and CG did not succeed in establishing eﬀ ective com-
munication with them. Instead, CG attempted to use 
mediators—vertically subordinated powers of oblast 
and rayon administrations. 
Th e conditions of intergovernmental relations 
did not change much after the new formula was 
introduced. As could have been foreseen, trans-
parency and other important principles of the BC 
were opposed by the existing system of powers. Th is 
can be illustrated by the new changes to revenue 
calculations introduced in 2001. Th e additional 
revenue equalization coeﬃ  cients, alpha and beta, 
are not in line with the increased transparency of 
the intergovernmental budget process declared by 
the BC and implemented with the ﬁ rst formula 
(CM 2000). Th ese coeﬃ  cients do not improve 
upon and/or simplify the ﬁ rst formula of 2000 
(which perhaps appears overly complex). Th e new 
equalization coeﬃ  cients of 2001 create more space 
for arbitrary and nontransparent decision-making in 
intergovernmental budget relations. In introducing 
these changes, the central government secures the 
right to intervene in the calculation of transfers and 
change the “rules of the game” during the ﬁ nancial 
year. For example, paragraph 8 of the BC (CM 2001) 
may be read in such a way.
Almost all taxes are administrated by territorial 
oﬃ  ces of the State Tax Administration of Ukraine 
(STAU). Th e STAU work in close partnership 
with oblast and rayon state administrations. Th ose 
two levels of power (OSA and RSA) serve national 
strategic interests on the local level by monitoring the 
implementation of formulas; at the same time oblast 
and rayon councils in fact ceased to be representatives 
of their respective territorial communities, as stated in 
the Constitution of Ukraine. Moreover, whereas oblast 
and rayon councils have become less accountable 
to the local community, oblast (OSA) and rayon 
state administrations (RSA) have been granted the 
unlimited ability to intervene in the competencies of 
local authorities by the central government. 
As mentioned above, the new BC treats rayons as 
disaggregated when it concerns revenue calculations 
and collection of revenue, and as integrated into a 
single territorial-administrative unit when it concerns 
transfer calculations and distribution. With respect 
to expenditures, according to the BC the rayon 
government divides expenditures within its territories 
among other self-governments. Th e limited capacity 
of small LGs (especially of the sub-rayon level), serves 
to justify the abuse of power. Under such conditions 
oblast and rayon governments are not MoF partners 
in the implementation of equalization instruments—
for their decisions are determined very often not by 
the public, but by private or shadow group interests 
and do not follow the prescriptions of the CG. 
Arbitrariness exists within the redistribution 
of public ﬁ nances and can be witnessed with the 
implementation of the BC in FY 2002. Studies and 
direct interviews with members of the councils of 
sub-rayon LGs have conﬁ rmed as much. Rayon 
administrations can reduce the expenditures of one 
sub-rayon government and increase the expenditures 
of another during the ﬁ scal year. Th erefore, Th irsk 
(2002) notes that “the distribution of payments from 
the land tax appear to breach the provisions of the 
Budget Code. Th e Code stipulates that 60 percent of 
these proceeds should be retained by town, villages 
and settlements, and only 15 percent of these proceeds 
should accrue to the rayon district budget. In all ﬁ ve 
rayons [in which studies have been conducted—Y.L.], 
however, the entire proceeds from the land tax show 
up as one of the revenue sources of the rayon district 
budget. Further investigation is needed to determine 
why this is the case.” Th e author also found out “that 
none of the revenues collected from the uniﬁ ed (small 
business) tax are used to ﬁ nance the rayon district 
budget.” Th is can be explained by the concentration 
of power on the oblast level, which discriminates 
against the local (sub-rayon) governments. 
To put an end to arbitrary decision-making, abuse 
of power and disregard for governmental legal acts, a 
process must be introduced by which the ﬁ scal and 
managerial capacity of LGs is increased. Th is process 
must be supported by the participation of communi-
ties and NGOs in the policy process (including policy 
analysis, budget hearings, and evaluation) on the cen-
tral and local levels.
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One feature of the budget process throughout the 
implementation of the new BC and its formulas was 
the nonfulﬁ llment of responsibilities by the central 
government. Th e so-called delegated responsibilities 
of the central government became in fact unfunded 
mandates. Th e formula is powerless in this case when 
other forces play more decisive roles. Th e following 
part of this chapter uses the education sector as 
an example to reveal the reality of expenditure 
distribution in Ukraine. 
5. SUBNATIONAL EXPENDITURES 
 ON EDUCATION: TOWARDS AN 
 EFFECTIVE USE OF PUBLIC 
 RESOURCES?
5.1 The Present Situation in Secondary 
  Education after Independence
School education is one of the largest LG expenditure 
responsibilities. In the years since independence, the 
funding of Ukraine’s education has not been brought 
into line with market demands and the new budget 
process. Instead of rewarding savings and mobiliza-
tion of additional resources, the old supply-driven 
approach in public service delivery pushes SNGs 
to overstate their expenditure needs and understate 
their revenue means. Such is the state of interactions 
between central and local governments in education 
throughout the last decade of independence. Th e 
results are public sector expenditure arrears and great 
disparities between regions, within rayon and city, and 
between households in the delivery and consumption 
of educational services. 
Schools are permanently underﬁ nanced from 
the state budget. Such a trend is a consequence of 
the contradictory Article 67 of the Law of Ukraine 
on Local Self-Government which stipulates: “Th e 
state shall ensure the full ﬁ nancing of all legislatively 
stated responsibilities of the central government from 
local government resources.” Th us it is not clear 
who is responsible for school ﬁ nancing. Th ough the 
Constitution stipulates that secondary education is 
compulsory and “free” (Art. 53), the Law of Ukraine 
on Education does not provide a clear answer to this 
issue—nor do other documents like the national 
program, Education: Ukraine 21st Century, adopted 
by Verhovna Rada in 1993 with amendments in 
1996, or the National Doctrine of Development 
of Education signed by the President of Ukraine in 
2001. Th e ambitious commitment of the state in the 
education sector is not founded on comprehensive 
and consistent public policy.
Spontaneously, state and society tried to adapt to 
the situation by the two following means:
1) Teacher salaries in Ukraine are very low, about 
$30–45 per month plus compensation, which 
equals two additional month’s salary each year. 
But up until recently past arrears in payments 
were 5–6 months and compensation was not paid 
in some regions. Fixed teacher salaries and arrears 
can dampen the impact of deﬁ cient ﬁ nancing and 
ineﬀ ective use of funds for some time. Th ough 
this policy drives down teacher qualiﬁ cations and 
the quality of education. 
2) Financing of all other spending items has been 
reduced, and parents are made to pay for “free” 
education in both formal and informal ways. 
But parent contributions cannot compensate for 
many important items, and the most impacted ex-
penditures include the renovation of school build-
ings and such critical elements of education as the 
development of content, purchasing of textbooks, 
and retraining of teachers. Lack of ﬁ nancing for 
education results in a deterioration of the infra-
structure and is dangerous for the entire system in 
general. 
Ukraine’s absolute expenditure for education in 
the late 1990s was very low. According to UNESCO, 
average expenses in the formal basic education sys-
tem in 1997 amounted to UAH 275 (nearly $140) 
per student. However, using oﬃ  cial statistical data, 
it is diﬃ  cult to estimate the lack of resources and 
impossible to evaluate whether the available resources 
are used eﬀ ectively; with eﬀ ectiveness measured as 
the ratio of resources used to results achieved. Until 
now in Ukraine only such results as student academic 
achievement and participation in international com-
petitions have been measured, without comparison to 
state and local government spending on education. 
Th e quality of education is assessed using only the 
sector’s internal criteria; such relevant factors as success 
in the labor market, professional career of graduates, 
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their wages, etc., are not taken into consideration by 
the central government educational authorities. 
SNGs have very little opportunity and limited 
capacity to eﬀ ect change in this state of aﬀ airs 
because of centralized policy. In fact, the MoES 
itself provides secondary education and ﬁ nances 
subordinate entities. LG responsibilities in education 
are very great in terms of obligations, and very small 
in terms of rights. Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine 
on Education (1991) defends the monopoly of the 
state in decision- and policy-making, but at the same 
time vests a great part of the responsibilities in local 
governments. Municipalities have to fulﬁ ll respon-
sibilities delegated by CG and maintain communal 
infrastructure of schools, while MoES determines the 
academic load, teaching materials, salaries, and hires 
and ﬁ res administrative staﬀ . Almost all secondary 
schools are subordinated to the MoES. Th e non-
governmental sector covers less than 0.3 percent of 
student enrolment and 0.9 percent of the teaching 
staﬀ  (UCEPS 2002).2
5.2 Spatial Disparities 
  in Educational Expenditures
Disparities in expenditures on secondary education—
and, therefore, in the access to education for diﬀ erent 
groups of the population—exist between regions, 
between urban and rural areas, and between diﬀ erent 
schools within one locality.
Certain local communities—especially those in 
urban areas with substantial revenues from the collec-
tion of local taxes and levies—try to support their 
schools ﬁ nancially. According to studies conducted 
in 2001, LGs have to spend additional resources from 
their budgets as a result of CG not fulﬁ lling its res-
ponsibilities, or not fulﬁ lling them in a timely manner. 
According to interviews conducted with local autho-
rities in the city of Kherson, this “supplement,” an 
unfunded mandate issued by CG, constitutes 60–70 
percent of all educational expenditures. Besides other 
negative eﬀ ects, this means that cities which are 
forced to fund CG responsibilities have to reduce the 
outlays on their (own) other responsibilities.
Not all local communities are able to compensate 
for the implicit deﬁ cit of public resources and ensure 
the eﬀ ective ﬁ nancing of education. Increase in the 
cost of education (costs of energy alone have increased 
by at least 40 percent over the last decade) is felt espe-
cially in rural areas where parents and local commu-
nities have less resources for additional payments, and 
where businesses are in a less fortunate position to 
assist schools, as compared with their counterparts in 
some urban regions. For example, rural educational 
entities in Kherson oblast spent as little as 8 kopecks 
for meals per child in 2000, compared with 20 kopecks 
in 2001 (Ukrainian Regional Review 2001).
During the period before the introduction of the 
BC, CG was involved in informal schemes of ﬁ nancial 
redistribution by the local educational authorities, 
which led to further inequity in the delivery of edu-
cational services. So, the coeﬃ  cient of variation of 
the arrears in salaries and communal payments for 
schools was 89 percent in sub-rayon LGs of Kharkiv 
oblast and 189 percent in cities of oblast signiﬁ cance 
in Odessa oblast. Th e amount of debt for education 
expenditures in these two oblasts (on 1 January 2000) 
was more than 41 and 23 million UAH respectively. 
Such an extremely high degree of variation in arrears 
can be explained as, at least partly, the result of 
informal bargaining. 
Studies conducted in Lviv in 2000–2001 show 
that some schools received from the city 20–30 percent 
more than others (Levitas 2001). Th is occurred under 
conditions of permanent ﬁ scal deﬁ cit due to the use of 
such methods as split classes, extra hours for teachers, 
etc. Favorable conditions for some “elite” schools do 
not improve the quality of education, but on the 
contrary, make disparities even deeper.
Analysis of budget arrears in the educational 
sector in diﬀ erent localities shows that such tenden-
cies were typical not only for big cities, but for all 
kinds of localities and for all regions. Equalization 
eﬀ orts of CG can do very little in a state of hidden 
resource deﬁ cits. Th e situation at the sub-rayon level 
is especially bad. Introduction of the BC has not 
altered conditions for the better in small towns, 
villages, and settlements. On the contrary, disparities 
have increased. Th e range of expenditure tasks in ed-
ucation required of diﬀ erent sub-rayon governments 
are considerably diﬀ erent across rayons. Th is diversity 
is reﬂ ected in the much wider range of per capita ex-
penditure diﬀ erentials observed across rayons for any 
tier of rayon government, than in consolidated rayon 
per capita spending (Th irsk 2002). 
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Th is can be explained partly by the fact that 
Articles 88 and 89 of the BC do not deﬁ ne distinct 
roles in the education sector for diﬀ erent tiers of 
government within a rayon. Article 88 stipulates that 
intergovernmental transfers involving towns, villages, 
and settlements have to cover expenditures on local 
administration, preschool, and general secondary ed-
ucation (as well as spending on ﬁ rst aid and obstetric 
stations, district hospitals, outpatient care and places 
of culture, clubs, and libraries). Article 89, prescribing 
the expenditure responsibilities of rayons and cities of 
oblast signiﬁ cance, includes the same expenditure 
powers as those in Article 88, as well as others of 
a broader nature—although a strict interpretation 
of Article 89 seems to preclude the funding of pre-
schools from rayon district budgets. As a result of 
these overlapping responsibilities, rayons are permit-
ted considerable discretion in deciding who should do 
what and how the delivery of public services will be 
organized within a rayon. As a result, “who actually 
does what” in a given rayon appears to be governed 
largely by historical decisions which have determined 
whether an area in a rayon would have, for example, a 
local school or district academies for sports, music, or 
children’s art. Some towns, villages, and settlements 
have district educational facilities; others have none. 
Some fund general education schools; others do not. 
Some rayons ﬁ nance portions of their district educa-
tional facilities from the rayon district budget; other 
rayons fund most of their preschools from the rayon 
district budget; while still other rayons fund most 
of their schools from village and settlement budgets 
(Th irsk 2002).
Th e other explanation for such great disparity in 
factual educational expenditures is that under tight 
ﬁ scal conditions many educational administrators of 
all levels try to use all possible means to attract or 
force teachers to stay at schools, in spite of the low 
salaries and lack of perspective in their professional 
careers. Th us, in 2001/02 academic year there are 
3,000 vacancies for school teachers in Ukraine; 
Kherson and Mykolayiv oblasts as well as AR Crimea 
experience an especially large lack of teaching staﬀ 
(UCEPS 2002).
All these negative tendencies result in unequal 
access to education for children from families with 
diﬀ erent incomes. For a great many households, edu-
cation became much more expensive today than in 
the Soviet era, due to the dramatic decrease in indivi-
dual incomes. Th e oﬃ  cial data on how many families 
in Ukraine pay for education are rather vague, as 
the payments are made through both oﬃ  cial and 
unoﬃ  cial channels. Independent studies reveal that 
parents spend UAH 40–50 million on tutoring, and 
UAH 350–400 million for “aiding” schools and other 
related expenditures (World Bank 1999). As low-
income families have fewer possibilities to make extra 
payments for the education of their children, the 
inequality in incomes turns into inequality of access 
to education. A growing number of children from 
low-income families are failing to attend schools on a 
regular basis due to the failure of their parents to pay 
extras for their education. As independent opinion 
polls show, children from low-income families cannot 
attend nursery schools. As a result, they are less adapt-
able to secondary school life and have less chance of 
getting a quality education in the future. Moreover, 
as public education services are not provided in full to 
children from low-income families, poverty becomes 
a phenomenon which is then inherited and leads to 
further social inequality in the future. 
As the situation on the sub-rayon level seems to 
be the most critical in terms of the delivery of edu-
cational services improvements in intergovernmental 
ﬁ scal relations on this level are urgent. Th ey must be 
introduced in line with the principles of budgetary 
transparency and subsidiarity. To promote greater 
transparency and implement the subsidiarity precept, 
more responsibilities for the provision of preschool 
and secondary education must be given to towns, 
villages, and settlements; and rayon district govern-
ments must be responsible for the provision of all spe-
cial educational services and the operation of district 
educational facilities. Th ere also needs to be a facilita-
tion of public involvement in the budget process in 
education expenditure. Community participation has 
to increase and compel accountability and openness 
in local and central government budgets. In this way, 
funding of education would be done in accordance 
with the existing order and norms and would be 
steered by local councils and/or educational boards 
serving the interests of the local population.
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Conclusions
One of the main issues of intergovernmental ﬁ scal 
relations in Ukraine is the absence of a clear and com-
prehensive policy toward decentralization. Th e behav-
ior of CG oﬃ  cials does not correlate with declared 
policy. Th e state’s strategy of ﬁ scal decentralization 
is unclear and diﬀ erent normative documents in this 
area fail to complement, and instead contradict one 
another. In the absence of consistent and comprehen-
sive public policy towards ﬁ scal decentralization, the 
system of intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations in Ukraine 
suﬀ ers from lack of clear revenue and expenditure as-
signments as well as transparent “rules of the game,” 
which together have resulted in a decreased tax base 
and limited managerial capacity of LGs. CG has failed 
to eﬃ  ciently equalize interregional disparities.
Th ere are some policy documents which formu-
late positive ideas about the development of local 
self-governance, regional policy, and decentraliza-
tion. Th e President’s “Concept of the State’s Regional 
Policy,” adopted in 2001, formally supports decen-
tralization of public ﬁ nance. But the way in which 
political decisions are made tends to make this and 
other government documents pure declaration. In the 
case of Ukraine, we are still faced with nontranspar-
ent decision-making. From this point of view, ﬁ scal 
decentralization policy must incorporate the analysis 
of previous policy documents and relations between 
diﬀ erent policy agents involved in the process. Very 
often legislative documents are not prepared as nor-
mative acts; they are not built upon analysis of previ-
ous eﬀ ects and errors; they disregard implementation 
and therefore tend to become mere ideological docu-
ments directed only to change public opinion. Th ey 
fail to contain clear deﬁ nitions of the responsibilities 
of government and mechanisms of policy evaluation. 
Together all these features result in nonworkable doc-
uments, far from serving the real interest of society. 
 Th e BC has introduced changes in the system of 
public ﬁ nance. Once again revenue and expenditure 
responsibilities of SNGs are redeﬁ ned. Th e BC has 
also implemented a formula-based approach to equal-
ization and gives much more responsibilities to the 
rayon level of power. But the real reasons for dispari-
ties and inequity were not analyzed suﬃ  ciently, and 
implementation of new principles and prescriptions 
are very slow and even doubtful.
Th e formula-based equalization transfers system 
introduced by the BC has been designed according to 
advanced theory and the best international practices 
of ﬁ scal equalization. But this does not ensure that 
real improvements in intergovernmental ﬁ nance will 
be realized in Ukraine. Other steps are required, i.e., 
eliminating the shortcomings of the existing policy. 
As the situation on the sub-rayon level seems to 
be the most critical, improvements in intergovern-
mental ﬁ scal relations on this level are urgent. Clarity 
will be bolstered if the rules that are adopted are made 
as uniform and as simple as possible, and if there is a 
clear delineation of expenditure assignments between 
the rayon district and other tiers of governments. If 
these conditions are met, it might be possible to con-
struct a workable system of formula based transfers 
within the rayon. Th e current formula-based transfer 
system that applies to oblasts, cities of oblast signiﬁ -
cance, and rayons could be replicated within the ray-
ons. With its implementation, the SNGs of sub-rayon 
level will witness greater transparency in the budget 
process, greater budgetary stability, and a fairer distri-
bution of revenues. 
6.2 Policy Recommendations 
 
6.2.1 Objectives
Th e study of current ﬁ scal equalization policy in 
Ukraine shows that eﬀ ective implementation of 
new equalization instruments is impossible without 
establishing transparent “rules of the game” at the 
subnational level.
To reach this goal the following measures are 
proposed:
• Relationships between the central government and 
diﬀ erent tiers of SNGs to be regulated by social 
agreements and contracts. One such social agree-
ment must concern the execution of delegated 
and own responsibilities by local governments. 
Th e issue is that people are not informed about 
the details of intergovernmental arrangements. 
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Sharing of responsibilities between tiers of gov-
ernment and the order of execution of budgets are 
not obvious to most people, especially to the more 
elderly. Central, oblast, rayon, and local govern-
ments often argue about their relations, and have 
diﬀ erent interpretations of normative acts and 
related debates and documents. All these things 
create conditions under which both central and 
local governments are prone to neglect the fulﬁ ll-
ment of their responsibilities. Within this state of 
aﬀ airs, agreement amongst the local community, 
local council, and central government will make 
possible the implementation of such principles 
of intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations as eﬃ  ciency, 
subsidiarity, transparency, and accountability. Th e 
agreement also must include rules for calling of-
fenders (of the agreement) to account. Such an 
agreement may serve as a basis for other kinds 
of contractual relations between the public sec-
tor, NGOs, and the private sector. Th e diﬀ erent 
tiers of government must be fully responsible for 
the execution of budgets and, in case they do not 
fulﬁ ll their obligations, must be penalized in some 
manner. Another type of contractual relationship 
is an agreement between several local councils in 
order to perform eﬀ ective public service delivery. 
• Increasing transparency of the budgetary process 
while introducing a formula-based equalization ap-
proach on the sub-rayon level. With clearly deﬁ ned, 
constant and uniform expenditure assignments, 
the rayon budgetary process might conceivably 
unfold in the following manner. Knowing the 
amount of the transfer it will receive from, or 
make to, the state budget and based on forecasts of 
the rayon revenue basket, the rayon council could 
establishe an overall spending ceiling for the ray-
on. Within that ceiling the council would decide 
how much was to be spent on education, health 
care, and culture. From the education envelope, 
the council would deduct an amount needed to 
provide its own specialized educational services. 
Th e remainder would be allocated by formula 
among towns, villages, and settlements according 
to their share of the rayon’s preschool and general 
education students. Th e share of each local self-
government in that total would be determined on 
the basis of its population share in the rayon. Th e 
same type of procedure would be used to unravel 
and allocate the rayon’s health care spending and 
culture envelope. With some provision made 
for local self-government administration, these 
calculations, when summed, would generate an 
estimate of the per capita expenditure need of 
each local self-government in the rayon. Th e dif-
ference between this estimate and a forecast of the 
per capita revenue in each government’s revenue 
basket would yield a formula-based calculation 
of the transfer each would be either entitled to 
receive or required to make.
• Institutional capacity of the local governments in 
Ukraine must be enhanced. Th e goal should be to 
obtain international standards in the delivery of 
public services. Enhanced capacity will make 
possible implementation of the principles of  trans-
parency, subsidiarity, sharing of responsibilities, 
and economy of scale, in addition to clearly 
deﬁ ning “who does what,” etc.
• Public involvement in the budget process on the 
local level must be increased and institutionalized. 
Together with the formula-based approach to 
equalization this would increase institutional capa-
city, create conditions for greater accountability 
of LGs, and make possible the transfer of more 
responsibilities from the center downwards. 
6.2.2 Approaches
Improvements to the expenditure calculation. Intergov-
ernmental ﬁ scal relations in Ukraine involve the cal-
culation of the expenditure needs of 680 local budgets 
for oblast level administrations, cities, and rayons. 
Th e formula with the changes for 2001—presented 
in the government’s 2000 document—is only the ﬁ rst 
step. For budgetary purposes attempts are now being 
made to disaggregate this formula into the constitu-
ent transfer-related expenditure needs of the diﬀ erent 
tiers of SNGs which comprise any oblast. Th e disag-
gregating process requires some modiﬁ cations of the 
preceding formula (FAO 2002). Such modiﬁ cations 
are prepared within MoF, which take the form of par-
titioning the functional expenditure categories among 
the diﬀ erent tiers of SNGs according to their respec-
tive expenditure assignments in each spending cat-
egory. When this is done, the calculation of per capita 
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expenditure needs for the j’th city or rayon within an 
oblast will be guided by the following formula:
Vj/Pj = V/Pu[ϕAφj
A + ϕHKiφj
H + ϕE(Sj/Pj ÷ Su/Pu) + 
ϕCSϕj
CS + ϕS(Rj/Pj ÷Ru/Pu)]
where
ϕj: the share of total oblast expenditure undertaken 
by either all cities or all rayons within the oblast 
for each of the functional expenditure categories 
labelled as A, H, and CS. 
Th e new variables appearing in the proposed 
formula, in the form of φ, are allocation variables 
designed to consistently allocate functional spending 
needs among diﬀ erent tiers of local government. For 
example, in the cases of health care, public adminis-
tration, and culture and sports, the values for the φ 
variable have been established by the MoF from his-
torical data. With regard to health care, this variable 
has a value of 0.34 for oblast administrations, 0.36 
for cities, and 0.3 for rayons. In the case of physical 
ﬁ tness and sports, oblasts have been assigned a value 
of 0.4 while cities and rayons have a value of 0.6. For 
administration, the MoF sets diﬀ erent values for cit-
ies and for rayons. Obviously these values take into 
account the proportion of the population residing 
in cities and rayons. If, however, the formula were to 
apply the parameter of general expenditures on a per 
capita basis, this variable would have a value of 0.1 for 
oblast levels and 0.9 for both cities and rayons. Th e 
level of per capita expenditure established for an oblast 
is simply a variant of the formula for a city or rayon. 
Improvement of revenue estimation. In introduc-
ing the new changes, CG must limit opportunities 
for intervention in the calculation and for changing 
the “rules of the game” during the ﬁ nancial year. CG 
regulations must preclude arbitrary decision-making. 
As discussed earlier, the revenue equalization coeﬃ  -
cients introduced in 2001, alpha and beta, do not add 
to the transparency of the intergovernmental budget 
process; the new equalization coeﬃ  cients create more 
space for arbitrary and nontransparent decision-mak-
ing in intergovernmental budget relations. 
A deﬁ nition of the status of the recipient local 
government budget must be developed and published. 
Th e introduction to the new equalization coeﬃ  cients 
(CM 2001) contains a passage that states, “during 
the calculations of the intergovernmental budget 
transfers for the FY 2002, alpha (i) is taken as equal 
to 1 in the case of local government budgets which 
are considered as recipients.” Such deﬁ nitions and 
the corresponding equalization policy must give LGs 
incentives to increase their revenue base. 
To improve revenue distribution and the equal-
ization process, the Tax Code must be adopted and 
the tax administration system changed. 
Changes must be introduced which will reduce or 
prevent upper level governments from discriminating 
against the interests of LGs. For example, until now, 
payments from the land tax have not been distributed 
in line with the provisions of the BC. Th e Code stipu-
lates that 60 percent of these proceeds should be re-
tained by town, villages and settlements, and only 15 
percent of these proceeds should accrue to the rayon 
district budget. In real life, however, the entire pro-
ceeds from the land tax is a revenue source within the 
rayon district budget. Th is practice can be explained 
by the concentration of power on the oblast level, 
which discriminates against the local (sub-rayon) go-
vernments. 
Horizontal cooperation as a way towards improved 
ﬁ scal equalization. Horizontal equalization grants 
between communities could be introduced which 
would be calculated on the basis of the actual budget 
execution. Th e aim of these grants is to use own LG 
revenues more eﬀ ectively and redistribute them in the 
common interest, ﬁ rst of all, in meeting the needs 
and interests of the revenue-poorer self-governments. 
Th e second important issue, which could be resolved 
by this approach, is to provide the LGs with the op-
portunity to choose their partners for the execution of 
some functions. Th is recommendation is in line with 
BC articles, which declare that transfers may also oc-
cur between self-government budgets in exchange for 
contractually provided, and mutually agreed upon, 
public services. For example, towns, villages, and set-
tlements may choose among themselves or contract 
another LG to provide assigned services. Th is may be 
necessitated by economic, historical, and geographic 
factors (economies of scale, more eﬃ  cient provision of 
particular services by another LG, more convenient 
location of facilities, etc.). Such responsibilities are 
presently fulﬁ lled by the oblast and rayon authorities, 
which are perceived by the local community as “up-
per levels of power.”
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Th e proposed approach provides a base for collabor-
ation amongst LGs belonging to diﬀ erent administ-
rative-territorial units. Horizontally cooperating LGs 
can belong to diﬀ erent oblasts, or to diﬀ erent rayons 
within a single oblast. Th ey can create new governing 
bodies, or choose to delegate responsibility to an LG 
from among themselves to manage funds which are 
now usually transferred to and/or redistributed by 
rayon or oblast. Local governments can also combine 
their resources, attracting domestic and foreign 
investors in order to develop infrastructure and raise 
their tax base in the future.3 Such mutually beneﬁ cial 
projects are important and will create a favorable 
social, economic, and political environment. 
Under such arrangements, LGs would be account-
able to the population of involved communities for 
the provision of certain public services. In this case, 
criteria are needed for evaluating the eﬀ ectiveness of 
public resource allocation; special committees with 
representatives of local communities and self-govern-
ments must be established to monitor and evaluate 
eﬀ ect-iveness of service provision.
Such an approach would contribute to the end 
of administrative-territorial reform. No one can fore-
cast the ﬁ nal composition of the country, but such 
horizontal cooperation would facilitate some obvious 
trends. Th e oblast and rayon authorities of related 
territories would be obliged to clarify their role and 
function. Rayons are more likely to become local self-
governments with all the prerequisites and responsi-
bilities needed to be able to serve as eﬀ ective partners 
in diﬀ erent forms of horizontal cooperation. Whereas 
the oblast level is becoming more of a CG representa-
tive, with competencies more geared towards control, 
supervision, and consultation of LGs. 
Political resistance to this approach can be ex-
pected from some oblast and rayon powers, who 
are committed to conserving their role of “invisible 
power” in the redistribution of public ﬁ nance. In 
response, CG may take a deﬁ nite and consistent posi-
tion; LGs may develop a shared strategic vision; and 
the respective community may voice support for the 
declared policy. Finally, a series of pilot initiatives in 
this ﬁ eld are soon to be launched.
Local spending programs. One of the problems of 
local spending programs is that while local commu-
nities with a suﬃ  cient revenue base, in theory, may 
launch their own expenditure programs to support 
education, others cannot. On the other hand, even 
the additional resources to be had cannot be used ef-
fectively under the existing conditions. Other issues 
concern the shortcomings of the methodology by 
which educational norms are calculated, which ties 
educational ﬁ nance to the administrative unit and 
not to the service consumer.
To resolve the two problems—of disparity of 
revenue capacity among diﬀ erent LGs and ineﬀ ec-
tive norms in school provision—educational districts 
might be established. Th is is especially topical for 
rural areas, where in many cases the location of, and 
distances between schools, and villages result in inef-
ﬁ cient educational norms of school provision.
Educational districts would give relatively wealthy 
LGs the opportunity to devote a larger portion of 
their revenues to education. For these purposes ad-
ditional taxes or duties could be introduced by local 
governments (the BC and other state documents fore-
see this). Other poorer local communities, which be-
fore had only central government transfers to rely on, 
under the new approach would have the opportunity 
to receive additional resources distributed within the 
educational district.
Th e new territorial education (school) districts 
would not be obligatory and must cover the borders 
of the administrative unit. Which means that along 
with state governance of education on the territories 
(oblast- and rayon-level educational administrations), 
a new educational authority would need to be em-
powered by the local communities of small towns, 
settlements, and villages. Governmental bodies would 
then be more ﬂ exible in meeting the needs of the 
community. Th e activities of these community-based 
educational authorities, of the newly established 
educational districts, would assist in distributing 
central budget money more transparently and eﬃ  -
ciently. Also, there is a good chance that additional 
funds (part of the own revenues of local government 
budgets, speciﬁ c educational taxes and duties, and 
other possible incomes) could be attracted to pro-
vide additional resources for schools and educational 
services. 
Th e second means of resolving these issues is to 
establish self-government committees at the school 
level, which would include parents, businesses, and 
local NGOs. Representatives of these committees 
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would be responsible for strategic planning and deter-
mining the use of school resources.
School self-government committees and com-
munity-based councils of educational districts can 
be agents to cooperative agreements on the use of the 
additional funding attracted through the new struc-
ture. Both units—educational councils and school 
committees—could also contract out the provision of 
public services to other agents. Such contracting out 
may include repairing and reconstruction of school 
facilities to reduce heating and other communal 
expenses; micro-planning in developing school infra-
structure with the help of local community experts; 
provision of computers and equipment to schools and 
publishing of textbooks; retraining of teachers and 
managerial staﬀ  of schools; etc. All these activities 
would help to reduce the ineﬃ  cient distribution of 
resources and increase the quality of the educational 
process. 
Such innovation would help promote greater 
transparency and implementation of the subsidi-
arity principle, which is now a primary concern in 
determining the needed changes to the delivery of 
educational services. Possible consequences of new 
educational districts are the following:
• Communities and local authorities of towns, vil-
lages, and settlements would become exclusively 
responsible for the provision of preschool and 
general educational services and would be given 
more ﬁ scal responsibility than they currently exer-
cise.
• School districts would be responsible for the 
provision of all specialized educational services 
such as art schools and sports academies, proﬁ le 
schools, lyceums, gymnasia, etc., in the interest of 
creating an integrated educational network.
6.2.3 Implementation
Implementation of the above-mentioned approaches 
can be carried out through local pilot projects. Th ese 
projects must be organized within the following 
frameworks:
1) Intergovernmental Contract (Social Agreement)
 Contracting agencies: local government, territorial 
community (coalition of NGOs, regional depart-
ments of trade unions, parties), and central gov-
ernment (MoF, oblast or rayon state administra-
tion).
 Subject of contract: fulﬁ llment of their obligations 
in the provision of speciﬁ ed public services.
 Responsibilities of contracting agents (“rules of the 
game”): 
 a) Execution of expenditures of LG budgets
 b) Equalization of LG expenditure needs through 
central budget
 c) Equalization of the LG expenditures through 
horizontal cooperation
 d) Activities of the stakeholders and representa-
tives of contracting agencies when other parties 
to the contract fail to meet their obligations 
e.g., in cases where: funding is not disbursed 
by CG either in full or on time, and in other 
similar cases.
2) Municipal Loans 
 Covering deﬁ cits of local budgets by borrowing 
on the ﬁ nancial markets is prohibited in Ukraine. 
But in some cases (arrears caused by external fac-
tors) it can be justiﬁ ed. A portion of the interest 
could then be covered at the expense of other 
governments who are responsible for the SNG’s 
budget deﬁ cit. For this purpose too, the “inter-
governmental contract approach” can be helpful. 
But in general, LG borrowing on ﬁ nancial mar-
kets is not very successful in Ukraine (East-West 
Institute 2000). 
  Some resources, aimed at covering certain LG 
expenditure needs and/or increased ﬁ scal capacity 
of local government budgets, may be suggested 
by the ﬁ nancial institute acting in cooperation 
with LGs. Th ese ﬁ nancial resources must be 
allocated to the improvement of infrastructures 
or to projects aimed at bettering public service 
delivery and increasing the own and shared tax 
base of the local government over the mid- to 
long-term. Th e CG budget could support such 
borrowing in two ways: by providing guarantees 
to ﬁ nancial institutions participating in such 
transactions and, through oblast-level budgets, by 
intergovernmental (within oblast) transfers which 
would cover risk of nonpayment of interest or 
arrears in repayment of the loan. 
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3) Supporting Projects Eﬀ ecting Systemic Change
 Th e new equalization instruments could be im-
plemented through a number of pilot projects on 
the local level. Th ese projects must be conducted 
by nongovernmental as well as governmental 
organizations in close cooperation with business 
and the public at large. Th ey must be supported 
by the improvement of ﬁ scal decentralization 
policy on the central level in the following areas.
Policy analysis, research and formulation
 • Adjustment of Ukrainian legislation in the 
area of intergovernmental relations to the 
requirements of the European Community. 
Policymaking and document development 
projects must be launched, including analyti-
cal policy paper development and changes to 
legislation in connection with intergovern-
mental ﬁ scal relations (Local Self-Government 
Law, Tax Code, Budget Code, Municipal 
Service Law, Municipal Property Law, Law on 
Not-For-Proﬁ t Organizations, etc.). Th is pro-
cess must be based on a changing approach 
to policymaking on all governmental levels.
 • Consultations with community, independent 
experts, involvement of foreign experts in the 
policymaking process. Th is project area must 
include diﬀ erent forms of public consulta-
tions, debates, and discussions of the draft 
policy papers and analytical documents pre-
pared in the above project area.
Human resource development and training
 • Introduction of education and training prog-
rams at schools, universities, and post-diploma 
educational institutions in order to facilitate 
community participation in the policy proc-
ess aimed at the improvement of intergovern-
mental relations. 
 • Development of human resources for the 
above projects areas through the in-service 
training of municipal, CG and NGO repre-
sentatives, who work within intergovernmen-
tal ﬁ scal relations and with related issues in 
their everyday practice. Th is project area must 
be organized like a virtual college (or distance 
learning network) involving municipal man-
agers of post-Soviet countries. Th ey would 
create self-organized international teams col-
laborating with each other on projects in their 
respective country’s local governments, within 
cross-regional programs. Professional growth 
in the related ﬁ elds of public/municipal serv-
ice and political, research, or academic careers 
would provide the incentive to participate.  
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ENDNOTES
1 Th is chapter is based on analytical materials 
posted on the website of the Fiscal Analysis Group 
(www.fao.kyiv.ua) and on governmental docu-
ments on equalization issued in 2000 and 2001.
2 For a detailed analysis of education management 
in Ukraine, see Lukovenko et al. 2002.
3 Th ere are some pilot projects pursuing community 
interests, which are represented by the association 
of LGs. Take for example, the territory of “Big 
Sudak,” where some “poor” rural LGs combine 
resources with wealthier urban LGs. All of them 
have good potential for economic development 
because of the favorable location and opportuni-
ties for the development of small businesses and 
tourism. Each LG’s potential can be better used 
with the coordination of activities and combining 
of resources. Moreover, such collaboration helps 
to attract investments in infrastructure and his-
torical heritage reconstruction, which beneﬁ ts all. 
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ANNEX
Statistical Data on Subnational Finance and Public Service Delivery in Ukraine
Table 4A.1
Share of Local Taxes and Duties in Local Government Revenues (without transfers from other budgets) [%] 
Year Consolidated 
Budget
Oblast 
Budgets
Cities of Oblast 
Signifi cance
Rayon 
Budgets
Cities of Rayon 
Signifi cance
Urban 
Settlements
Rural 
Settlements
1992 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.01 1.54 0.83 0.61
1993 0.13 0.00 0.27 0.03 0.34 0.10 0.63
1994 0.51 0.02 0.83 0.12 2.54 1.56 0.49
1995 1.46 0.35 2.96 0.35 8.86 6.94 1.90
1996 2.63 0.67 5.28 0.63 13.14 12.90 4.33
1997 2.94 0.78 5.42 1.24 15.38 14.38 5.21
1998 2.97 0.41 2.40 5.80 15.66 16.43 5.93
1999 3.36 0.29 3.16 6.66 14.59 16.41 6.88
2000 3.65 0.28 5.92 3.35 12.23 14.27 5.29
Source: S. Slukhai 2002.
Table 4A.2
Medical Service Levels in 1999, by City
 City Number of Places in Hospitals 
per 1,000 Population
Number of Daily Attendencies 
of Ambulatory-Polyclinical Entities 
per 1000 Population
Cities of State Signiﬁ cance 
Kyiv 11.7 31.2
Oblast Centers 
Kharkiv 11.1 23.2
Zaporizhzhia 8.4 11.6
Lviv 15.39 23.6
Mykolaiv 14 17.3
Lugansk 15.1 23.1
Kherson 6 23.4
Poltava 12.1 23.3
Cherkasy 6.5 22
Zhytomir 4.1 18.8
Sumy 13.9  
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 City Number of Places in Hospitals 
per 1,000 Population
Number of Daily Attendencies 
of Ambulatory-Polyclinical Entities 
per 1000 Population
Kirovohrad 5.7 12.5
Chernivtsy 19.1 23.2
Khmelnitsky 15.1 26.3
Ivano-Frankivsk 17.9 23
Rivne 11.3 23.5
Uzhgorod 22.1 27.7
Cities of Oblast Signiﬁ cance
Makiivka 7.9 26.8
Dniprodzerzhinsk 7.4 18.7
Kremenchuk 8.8 21.4
Bila Tserkva 8.5 22.1
Kerch 8 18.7
Lisichansk 10 23.9
Severodonetsk 7.9 25.6
Berdiansk 7 ... 
Alchevsk 11.5 16.4
Kamianets-Podilsky 7.3 19.2
YenaKyivo 7.5 16.3
Drogobitch 10.3 25.1
Konotop 10.9 20.1
Uman 8.6 27.7
Shostka 8.3 80.2
Berdichiv 5 19.7
Krasnormiysk 7.8 11.3
Nizhin 8.3 14.3
Druzhkivka 7.1 27.4
Lozova 5.5 19
Kovel 14 — 
Kupiansk 11.9 25.4
Striy 12.7 17.8
Kolomiya 7.7 10
Korosten 7.8 22.4
Svitlovodsk 7.1 15.9
Table 4A.2 (continued)
Medical Service Levels in 1999, by City
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 City Number of Places in Hospitals 
per 1,000 Population
Number of Daily Attendencies 
of Ambulatory-Polyclinical Entities 
per 1000 Population
Dmytriv 7.6 37.7
Energodar 7.5 25.5
Novograd-Volynske … 21.1
Debalzeve 6.6 25.9
Borispil 5.9 40.3
Marganets 72 15.9
Komsomolsk 5.6 23.7
Fastiv 12 18
Shepetivka 11.5 93.2
Voznesensk 12 22
Kahovka 10.5 14.3
Yuzhnoukrainsk 6.4 21.1
Vasylkiv 6.1 15.2
Pervomaiski 5.2 12
Cheguiv 5.6 11.5
Gluhiv 5.1 24.2
Mogiliv-Podolsky 6.1 19.6
Netishin 6.1 26.6
Znamianka 15.3 23.8
Lebedyn 5.3 18.6
Zolotonosha 11.7 20.4
Krasnoperekopsk 4.1 14.2
Pereyaslav-Khmelnitskiy 5.6 16.8
Pershotravensk 7.7 52.3
Slavutych 8.3 29.2
Truskavets 10 16.3
Cities of Rayon Signiﬁ cance
Kostopil 3.1 19.4
Sarny 11.7 25.3
Polonne 11.9 57.5
Novy Bug 7.2 96.3
Pogrebysche 27.2 22.7
ASD for oblast centers 5.04 4.40
Table 4A.2 (continued)
Medical Service Levels in 1999, by City
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 City Number of Places in Hospitals 
per 1,000 Population
Number of Daily Attendencies 
of Ambulatory-Polyclinical Entities 
per 1000 Population
Average 12.36 21.5
CV, percent 42 18
ASD for cities of oblast signiﬁ cance 9.09 14.52
Average 9.50 24.09
CV, percent 90 63
ASD for cities of rayon signiﬁ cance 8.16 29.41
Average 12 44
CV, percent 67 66
ASD—Average Square Deviation; CV—Coeﬃ  cient of Variation.
Source: ACU 2000.
Table 4A.3
Debts in Educational Sector in Lviv Oblast (as of 1 January 2000), UAH [thousand]
Rayons and Cities of Rayon 
and Oblast Signifi cance
Total Salaries Utilities
Brody 139.6 10.8 25.6
Brody 33.3 10.8 12.6
Busk 190.1  106.9
Busk 57.6  49.5
Gorodok 712.3 2.7 493.0
Gorodok 257.1  147.4
Komarno 6.8  4.0
Drogobych 106.2  80.6
Zhydachiv 516.4 157.1 210.5
Zhydachiv 33.8  25.9
Khodorov 21.1  14.3
Zhovkiv 321.6 0.5 235.3
Zhovkva 5.8  5.8
Dubliany 33.0  33.0
Rava-Rusa 26.4  26.4
Zolochiv 275.1 18.4 122.4
Zolochiv 14.4  14.4
Glyniany 2.2  0.0
Table 4A.2 (continued)
Medical Service Levels in 1999, by City
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Rayons and Cities of Rayon 
and Oblast Signifi cance
Total Salaries Utilities
Kamianka Buzka 545.0 8.4 348.6
Kamianka Buzka 32.4 6.5 0.7
Mykolaiv 724.7 1.8 347.0
Mykolaiv 134.3  111.3
Novy Rozdil 231.5  94.1
Mostyska 141.4 7.3 76.2
Mostyska 42.6 4.4 36.2
Sudova Vishnia 10.7  6.3
Peremyshliany 322.6  250.9
Peremyshliany 79.3  73.6
Bibraka 107.1  107.1
Pustomyty 236.4  103.6
Pustomyty 86.4  76.5
Radehiv 494.9 2.9 148.0
Radehiv 25.1  24.1
Sambir 70.8 0.1 26.9
Rudki 0.0  0.0
Skol 24.8  14.4
Skol 1.9  1.9
Sokal 756.6 2.2 479.6
Sokal 256.8  220.1
Belz 51.7  28.6
Velyki Mosty 23.2  18.2
Ugniv 0.1  0.0
Starosambir 383.5  294.6
Stary Sambir 106.2  102.1
Dobromil 20.9  19.8
Horiv 14.6  13.2
Striy 682.5 225.0 13.0
Morshin 36.6  7.7
Turka 205.7  135.2
Turka 0.0  0.0
Yavoriv 567.3 0.7 419.1
Table 4A.3 (continued)
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Rayons and Cities of Rayon 
and Oblast Signifi cance
Total Salaries Utilities
Yavoriv 7.7  0.1
Novoyavorivske 313.4  308.5
ASD 216.2 62.7 129.3
Average 179.1 28.7 104.1
CV 120.67 217.24 124.04
Cities of Oblast Signiﬁ cance 
Lviv 3,469.6 1229.6 1051.0
Borislav 176.2 0.7 129.7
Drogobych 497.7 180.7 179.6
Sambir 212.6 1.9 161.1
Striy 662.1 131.6 319.8
Truskavets 515.7 0.0 472.8
Chervonograd 554.7 236.6 157.5
ASD 1,074.3 407.9 306.5
Average 869.8 254.4 353.1
CV 123.45 160.63 86.97
Rayons Total 7,417.5 437.9 3,931.4
Cities of Rayon Signiﬁ cance 2,074.0 21.7 1,583.4
Total for Cities of Oblast Signiﬁ cance 6,088.6 1781.1 2471.5
Source: FAO 2000.
Table 4A.3 (continued)
Debts in Educational Sector in Lviv Oblast (as of 1 January 2000), UAH [thousand]
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Table 4A.4
Expected and Actual Local Budget Expenditures, as Percentage of National Average
Regions 1993 
Expected
1993
Actual
1997
Expected
1997
Actual
1998
Expected
1998
Actual
1999
Expected
1999
Actual
AR Crimea 116.3 142.8 96.0 98.8 93.8 89.5 96.5 97.9
Vinnitsa 90.9 85.2 92.9 82.7 90.9 73.9 89.6 70.6
Volyn 99.6 89.1 115.5 84.1 100.4 80.9 110.6 85.2
Dnipropetrovsk 123.3 96.8 103.1 139.6 107.6 99.7 102.0 87.0
Donetsk 99.9 93.3 95.8 104.3 99.7 108.4 93.5 88.7
Zhytomyr 98.4 116.6 124.9 105.7 120.6 99.8 116.4 99.2
Zakarpattia 84.5 68.0 99.9 79.3 91.7 77.4 112.6 107.4
Zaporizhzhia 108.5 139.5 99.3 92.8 110.7 108.1 100.0 118.7
Ivano-Frankivsk 80.3 68.5 96.6 81.5 93.2 82.1 103.5 102.4
Kyiv oblast 92.5 118.9 97.0 88.1 118.2 112.9 126.7 159.4
Kirovohrad 106.6 99.7 104.0 84.3 99.3 77.9 104.3 86.0
Luhansk 96.6 80.6 94.0 86.5 95.6 77.1 91.0 84.7
Lviv 84.8 81.6 96.7 78.5 96.6 77.7 96.7 92.1
Mykolaiv 98.0 109.8 100.0 104.3 96.6 110.5 94.3 97.0
Odesa 94.2 84.8 85.6 83.8 88.6 85.5 85.8 92.7
Poltava 88.3 85.3 99.8 113.3 101.7 157.4 104.1 138.9
Rivne 91.7 97.6 97.1 81.6 90.1 89.6 101.5 124.7
Sumy 94.1 93.6 98.1 88.6 99.4 87.3 94.6 80.6
Ternopil 98.7 78.2 96.8 81.1 90.2 74.9 108.7 76.8
Kharkiv 93.6 83.0 700.0 123.6 100.7 129.8 92.3 105.6
Kherson 111.3 116.6 100.3 92.3 96.2 80.2 100.0 77.4
Khmelnytsk 83.8 87.6 99.8 86.1 95.4 86.8 95.7 84.9
Cherkasy 111.8 90.5 107.7 101.8 108.8 100.9 109.1 105.8
Chernivtsi 91.6 97.7 94.2 80.6 86.0 74.6 93.3 63.8
Chernihiv 90.0 75.0 104.1 90.2 100.4 73.9 103.0 78.7
Kyiv city 125.9 182.1 118.2 152.0 109.6 181.2 19.9 163.0
Total for Ukraine 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Min 80.3 68.0 85.6 78.5 86.0 73.9 85.8 63.8
Min 125.9 182.1 124.9 152.0 120.6 181.2 126.7 163.0
Source: Lunina 2000.
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Table 4A.5
Taxes under STA Control, calculated at UAH 1 of added value (kopeck/UAH rate) [Percent]
Region 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 Deviation
Th e Crimea 38 35 34 32 23 121,9
Vinnitsa 21 22 22 19 14 71,9
Volyn 21 20 21 21 18 96,3
Dnipropetrovsk 30 25 29 22 17 87,5
Donetsk 25 28 27 23 18 92,6
Zhytomyr 24 23 23 21 12 64,7
Zakarpattia 23 25 24 24 14 72,5
Zaporizhzhia 32 26 23 22 17 87,5
Ivano-Frankivsk 34 36 34 28 15 81,3
Kyiv oblast 22 22 23 21 12 61,9
Kirovohrad 21 24 25 23 16 85,1
Luhansk 21 25 26 21 13 68,2
Lviv 44 36 36 33 21 112,0
Mykolaiv 24 25 25 28 19 102,3
 Odesa 29 29 28 26 21 112,3
Poltava 33 36 43 42 26 136,8
Rivne 22 22 22 21 10 52,8
Sumy 31 36 34 24 24 128,1
Ternopil 21 21 24 22 11 59,4
Kharkiv 37 43 39 36 19 100,5
Kherson 24 22 22 21 13 66,8 
Khmelnytsk 21 21 21 20 11 58,6
Cherkasy 26 26 29 28 17 89,1 
Chernivtsi 24 22 25 27 14 74,2
Chernihiv 31 28 30 26 20 105,1
Kyiv city 50 66 47 51 32 166,1
Total for Ukraine 30 31 30 28 19 100,0 
Max 50 66 47 51 32 166,1
Min 21 20 21 19 10 52,8
Sources: Lunina 2000; AHT 2001.
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Each year LGI selects talented professionals to partici-
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associations, policy researchers and policy advisers. 
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which are then supervised by expert mentors.  Fellows 
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comparable research agendas.  
Th e four fellowship topics for 2002–2003 are: 
the digital divide and e-democracy in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia; housing the poor in major urban 
centers; decentralization and transformation of the 
governance of education; and administrative remedies 
for abuses at the local level.
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